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1.0 Introduction 
On December 12th 1993 the Russians were about to elect their new national assembly: The 
State Duma. Nearly 106 million registered voters were allowed to participate in the election. 
This was the first election contested by several political parties since the early experiences in 
the beginning of the 20th century. 
  
Since then Russia has been through three presidential elections and three parliamentary 
elections as well as local parliamentary elections. According to many observers the transition 
is still going on and not completed (See for instance Rose and Munroe 2002, Herspring (Ed) 
2005 and Sakwa 2002). Democracy is not yet “the only game in town”. Others claim that 
Russia has made serious steps towards a democratic society and that the elections have proven 
to be fair.  
 
The question to be asked is: what kind of electoral pattern has emerged? Can we talk about 
some kind of stable relationship between party preference and demographic attributes and 
opinions? In other words are the parties represented in the Duma a manifestation of latent 
cleavages in the Russian society?  
 
The question of cleavage is what this thesis intends to explore. We will try to uncover the 
Russian society, by trying to find cleavages in it, and to examine how these are manifested in 
the political spheres with specific attention to political parties.  
 
There are several ways to approach a problem like this. What we intend to do is to find out 
what characterises the voters of the respective parties represented in the Russian State Duma. 
By using surveys we shall be able to track down demographical, geographical as well as 
attitudinal characteristics.  
 
 We can roughly say that there are three issues to be taken into considerations in this thesis: 
 
I. What kind of latent cleavages exist in the post communist Russian society? 
II. What kind of latent cleavages have managed to manifest themselves as political 
parties? 
III. Can this manifestation lead to a stabilised democracy in Russia? 
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The question of how to measure cleavages and what a cleavage is will be further discussed in 
the theoretical and the methodological chapter.  
1.1 Why Russia? 
Why is Russia an interesting case in this the context of cleavage? Russia is interesting for 
numerous reasons. But one of my main ambitions was that I’d like to make a conceptual 
travel to Russia. My luggage was loaded with concepts initially developed for a Western 
European space. When Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset viewed the European 
political landscape at the end of the 1960s they were struck by the similarities they found with 
the political landscape in the 1930s (Aardal 1994). In the same fashion I will try to look at the 
political landscape in present Russian society. I expect to find patterns that can be explained 
by conflicts that have historical roots. One could also expect to find patterns whose origin is 
rooted in the post communist period and which do not necessarily reflect any historical roots 
per se. 
 
One interesting aspect with Russia is its geographical position. We can argue that Russia is 
located in two different ways. The country is situated both between Europe and Asia, and it is 
European and Asian. Following this you can view Russia as an exceptional country not 
belonging to any of the parts, and a country belonging to both areas. This has been an 
important aspect for the Russian identity. The question of where to look, whether to the 
westwards, eastwards or inwards, is always crucial for the Russian society. 
 
Russia is often criticised for not fulfilling the democratic norms. Russians and President 
Vladimir Putin usually respond that Russia will develop its own kind of democracy based on 
Russia’s own tradition and culture (Shevtsova 2005).  From a comparative perspective we 
might ask whether we are dealing with a subtype of democracy or just mixing oranges and 
apples. To answer this question one must decide how to view democracy. Is it a dichotomous 
variable meaning that a system is democratic or not, or is democracy a continuous variable 
where you have a scale from 1-10 judging the degree of democracy within a given society? 
 
Although the main focus in this thesis will rest on the parliamentary elections, it is important 
to stress the institutional design of the Russian Federation. Russia is usually described as a 
semi presidential regime with a very strong president (see for instance Brown 2001 and 
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Sakwa 2002).  This will be further elaborated in the next chapters but for the moment we can 
assume that the presidential elections have important consequences for the Duma elections. 
These consequences are not only limited to the election results, i.e. who is elected president, 
but the very circumstances before and after the elections. This institutional design also plays a 
major role in determining how the political parties are organised. In addition the institutional 
approach is useful in explaining the parties’ behaviour both towards the electorate and on the 
parliamentary arena.  
 
As mentioned above one interesting aspect of studying a case like Russia is to see how it 
develops according to established theories and models originally used on the developed 
world. In this respect the thesis will not limit itself to the concept of cleavage but include 
general theories of party development as well. This will also include the effect of election 
procedures and methods.  
 
We will specifically deal with political parties represented in the Russian State Duma. By 
analysing a wide range of opinion and exit polls it will be possible to get an understanding of 
how the Russian political society has developed so far, both at a macro and micro level.  
 
The discourse between micro and macro is in general a very interesting topic. How were the 
political parties established? How do parties respond to public demands? How are the 
political parties organized? These are just a few of many questions concerning this discourse. 
This topic is however beyond the scope of this thesis, but some points will be included. First 
of all it is important to note how the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy 
was conducted. Was it coming from below or was it a staged coup d’etat? The immediate 
reactions in the aftermath of the transition are also of crucial importance. The way the 
political parties are organised will also be given some attention.  
 
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
The next chapter will deal with a very short history of Russia. Chapter three will present the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. In particular three aspects will be covered. First we will 
study party and party system theory. The second part will deal with legislative theory and how 
parties respond to different institutional mechanisms. The last part of our theory chapter will 
deal with a conceptualization of the concept of cleavage. In chapter four this theoretical 
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framework will be applied on the Russian case. The next chapters will deal with how the 
Russian political system has developed since the collapse of the communist regime. Here we 
will specifically look at how the State Duma is organised. Furthermore we will study the 
election results to the Duma in detail, and present the most important political parties 
contesting them. The methodological issues dealt with in chapter seven will provide the 
reader with an insight into how we are going to measure cleavage. In chapter eight we will 
study the cleavages using the tools presented in the methodological and theoretical chapter. In 
the final chapter we will discuss results as well as prospects for the future.  
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2.0 Empire-, State- and Nation building in Russia: A brief history 
In the following chapter we will try to track down some important aspects of the history of the 
Russian society. More specifically we will deal with the evolution of the political system. 
This will of course be a selection of important independent variables, and many scholars will 
argue a biased selection. But again the purpose is not to cover the entire Russian history, but 
to try to find some explanations of the pattern we find in the Russian society. Broadly 
speaking we are seeking to clarify two aspect of society. First of all we will seek explanations 
for the institutional design of today’s Russia. Why did Russians choose a strong presidency? 
Why a federal state system and not a unitary system.1 The second aspect of Russian society 
which we will seek to explain (with history) is located at the micro-level. Why do certain 
people display some attitudes while others not. In other words, why are there latent cleavages 
among some people in a given area, while these do not exist in others?  
2.1 Russia’s geographic position  
Broadly speaking we can distinguish between two main categories that constitute the 
evolution of regime types. First of all we are dealing with factors that are, at least at the 
beginning beyond human control and influence. These are natural factors like climate, 
vegetation, rivers, landscape and so on. The second main category includes factors that 
humans do control. Here we deal with choices by the rulers or the ruled.  
 
As Richard Pipes wrote 30 years ago: 
 
The contemporary western reader has little patience for physical geography, and 
understandably so, because science and technology have to an unprecedented degree 
liberated him from dependence on nature (Pipes 1995:2). 
 
The geographical variables are very important when viewing Russian history. Simply put we 
can say that Russia is an enormous country in terms of size. If including the Kaliningrad 
enclave Russia has eleven time zones. When the voter in Vladivostok votes for a parliament 
situated in Moscow, it would almost be the same as a Norwegian voter in Bergen voted for a 
parliament situated in Chicago (US).  
 
                                                
1 Here we must distinguish between a de facto and a de jure federal system. Many will argue that Russia is a de 
facto unitary political system, with all powers located in Moscow.  
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The most usual way of viewing Russia is by dividing the country in three zones using 
vegetation as a criterion. The first zone is the tundra positioned north of the artic circle. This 
area is characterised by sparse resources and cannot support human life. About 15 percent of 
Russia can be characterised as tundra. South of the tundra we find Taiga, the forest zone. This 
zone is divided in two parts, one which consists of pine forest and on consisting of mixed 
trees. This is the largest zone in Russia stretching from the western to the eastern border. The 
last zone is the steppe zone. When considering the soil and its fertility the steppe zone differs 
from the others. It is here that we find the black earth called chernozem. 
 
The climate in Russia is not very suitable for agriculture. The climate is characterised as a 
continental one, meaning cold winters and hot summers. In Russia the winter is indeed cold 
but also long. At the same time the rain comes at the “wrong” time of the year, during the 
harvest. The net effect of the climate and the vegetation is an agricultural system that hardly 
grows and cumulates. This in turn effected the societal development as Pipes writes:  
 
Unfavourable natural conditions made for low yields; low yields resulted in poverty; 
poverty meant that there were no buyers for agricultural produce; the lack of buyers 
discourages yield improvements (Pipes 1995:9). 
 
The political consequence of the poor soil was expansion. The need for new land was always 
present, and the direction of the expansion went from west to the south and eventually south 
east. The enormous territory had to be governed, and the size, vegetation and climate partly 
explain the political system in tsarist Russia.  
 
One can appreciate, if not accept, the opinion of those thinkers, prominent in the 
Enlightenment and present in other periods, who related the system of government of a 
country directly to its size and declared despotism to be the natural form of rule in 
Russia (Riasanovsky 1993:8-9). 
 
 
Hence the Russian expansion remained quite different from the Western European expansion/ 
colonization of the third world. As Pipes wrote:  
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…unlike the great European powers and Japan whose imperialism represented an 
overflow of national wealth in search of profitable investments outlets or fresh 
markets, Russian imperialism was an escape from poverty (Pipes in Dalin and Lapidus 
1991:23). 
 
We have thus so far briefly touched the geographic variable and it’s consequence on the 
Tsarist regime. Again it is not my intention to summarise the Russian history between these 
pages, but there is one further element of the Tsarist regime that needs some considerations. 
The regime was not static in terms of institutional design. In particular the 19th century was 
quite dynamic witnessing many reforms which were highlighted in the 1860s. “In spite of the 
obvious limitations, these reforms mark a watershed in Russian history. They represent the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism in Russia (Egge 2002:29 own translation). It is also 
worth to give heed to the fact that the 19th century also saw the rise of some oppositional 
forces within the society, what is usually described as the intelligentsia. An important 
discourse from this period is a conflict between the so called Westernisers (Zapadniki) and the 
Slavophiles. This conflict will be studied in detail in chapter four.  
 
Russian pre communists (and communist as well) history is characterised by its expansion. 
The expansion required a centralised state. This centralisation was established in many ways. 
What is highlighted as one of the main distinctions of Russia was the fact that the nobility was 
not able to consolidate their position in Society.  
 
2.2 Communist regime 
There is a vide range of literature on the communist period in Russia. The limitations (both in 
time and space) of the thesis force us to deal with this in a short manner. The communist 
legacy is very important when studying cleavages in post communist Russia. The question is 
however what kind of legacy?  
 
Pipes argues that the totalitarian tradition of the Soviet Union does not come from the 
political ideology itself: “…the explanation for Soviet totalitarianism must be sought not in 
socialism but in the political culture which draws on socialist ideas to justify totalitarian 
practises” (Pipes in Dalin and Lapidus 1991:19). In particular there are two traditions lacking 
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in the Russian context: the right of private property and human rights. Given these two 
fundamental rights socialism in Western Europe took another shape and direction.  
The Russian revolution of 1917 once again put Russia against Western Europe. Bjørn Nistad 
argues that the Zapaniki-Slavophile dimension vanished from the political debate, to return 
after the fall of communism (Nistad 2004). 
 
The communist experience in Russia failed to accomplish what it according to Marxian 
theory should have accomplished. The classless and democratic society did not develop. 
However if there are some positive elements derived from the previous system, then the 
education system stands out. The Russians are a highly educated people. Unfortunately the 
potential that lies herein is not fully realised.  
 
A more direct inheritance from the Soviet Union is its foreign economic debt. Boris Yeltsin 
declared that the loans that Gorbachev had acquired were to be paid for by the Russian 
Federation. When Putin became president Russia had $154 billion in foreign debt (Rose and 
Munroe 2002:41). Rose and Munroe summarise the legacy into two words: economic debt 
and corruption.  
 
The legacy of the Soviet Union might be twofold. First of all it is the system in itself. It seems 
that although the system was authoritarian, many Russians had a better lifetime during the 
communist period. A common sentiment among the average Russian seems to be that 
although we were not free at least we had a job. As Millar writes:  
 
The severely negative economic consequences of shock therapy for the majority of 
Russian citizens soured most on market reform and created political opposition to 
further reforms in the Duma and in the various republics of Russia  
(Millar in Herspring 2005:129). 
 
A second legacy is of a psychological character. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked 
the end of Russia as a great super power in the world. The loss of many former autonomous 
republics was also difficult to bear. One example could be such “hard losses” was Ukraine, 
which is seen as the cradle of Russia. The consequences of these legacies might be a twofold 
nostalgia. One kind that seeks a revival of the old system and, and one which seeks a 
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restoration of Russia as a superpower. In other words we have an economic on the one hand 
and a militaristic/ cultural nostalgia on the other.  
 
2.3 The transition 
Judging from a state and nation building perspective the fall of the Soviet Union represented a 
tremendous crisis for Russia2.  The difference between the new Russian Federation, Soviet 
Union and Tsarist Russia is that the two latter states dealt with Empire Building. The post 
communist Russian Sate however had a nation building task.  
 
Tuminez argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union represented an anti-imperial event. The 
collapse had two major consequences. First of all it reduced the ethnic heterogeneity. 
Secondly the Russian Federation became a geo-political reality (Tuminez 2000:271). 
 
The dissolution from the Soviet Union went peaceful, and there were little causality. Despite 
this, the creation of the Russian state did not produce the same result. The crisis culminated in 
the storming of the parliament building causing the death of 146 people (Sakwa 2002:53). 
 
Linz and Stepan claim that Yeltsin’s priorities were executed in the wrong order. “…Yeltsin’s 
choice to privilege economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the 
state, weakened democracy and weakened economy” (Linz and Stepan 1996:392). 
 
In addition to the problem of putting economic reforms before democratic reforms, came the 
problems with the constitution. The break with USSR was acknowledged but there was no 
new constitution. Russia used the same constitution that was implemented in the Brezhnev 
era. Hence the relationship between the executive and legislative powers was not handled in a 
proper way. The period from December 1991 to 1993 is by Richard Sakwa described as a 
“phoney democracy” (Sakwa 2002:45). 
 
One of the striking differences between Russia and other transiting countries is the unusual 
path chosen by the men behind the coup. In most of the post soviet countries elections were 
                                                
2 In his annual address to the Federal Assembly 25th of April 2005 president Vladimir Putin called the collapse 
“…a major geopolitical disaster of the century. For the Russian nation it was a genuine drama.” 
(www.kremlin.ru) 
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held immediately after the coup and those who initiated the coup won the elections. An 
example of this could be Poland, were the group called Solidarity started the coup and won 
the following election. When Boris Yeltsin looks back on the time after the coup he writes:  
 
I believe the most important opportunity missed after the coup was the radical 
restructuring of the parliamentary system. I have a sneaking suspicion though, that 
society might not have been ready to nominate any decent candidates to a new 
legislature. The idea of dissolving the congress and scheduling new elections was in 
the air (as well as a constitution for the new country) although we did not take 
advantage of it (Linz and Stepan 1996:394). 
 
Linz and Stepan argue that this quotation shows that democratic parties were not part of his 
world and that he was reluctant to take a chance on elections. The last point is important 
because “…democracy building is precisely a process in which political leaders have to 
accept the uncertainty of elections” (Linz and Stepan 1996:394). Andrei Melville argues that 
there is only one argument that can explain why Yeltsin refused to hold elections at the early 
stage: “…his reluctance to share the laurels of the victory with the persons who were only 
recently his close associates in the democratic movement” (Melville in Nagel 2000:479-480). 
 
Summary – State and Nation building 
The problem with state and nation building in Russia is the fact that both the nation and the 
state are lacking a base foundation. Although Russia is not as ethnic heterogeneous as the 
Soviet Union it still has problems with defining the nation’s key elements. The solution with 
asymmetric federalism did not turn out to be the key solving this problem. As an example, 
albeit an extreme example, the Chechnya problem is still a problem. In the state-building 
process Russia has thus not yet gained monopoly on violence. But also in the economic 
sphere the monopoly has not been established. For example the Russian State has problems 
with collecting taxes form its inhabitants. The introduction of a tax reform, in 2001, with flat 
taxes was one effort of dealing with this problem. It is in this context that democracy must 
struggle. 
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3.0 Theoretical chapter 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will deal with the theoretical framework for this thesis. The emphasis will not 
only be on reviewing previous research on similar subjects, but also on presenting the models 
that the analysis will be based on.  
 
The question is how the research should deal with theory. Should we start with theory and 
then test these established theories? Or should we analyse the data and then use theory to 
explain the results? This distinction is not of primary concern in this thesis. However the 
thesis will have a sort of test design. First of all we must review established theories in the 
field on political parties, legislative theory and cleavage. This in turn is used to suggest a 
model for the Russian case. The analysis, using this model as a basis, will then reveal answers 
which in turn will be explained by the theories and Russian history, culture etc. 
 
In the following we will firstly discuss political parties. Secondly we will deal with 
institutional design and its consequences. In the third part of this chapter we will critically 
assess the concept of cleavage. In the chapter following the theoretical assessment the task is 
to apply the theoretical framework on the Russian case. 
 
3.2 Liberal Representative theory 
The idea of representation, rest on the fact that it is not possible for everyone to participate in 
the daily political life. Hence a given community sends a representative to the national capital 
in order to speak their case.  
 
Through the selections of representatives, political representation is a mechanism that 
gives the citizens the possibilities to participate indirectly in governing their living 
society (Østerud et al. 1997:208 own translation). 
 
Political representation involves the permanent transfer of government to ‘a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest’. It involves representatives acting as the trustees 
of the electors, making up their own minds and exercising their own judgement about 
their constituents’ interests and how these might most appropriately be met. 
 (Held 1999:92) 
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We can distinguish between a trustee and a delegate. A trustee is supposed to act at one’s own 
conviction, whereas the delegate is bound to the instructions from the voters.  
From the perspective of the trustee the, question of representation is a value in itself. The 
political decisions are decided by people more qualified than the voters. The delegate on the 
other hand is more a reflection of the population.  
 
…since representatives, once elected, remained under the control of party managers 
and activists, as a result of the party’s internal discipline, the autonomy previously 
enjoyed by representatives during their term appeared to be violated. And political 
platforms seemed to further restrict the freedom of action of representatives. 
 (Manin 1997:194-195) 
 
There might be an argument that liberal representation theory is of historical interest, since 
most proponents of the theory came before the establishment of political parties. That being 
said, one can argue that the recent increase in mixed-member electoral systems might be a 
revival of liberal representation theory.  
 
The question of representation is closely related to the choice of one of the most important 
institutional designs of a democratic system, namely the election law. This issue will be 
addressed in the review of legislative theory as well as the study of parliamentary elections in 
Russia.  
 
3.3 Political parties 
In order to compare parties from different countries, one must have a set of features defining 
what is to be compared. The problem in this case is that there is no consensus of what a party 
exactly is. There are several definitions given by different scholars on what a party is. There is 
however a widely held belief that parties seek to influence a state, and often this influence is 
through competing for governmental rule. This last feature, to compete for governmental rule, 
characterise most European countries. It is also believed that a party usually consists of more 
than one specific interest. That is because once in parliament one is faced with other issues 
than those one was elected on.    
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Although there is no common agreement of what a party is, many if not all argue that parties 
are a necessary part of a representative democracy. As Budge et al. writes: 
 
There is little dispute nowadays that modern democracy is essentially party 
democracy. That is, it depends on political parties to present alternative for electoral 
choice and to organize government afterwards so as to bring electorally preferred 
policies into effect (Budge et al. in Keman 2002:65-66). 
 
A party is thus believed to be the link between the people and the rulers. This feature of a 
party is, as we shall see in the next chapter, problematic in the Russian context. Theoretically 
democracy does not require parties, however there is an empirical fact that modern 
democracies are characterised by multiparty competition. As Richard Sakwa puts it: “In the 
world today there are no democracies without parties; but of course not all systems with 
parties are democracies” (Sakwa in Flikke 2004:64). The reasons that modern democracies 
are characterised by participating parties are two important features of democracy. First of all, 
democracy includes a collective right to express one’s opinion. Secondly democracy includes 
the right to establish free and independent organisations. 
 
There are, as stated above, several definitions of what a party is. One way of clarifying the 
concept of political parties is to look at what functions they have. Giovanni Sartori claims that 
the fundamental functions of parties usually are:  
 
…connecting civil and political society by crafting a government accountable to the 
people; advancing the perceived interests of individuals, groups and social strata while 
aiming consciously to develop these constituencies; and providing a link between civil 
society and the state, espousing the claims of the one and enforcing the rules of the 
other (Sakwa in Flikke 2004:64). 
 
According to Joseph Schumpeter “A party is a group whose members propose to act in 
concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (Schumpeter 1992:283). Richard Rose 
elaborates Schumpeter’s elitist view by claiming that:  
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Supply and demand considerations are combined by Joseph Schumpeter into an elitist 
theory of democracy, where oligopolistic elites supply voters with parties among 
which they can chose (Brown 2001:215). 
 
Schumpeter’s way of viewing parties is perhaps more adequate when used on the Russian 
case. As we saw in the conceptualization of cleavages many parties do present themselves de 
novo at each election. 
 
In the Russian case and other post communist countries one faces the term “bloc” as well as 
“alliances”. These electoral actors must in my mind be viewed as something qualitatively 
different from the term “party”.  Not only are we facing a different term but we are also 
entering the field of institutional interference. Who decides whether a group is to be called a 
party or a bloc? The institutional interference is crucial when interpreting voting behaviour as 
well as party behaviour. This will be discussed further in the chapter on institutional design.  
Alan Ware’s definition is: 
 
A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting 
to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than a single 
interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to aggregate interests. 
(Ware 1996:5) 
 
Our working definition for the moment would be: “A political party is a manifestation of a 
cleavage, and once the cleavage is manifested as a party it seeks influence in governing the 
state.” This definition is depending on the connotation as well as denotation of the concept 
cleavage which will be addressed further. 
 
3.4 Institutional Design 
It is not enough knowing how political parties function we must also take a look at where 
parties function. To put it another way, we must study how the political parties compete 
against each other and on what arena this combat takes place. 
  
The structure of the state has been given much attention in the studies on transitional 
countries the last decades. Particularly when comparing the transitional states with the mature 
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democracies this attention becomes interesting. As mentioned in the introduction the 
breakdown of the USSR and its firm grip on Eastern Europe made it possible to test 
established political scientific theories. How would the voters in these new democracies react 
to their new institutions? How would the market liberalisation reform be implemented? 
 
There are several aspects worth studying in this field. The focus in this thesis will be on 
Russia’s national assembly, in particular the lower house, the state Duma. The reason for this 
is that this is where party competition in Russia takes place. In addition we must cast into 
light three other aspects concerning the institutional arrangements. First of all we will 
consider difference between a presidential regime and a parliamentary regime. Secondly it is 
important to recognise how the question of territoriality is organised. Here we are interested 
in the difference between a unitary and a federal structure. Thirdly we will deal with the 
election laws and their implications on the party system.  
 
Governance style: presidentialism and parlamentarism 
The problem with presidential systems is according to Juan Linz the possibilities of conflict 
between the legislative and the executive power. Both institutions can claim legitimacy. 
 
One of the advantages with presidentialism is that it is supposedly more efficient and stable. 
In a transitional country this is rather important, since the new regime must perform 
economically. Freedom of speech does not put food on the table. One reason for this 
argument is that the President can appoint whoever he wants without considering “… the 
demands of coalition parties or even powerful personalities or factional leaders in their own 
party assures greater cabinet stability” (Linz 1994:31). The problem of course is if the 
President “picks the wrong guy”. The system opens at least in theory for a possibility that the 
president uses cabinet positions as a payback for previous help (for instance during 
campaign). 
 
The consequence of Presidentialism and a multi party system is that the president does not 
favour or endorse any of the parties. “It is not only personalities and political culture, but also 
political structures that explain why presidents have acted against parties” (Mainwaring in 
Linz 1994:35-36). 
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The advantage of parliamentarism is that the threshold for representation is rather low. 
It is easier for different groups in a society to get their voices heard when different parties 
compete. The trade-off may be an unstable, often coalition-government.  The parliamentary 
way of governing often produces instable and sometimes unaccountable government. The 
unaccountable aspect enters when parties form government at the expense of the voter’s 
wishes. Presidentialism on the other hand produces more stable governments.  
 
Semi-Presidential systems 
There are also countries that combine the two aforementioned systems of governance. This 
system is described as semi-presidential, a concept introduced by Maurice Duverger. 
Durverger introduced the concept to describe and compare the French Fifth Republic.  
 
For him, this ‘new’ regime type has three characteristics: the president is ‘elected by 
universal suffrage’, has ‘quite considerable powers’ and faces ‘a prime minister and 
ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only 
if the parliament does not show opposition to them’ (Duverger (1980:166) referred in 
Siaroff 2003) 
 
Territorial structure: federalism versus a unitary state 
The question of the territorial structure is usually answered in the immediate aftermath of a 
regime change. The way the new leaders deal with this question will determine whether the 
outcome of the transition will be bloody or not. At the extreme this can lead to a civil war.  
 
The territorial consolidation might not be settled once the structure is decided and may be 
peacefully negotiated for months if not years after the regime change.  
 
Election laws: rules of the game 
There is a wide range of election system throughout the world. In the literature it has been 
common to distinguish between systems based upon the so called “First past the post” system 
(FPTP) and systems with proportional representation (PR). In the FPTP one usually has single 
mandate districts, which means that each district sends one representative to the national 
assembly. The candidate who gets most votes wins the seat. This means that if there are two 
candidates and candidate A gets 55 % of the votes and candidate B gets 45%, then candidate 
A wins and the votes for candidate B are “wasted”. In the PR system the votes are distributed 
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proportionally. The districts are no longer single mandate, but multi-seat districts. If we use 
the same example here and assume that instead of candidates we now have parties, then party 
A gets 55% of the seats in the national assembly and party B gets 45%. These are two very 
broad categories, and within these there are quite a few variations.  
 
In the later years, however it has become more common to have so called Mixed-Member 
systems. These systems are hybrids of the two aforementioned systems, and here the 
variations within the category are perhaps even more complex. The possibilities of how to 
mix the system are numerous but:  
 
…in general electoral formulas break down into nominal vs. list systems (…) there are 
(at least) two separate overlapping tiers, one of which employs allocation of seats 
nominally while another employs allocation to party lists. (Shugart and Wattenberg 
2003:11) 
 
The way votes are counted and how they are transferred into parliamentarian seats, is crucial 
in influencing how parties compete. One of the most famous social “laws” in political science 
is Duvergers Law. This law is defined as follows: “A system with simple majority in one 
round election tends to develop a two party-system” (Kunhle, in Larsen 2003:68 own 
translation). A two-party system is defined as: “a system where the government power 
changes between to large independent parties.” (Ibid 2003:69). This “law” has created a vast 
literature of discussion. According to Kunhle there has developed a distinction between 
Duverges Law and Duvergers hypothesis. The hypothesis claims that elections with 
proportional representation (PR) leads to a multiparty system. Since most of the post-
communists states have developed a mixed-member system, one could expect the following 
results: the development of multiparty system in the PR elections and the development of 
two-party system in the majority elections.  
 
The FPTP and PR election system represent one of the most significant mechanisms that can 
be used in order to establish a party system. It is therefore reasonable to ask, who decides 
what electoral system should the regime have? It is quite clear that in transitional countries 
this is one of the most important questions that need to be considered. The reason for this is 
that herein lays a vast opportunity for what we can call institutional engineering.   
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There is in addition to the two election system, or the combination of them, other mechanisms 
that determine parties and party system development. One of these, which are limited to the 
PR system, is thresholds. In order to avoid a number of small parties entering the parliament, 
it is useful to have a threshold in pct. This threshold says that if a party do not cross for 
instance 4 pct. then it will not gain representation in parliament. The higher this threshold is 
the more difficult it is for small parties to gain representation. Another area of influence is the 
question of districts. How many election districts should there be? What is the size in terms of 
area and population?  An interesting country in terms of threshold and district is the 
Netherlands. In this electoral system there is no threshold and only one district. With a 
population of around 16 million and a 150 seat parliament, you only need around 0,67 pct of 
the votes which is about 107 thousand votes to get a seat.  
 
3.5 Civil Society - the glue between institution and parties?   
This is the feature in which the parties can affect the most. Whereas the two foregoing 
conditions, governance style and election system, are more like “rules of the game”, this point 
is more like “tactics of the game”. To put it differently, parties foster a nation’s citizens and 
teach them how to behave in a democratic manner. But civil society can also affect political 
parties. As Karen Dawisha notes: “...a strong civil society is necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for a strong party and system and it is difficult to examples where parties have been 
established in states with weak civil cultures” (Dawisha 1997:55). From this perspective 
parties are viewed as a dependent variable. But parties can also be viewed as an independent 
variable in the sense mentioned above, as a democratisation of the nation/ people. Richard 
Ross argues that from this perspective (parties as independent variable) institutional factors 
matter. “Hence before parties can play their vital role in the process of consolidating 
democracy, parties themselves must be institutionalised and consolidated” (Ross 2002:38).  
 
In the part on institutional features we mentioned the danger of corruption and personal 
contacts in presidential system. This becomes particularly dangerous if the presidential regime 
is centred on a populist and charismatic leader. As Gill notes:  
 
The important point about a charismatic tie is that it is immediate and direct, with the 
relationship between leader and followers based upon emotional commitment to the 
leader not mediated through any organisational structure. (Gill in Flikke 2004:53) 
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When the means for press one’s interests is through personal contacts, and not through formal 
channels then it undercuts the rationale for political organisation. 
 
3.6 Cleavage 
In political sociology Party Systems and Voter Alignment edited and contributed by Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, represents a milestone. Published more than 35 years ago it 
is: "… one of the most central references, when it comes to the concept cleavage" (Aardal 
1994:219). However it is far from agreed what (a) cleavage is. Lipset and Rokkan even use 
synonyms like conflicts and oppositions. The problem is that although Lipset and Rokkan 
provided an important theoretical as well as empirical framework in understanding political 
behaviour, they did not explicitly define the concept of cleavage.  One of the most widely 
used concepts in political science was therefore not defined and has since been used in many 
different ways.  
 
What we can say however, is that cleavages represent the raw material of politics. Broadly 
speaking, we deal with something that separates "us" from "them". All societies have 
cleavages, what varies is the intensity and frequencies. This can be ordinary matters such as 
difference in age, gender and so on.  Moving further to more seemingly complex cleavages 
we find for instances differences between territorial units. This can be two villages separated 
from each other by a river, a fjord or a mountain. These types of cleavages can, if driven to 
the extreme, result in armed conflicts or they can result in harmless myths for instance that 
highlanders are mean (in economic sense) and the lowlanders are big spenders. 
 
When Max Weber tried to reach a definition of the spirit of capitalism he did not define the 
concept straightforward: 
 
Die endgültige begriffliche Erfassung kann daher nicht am Anfang, sondern muß am 
Schluß der Untersuchung stehen: es wird sich m. a. W. erst im Lauf der Erörterung 
und als deren wesentliches Ergebnis zu zeigen haben, wie das, was wir hier unter dem 
“Geist” des Kapitalismus verstehen, am besten - d. h. für die uns hier interessierenden 
Gesichtspunkte adäquatesten - zu formulieren sei. (Weber 1999:30 [Online]) 
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It is in the same manner that we will try to reach an understanding of what a cleavage is. By 
discussing the concept as well as implementing the concept to the empirical case we might be 
able to get a better insight in the concept.  
 
Lipset and Rokkan argued that there were four critical junctures in European history that had 
major consequences for the party systems. This can be summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 1 Cleavages and critical junctures 
Critical juncture Cleavage Central conflicts 
Reformation/ Counter 
reformation 
16th – 17th centuries 
Periphery centre National vs. supra national 
religion 
National revolution 
1789 and after  
Church vs. state Secular vs. religious control 
of mass education 
Primary sector 
Secondary sector 
Toll politics: free trade vs. 
protection of agricultural 
products 
 
Industrial revolution 
19th century 
Employee vs. employer 
 
Employees vs. employers 
rights 
Russian revolution 
1917 and after 
Communism vs. socialism Integration in national state 
vs. support for international 
revolutionary movements 
Source: Flora in Hagtvet 1992:123 and Lipset and Rokkan 1967:47 
 
These conflicts can again be structured along two dimensions the centre-periphery and the 
culture – economy. 
Figure 1Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage structure 
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Latent and manifested cleavages 
On a general basis we distinguish between two types of cleavages, i.e. latent and manifest 
cleavages. Latent cleavages are those which exist within a given society. Manifest cleavages 
are cleavages which are being translated into political action. This translation can take various 
shapes, for instance a political party, demonstrations, and various voluntary organizations to 
mention a few.  The main focus in this thesis will be on political parties. Political parties are 
seen as the main agent of political conflict.  
 
The distinction between latent and manifest cleavages is important. Often when scientists 
write about cleavage they mean the manifest cleavage. For instance Geir Møller defines 
political cleavage: 
 
Political cleavage may be defined as established and recognised divisions between 
parties. These cleavages represent fundamental ideological identities that clarify 
choices made by the parties, and when these choices are understood by the mass 
public, also generate voter support.  (Møller 2000:190) 
 
Quite clearly Møller here talks about manifest cleavages. We also get a notion of some latent 
cleavages that the parties represent. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair stress the importance of 
separating the concepts political cleavages and cleavages. They claim that those who use this 
concept, for instance Robert Dahl, removes social structure and”… end up by failing to 
distinguish the notion of political cleavage from other concepts such as political opposition or 
political division.” (Bartolini and Mair 1990:213)  
 
The question of diversity within a society has always produced extensive literature. It would 
be fair to say that the production increased alongside with the expansion of the industrial 
society. The great sociological thinkers such as Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim 
put heavy emphasis on the diversity within a society. The industrial revolution is also seen as 
a crucial variable in the Lipset and Rokkan book. Hence the industrial revolution did not only 
change society on a macro level like changes in economic production, but it also produced 
changes at the micro level among society’s individuals. Lipset and Rokkan’s aim is to link the 
pattern of party formation to societal changes (Ware 1996). 
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The relationship between micro and macro is in fact the core of the matter. What impact has 
the individual on parties and vice versa? Bartonlini and Mair argue that:  
 
The essential problem with the concept of cleavage lies in its intermediary location 
between the two main approaches of political sociology: that of social stratification 
and its impact on institutions and political behaviour, on the one hand, and that of 
political institutions and their impact on social structure and change on the other. 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990:213) 
 
When viewing Møllers definition of a political cleavage we might believe according to his 
definition that once a cleavage has been manifested it has freed itself from its social structure.  
 
In the discussion above we see that the problem lies mainly in interpreting the micro macro 
conflict. In my view Bartolini and Mair have a very vibrant solution to this problem (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 The elements in Bartolini and Mairs Definition of the Cleavage concept.  
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Source: Skare 1998:176 
 
 
They claim that cleavages consist of three elements: an empirical, a normative and an 
organisational element. This model provides us with a dynamic understanding of the concept. 
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Once a cleavage is manifested it is not freed from its empirical element. In fact it is even more 
bound to its empirical element in the sense that the manifest cleavage must respond to the 
demands from the bottom. However to say that the manifest cleavage is solely dependent on 
the latent cleavage is wrong. A political party can and will try to influence the public in order 
to gain more votes at the election day.  
 
The Bartolini and Mair model does not suggest a difference between latent and manifest 
cleavage.    
 
…The term ‘cleavage’ should be restricted to the indication of a dividing line in a 
polity which refers to and combines all three aspects, and that alternative terms should 
be adopted when referring to objective social distinctions or to ideological, political 
and organisational division per se. (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 216) 
 
The Bartolini and Mair model suggests that a cleavage must combine all three aspects. 
Following this prerequisite the conflict is not a cleavage until there has been established as a 
political party or some kind of organisation. This might be one of the weaknesses of the 
definition. One of the purposes with a definition or a conceptualisation is to distinguish a 
concept from others. This means that it must have some characteristics that separate it from 
other concepts. Otherwise the concept will encompass all possible aspects of phenomena. The 
Bartolini and Mair model fails to separate between significant and insignificant cleavages.  
 
The Bartolini and Mair approach provide us with an inductive way of understanding the 
concept of cleavage. The Lipset and Rokkan model gives us a deductive way of analysing 
cleavages. By combining these theories we will try to achieve a better understanding of the 
Russian voters. 
 
The question of measuring cleavages 
The cleavages must be translated into variables in order to measure them. There are several 
ways of measuring cleavages; however I believe that there are two ways which must be 
combined. These two ways are what I call an explorer’s way and an experimenter’s way. The 
explorer does not assume anything as a matter of course. He tries to include as many variables 
as possible in a model. The experimenter on the other hand “knows” what the matter of 
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course is and merely tests it. The challenge is to combine these to extremes when analysing 
for instance voting behaviour. 
 
One could argue that cleavage is something located at a macro level, but needs to be studied 
at a micro level. For my part this is partly true, but I believe that cleavage can simply be put 
between the voters and parties. Neither voters nor parties are passive actors in the electoral 
game. Both seek to improve their life condition. In this perspective a cleavage is both a 
constraint as well as a catalyst.  
 
Although this thesis primarily rests on the study of voting behaviour this does not imply that I 
believe that cleavages are solely defined by the voters. Cleavages must be understood as a 
reciprocal relationship between parties and voters. Neither parties nor voters are passive 
actors in the political play. Cleavage must therefore be placed between the voters and the 
parties. The voter defines a cleavage just as much as the parties do. It is important to note that 
this is an ideal type and it should be used with caution. The voter decides what to vote all by 
himself. The model suggests a rational view of the actors. 
 
Since the possibilities of studying the cleavages are partly limited to the data available, it is 
important to grasp a coherent picture of the system that is studied. This thesis will solve this 
problem through a qualitative study of political parties, and a quantitative study of voting 
behaviour. The study of voting behaviour and political parties is not enough in order to reveal 
the cleavages in a society. This is a point were I agree with the Bartolini and Mair model i.e. 
the fact that a cleavage consist of all three aspects (an organizational, a normative and an 
empirical element). Therefore when studying cleavages in a society one must also analyse the 
institutional design and the society’s history.  
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4.0 Applying the theoretical framework on the Russian Case 
It is a challenge to structure this chapter in a lucid and logical way. The reason for this is that 
these three categories (cleavage, parties and institutions) are so closely intertwined with one 
another. They are not mutually exclusive categories and the way they are ranged in terms of 
beginning and end does not suggest a hierarchy of importance. Therefore this presentation 
will sometimes repeat itself.  
4.1 Cleavages in Russia 
The problem with applying the theoretical framework presented above, to the Russian case 
can be summarized into one word: time. The major difference between Russia and Western 
Europe is its experience with democracy both in time and space. Many of the political parties 
that exist in present European party systems have more than 50 years of experience. This 
problem can be linked with what Stein Rokkan called the four institutional thresholds. In this 
respect we can say that all these thresholds were open to all political parties, at least in theory, 
once the Soviet Union was history. This means that from a western European perspective the 
political parties had not enough time to build a large base of support from the voters. In other 
words there were a shortage of time to build a cleavage alignment between parties and voters.  
 
Russian politics can be characterised as Figure 3 shows. There are four main cleavages. The 
first cleavage is the one between Kremlin and the periphery. The concept of periphery is used 
here in its broadest sense, and not primarily focused on geographic location. In fact, as we 
shall see, the political periphery is not located in the rural areas, but in the urban areas of 
Russia. This cleavage has similarities with the Lipset and Rokkan’s centre – periphery axis 
still there are some differences. The most important difference is of institutional character. 
Since the Kremlin is headed by an elected president, it has so far been difficult for the 
political parties to pass the fourth of Rokkans institutional thresholds, namely the translation 
of parliamentary strength into executive power (Rokkan 1970:79-80). In the chapter on 
institutional design in Russia this will become more evident. There might be an argument that 
since this axis is incarnated in one person i.e. the president, it does not represent a cleavage. 
Nonetheless I believe that this axis goes beyond a support for the president. The reason for 
this is that it does not only imply who you support but it also implies how you think that 
Russia should be governed.  
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The second cleavage is the Zapadniki - Slavophile dimension. This is an old and historic 
division and it can be traced back to the 1840s. The conflict here deals with what direction to- 
look either to the east or to the west. The Zapadniki (which is the Russian for Westerners), 
believed that Russia should try to copy Western-Europe, while the Slavophiles thought that 
Russia should follow it own path based on their own culture and tradition (Nistad 2004). 
Bjørn Nistad characterises this conflict in the 19th century as “…probably the most important 
battle in Russian ideological history. Every political movement later up to the Russian 
revolution in 1917 had to deal with this conflict” (Nistad 2004:64). Nistad also claims that 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union this conflict has seen its revival. 
 
…Today when the communistic internationalist slogans have been discarded, the 
conflict between proponents and opponents of whether Russia should bind its future in 
collaboration with Western-Europe and USA, is without doubt the most important 
conflict in Russian politics. (Nistad 2004:64) 
 
This cleavage does not bear any immediate resemblance to the Lipset Rokkan model for 
Western Europe. Nevertheless it might be argued that this is a cultural cleavage. Originally 
the slavophiles endorsed a religious dimension. The slavophiles argued that Russia was 
distinct from Western Europe because of the role of the Orthodox Church. As Pipes writes:  
 
According to Slavophile theory, all essential differences between Russia and the west 
were ultimately traceable to religion. (…)Thanks to Orthodoxy, Russians have 
managed to retain ‘integral’ personalities in which logic and faith fused to produce a 
superior kind of knowledge which Alexis Khomiakov, Slavophilism’s outstanding 
theorist, called ‘living knowledge’ (zhivoe znanie). (Pipes 1995:266-267) 
 
The Zapadnikis seek a more secular approach. Historically the Zapadniki were not as coherent 
as a group as the Slavophiles. Yet there were some broad elements most of them embraced.  
 
…the Westernizers took a positive view of Western political development and 
criticised the Russian system (…) whereas the Slavophiles anchored their entire 
ideology in their interpretation and appraisal of Orthodoxy, the Westernizers assigned 
relatively little importance to religion. (Riasanovsky 1993:364)  
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The third cleavage is founded on a judgement of the past. In particular we are here dealing 
with the previous communist regime. Either you are nostalgic towards it or you reject it and 
seek other possibilities. Another option is to be satisfied with the present situation. People 
who are satisfied with the status quo will therefore position themselves in the centre of this 
axis. This axis is also an extension of the market vs. state economy cleavage in the sense that 
it clearly correlates with one another. If you are nostalgic towards the past communist regime 
it is reasonable to expect that you also endorse a state controlled economy. There might also 
be a more cultural form of nostalgia. This kind might be labelled power nostalgia, thus 
seeking a restoration of Russia as a super power.  
 
The last cleavage is the question of what economic system Russia should have. The 
counterparts here are market liberalism and planned economy. This is a cleavage in concert 
with what Lipset and Rokkan label “Owner-Worker Cleavage” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:47). 
One of the problems with this axis is that the industrialisation of Russian happened in 
authoritarian regimes. This means that both in the Tsarist and communist regime the 
possibilities to establish a workers party, such as the Social Democratic parties in Western 
Europe, were absent. The alignment of workers happened on quite different premises.  
 
Quite clearly these conflict lines can, and frequently do, overlap and cross cut each other. It 
seems for instance plausible that people who support a market economic reform, at the same 
time reject the previous anti-capitalistic regime. Although a cleavage may overlap, it is the 
model’s intention to suggest a hierarchy of cleavages i.e. that some cleavages are more 
important than others.  
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Figure 3 A intuitive cleavage model for the Russian case 
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This model of the cleavages is supposed to cover the most significant cleavages in the 
Russian Society. One might ask whether there are other cleavages. Quite clearly there are but 
it is the author’s view that the most significant cleavages are represented here.  The goal is to 
present a model as simple as possible, but at the same time an explanatory model as possible. 
The model is not thought to be a deterministic one.  
 
There are two reservations for the model. First of all it is not directly transferable to real life.3 
For instance the economy axis is not thought to suggest that there are a sizeable group of 
people that wants a return to fully state controlled economy. Most Russians today 
acknowledge that chances for a return to the past are diminished. At the same time there are 
strong differences between the parties’ economic platforms. The second reservation for the 
model is that the axis can have different denotations for various parties.  Two parties can 
represent nostalgia but they are nostalgic of different parts of the past. The question of what 
nostalgia they represent is not so important however. It is the fact that they are nostalgic that 
is of interest.   
 
4.2 Russian parties and party system 
Before classifying the Russian Political parties, it would be useful to present the parties as 
well as tracking their electoral history. As mentioned above this thesis focuses on political 
parties that are represented in the State Duma. Two reasons can justify this selection. The first 
reason is of parsimonious character. The State Duma elections are contested by more than 20 
different political parties and electoral blocs and taking all those into consideration will not 
provide us with a better understanding of the Russian party system. As with the cleavage 
model the goal is to explain as much as possible with a model that is as simple as possible. 
Secondly it can be justified from a theoretical perspective. Representation is a form of 
manifestation of cleavage. In other words only the most important cleavages manage to pass 
the institutional and societal barriers and gain representation.  
 
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) 
Contrary to many reformed communist parties in Eastern Europe the KPRF can still be 
labelled as communistic. This is the largest successor of the former CPSU. Its economic 
                                                
3 A model does not reflect the entire reality in the same way as a painting will never grasp the entire landscape. 
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platform focuses on a planned market economy with a powerful state. Although they still are 
labelled communistic, they have reformed to a certain degree. The party does not oppose 
private ownership, and will process reform without a shock therapy. The party’s leader, 
Gennadi Zyuganov, talks of reforms “…with a ‘human  face’ and being more ‘socially 
orientated’ ” (Jeffries 2002:469).  In our classification of the party system this party is 
categorised as a nostalgic opposition party. Since the KPRF is the former regime party it is 
determined to be a nostalgic party. The party is a manifestation of the nostalgic cleavage as 
well as the classic Lipset and Rokkan workers-employers cleavage. In addition it is a party 
that stands out as the opposition party. Another important feature of this party is that it is 
perhaps the strongest party in terms of organizational capacity.  
 
Party of power 
The Kremlin has in each election sought to establish a “party of power”, who would dominate 
the State Duma with a considerable number of seats.4 This party was to be a party that was 
loyal to the president and ensuring governmental economic reforms to be carried out. 
To simplify the differences between Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin we can say that Putin 
managed to create a successful party of power in the State Duma, whereas Yeltsin did not. 
The term party power is used to describe a party that supports the government without being a 
ruling party. As Stanovaya writes: “…a party of power is one that represents the interests of 
the authorities. Its main distinction from a ruling party is that the decision-making nucleus 
remains outside the party.” (Stanovaya 2005 [online]) 
 
The first attempt of establishing a loyal party was in 1993 with Russia’s Choice (VR) headed 
by Yegor Gaidar. The candidates listed included many members of the pre election cabinet. 
The party supported the market economic reform line. In the next Duma election Kremlin 
once again failed to establish a parliamentary strong party power. Nash Dom Rossia was 
sometimes nicknamed Nash Dom Gazprom because of its leader Viktor Chernomyrdin who 
also headed the state owned oil company Gazprom.  
 
The 1999 campaign developed to become a showdown between Unity and Fatherland - All 
Russia (OVR). Unity was established three months before the election “…and served as a 
means to neutralise the overtly anti-Kremlin governors’ bloc OVR.” (Petrov 2004:97) 
                                                
4 Boris Yeltsin also tried to establish a ”loyal opposition” in the 1995 State Duma election. Yeltsin wanted a two-
party system with a party of power headed by Ivan Rybkin. The party was named “The Ivan Rybkin Bloc”. 
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The two parties merged into one in 2000 under the name Unified Russia (UR). This party wan 
the election in 2003, winning her meaning in absolute terms. When the elected candidates 
from the SMD tier revealed their party affiliation UR had a 2/3 majority in the State Duma, 
and thereby the possibilities to make constitutional changes.  
 
What we must bear in mind is the question of how disciplined these party organizations are 
once in parliament. When having a directly elected president as the Russian case, one should 
expect according to Moser, less cohesive parliamentary parties (Moser 2003). 
 
Union of Right Forces (SPS) 
This party emerged on the political stage in the 1999 Duma election. As the party name 
denotes this is a union of various groups with a right wing oriented policy. The party is partly 
rooted in the early reform oriented parties, like Russia’s Choice in1993 and Democratic 
Choice or Russia in 1995 headed by Yegor Gaidar. Many of the candidates from this party 
have previously governmental experience. One of the top candidates on the federation list in 
2003 was Anatoly Chubais who is seen as one of the most important men behind the 
privatization of Russia.  
 
Yabloko 
Together with the LDPR and the KPRF this party has contested each election since 1993 and 
has gained representation in the state Duma. It failed to pass the five pct threshold in the 2003 
and won four seats in the SMD. Yabloko, which is the Russian word for “Apple”, was named 
after the founders and was called the Yavlinsky - Boldyrev - Lukin Bloc. This party is often 
characterised as the only real liberal political party in the Western European sense. It 
advocates market liberalism as well as human rights.  
 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 
The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is perhaps one of the most misleading names in the 
history of political parties. This party is known as anything but liberal and democratic. There 
are two main features that are attached to this party. First of all it is a nationalistic party, often 
described as “extreme nationalist” (White et. al 1997:114) or “ultra-nationalistic and anti-
Semitic” (Jeffries 2002:467). The second feature is the person who advocates the nationalistic 
policy of the party, namely its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Among its early party platforms 
Zhirinovsky stated: “How I dream of our Russian soldiers washing their boots in the warms 
 32
waters of the Indian Ocean” (Jeffries 2003:468). It is worth noting that this is one of the oldest 
parties in Russia, established in 1990. 
 
Rodina  
This is a newcomer in Russian politics and was established in August 2003. The party or 
electoral alliance consists of many different leftist parties and organisations. Its leader, until 
the presidential election 2004, Sergey Glazyev is a former member of the KPRF.5 The party is 
sometimes labelled “left patriotic” (see for example Clem and Craumer 2005), because it 
advocates a leftist economic platform at the same time as it campaigns on nationalistic issues. 
Rodina is often believed to be a party established by Kremlin in order to compete for the 
votes of the KPRF (Moscow Times 2004 [online]). 
 
The political parties can be placed in four categories: 
Table 2 Russia’s Party System  
Nostalgic 
Opposition 
Pro Kremlin/  Party 
of Power 
Liberal Opposition Nationalistic parties 
KPRF (1993-) 
 
VR (1993-1995) 
 
NDR (1995-1999) 
 
Unity (1999-2003) 
 
UR (2003-) 
 
Yabloko (1993-) 
 
SPS (1999-) 
------------------------- 
OVR (1999-2003) 
LDPR (1993-) 
 
Rodina (2003-) 
 
 
This classification of the Russian parties does not differ remarkably from other classifications 
(see for instance Clem and Craumer, Remmington and Oates in Flikke). 
                                                
5 After the presidential election Galzyev left the party and formed another. Dimitir Rogozin is now the leader of 
the party Rodina 
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4.3 Russia’s Institutional Design 
The Origins of Russian Semi-Presidential System 
Russia is usually described as a semi-presidential system with a powerful president. Eugene 
Heskey traces the origins of the semi-presidentialism back to the end of the communist 
period. Towards the end of perestroika Gorbachev wanted to create institutional arrangements 
“that would enhance regime legitimacy and offer the leader an additional base outside of the 
party [CPSU]” (Huskey in Brown 2001:29). It is also worth noting that Gorbachev did not 
manage to combine the chairman of the new congress of people's deputies' post with this 
communist party office. Gorbachev wanted a more dignified and powerful constitutional 
office. The changes were partly based on the experiences from the French 5th republic; in 
particular the division of responsibilities between the president and prime minister. In this 
model the PM dealt with economic and social politics whereas the President dealt with 
foreign and national politics. This stimulated Gorbachev's passion for foreign politics and 
aversion for budgets. 
 
The Soviet leaders appeared in the end of the 1980s to have given little thoughts to the issue 
of cohabitat i.e.  a divided executive. The new institutional arrangements reflected lack of 
precision and coherence, "But the Soviet Union’s new and confusing political system was also 
a product of Gorbachev's leadership style" (Huskey in Brown 2001:32). 
 
The years of 1992-1993 are described as the crisis of semi-presidentialism. The problem was 
vested in the fact that both institutions, i.e. the president and the parliament, claimed 
legitimacy. The crisis ended with the storming of the assembly-building in the autumn of 
1993. The referendum held in December later that year had a constitution which granted the 
President an enormous amount of power. The turnout was 53 per cent, which was scarcely 
enough. The elections have been view as flawed (White, Rose and McAllister 1997). 
 
One of the reasons why the Russian federation went the presidential path was the results of 
the power struggle between Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of Deputies. Both institutions 
claimed legitimacy and a mandate from the Russian people. In the end Yeltsin took control 
over the military and commanded the storming of the White House where the deputies had 
barricaded themselves. The result was the bloodiest street fight in Moscow since the 
 34
Bolshevik revolution. “By demonstrating his superior force, Boris Yeltsin lived up to the 
Russian notion that power is not given by law but taken.” (Rose & Munro 2002:30) 
 
The design of the second republic (1993-) 
Main Features: 
- A directly elected President who shares the executive power with the Prime minister.  
- Prime minister needs support from parliament, and is proposed by the President. If the 
parliament rejects the PM three times, the President can dissolve the parliament and 
hold new elections.   
- Ministers (except PM) are not subject to parliamentary confirmation. However the 
ministers are part of the parliamentary practice such as questioning time in Duma 
- Parliament can impeach the President but the rules and procedures for that are 
complex and "almost" impossible to achieve.  
 
This design exhibits many features of what O'Donnel calls "delegative democracy".  
 
Delegative democracies rest on the premises that whoever wins election to the 
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the 
hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term in office. 
(O’Donnel in Brown 2001:38) 
 
The dangers with a strong president might therefore be twofold. First of all, the problem with 
too much power in one position and secondly a fixed term office that makes it almost 
impossible to change a leader even if this is necessary. 
 
The argument is therefore that when the power is vested in one person only (almost all power) 
this will discredit the regime in the eyes of the opposition. One must give the anti-democratic 
forces something, so that they stay in the political game (and not entering other arenas to 
express their discontent/ grievances). Huskey argues that:  
 
Yeltsin seem to have understood that (…) [and] before the appointment of a 
Communist minister in December 1994, Russia had in a place a de facto coalition 
government, wither ministers representing various political perspectives and sectoral 
interests. (Huskey in Brown 2001:43) 
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What is important about a presidential election according to Moser is a concentration of votes 
into a choice for a single individual to fill a single office. This will narrow the options for the 
voters. An important institutional feature of the Russian presidential election is the two-round 
election. As Linz writes: “A two-round election with a runoff between leading candidates 
reduces the uncertainty and there by might help produce a more rationally calculated 
outcome” (Linz 1994:21). 
 
The second point is more difficult. Since the President is elected on a fixed term, it is very 
difficult to replace the elected office other than through a new election. This can only be done 
through impeachment, which is nearly impossible in Russia. If the president were subject to 
impeachment this “…is likely to provoke a regime crisis” (Linz 1994). 
 
As pointed out above in the theoretical chapter the claimed advantage of presidentialism is a 
stable executive. Nichols argues that: “presidentialism is more likely than other arrangements 
to preserve processes of democratic consolidation in societies that are characterized by a 
lack of social trust (Nichols 2001:7 [Italics in original]).  
 
The effect on the Party System 
Raymond Aron writes that  
 
The President of the republic is the supreme authority as long as he has a majority in 
the national assembly, but must abandon the reality of power to the prime minister if 
ever a party other than his own has a majority in the assembly.  (Aron 1982:8) 
 
Applying this to the Russian case is interesting because it is partly true and partly false. First 
of all the president in Russia has not an own party in the formal sense. Both Yeltsin and Putin 
avoided to be labelled as party candidates and ran on independent grounds.  Nevertheless both 
candidates endorsed some parties both explicitly and implicitly. Neither Yeltsin nor Putin has 
abandoned the reality of power to the prime minister. Once that being said, if one compares 
the Yeltsin years and Putin’s second term the difference is rather striking. Yeltsin had to deal 
with a Duma where his “own” party was far from majority and his fierce opponents, the 
communist party in particular, were the largest bloc. Putin on the other hand managed to 
secure a 2/3 majority in the Duma, something which quite clearly puts him in a better position 
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than that of Yeltsin. The argument therefore is that it is not necessarily the presidential design 
in itself that affects the party development; rather it is the behaviour of those who have held 
the presidency.  
 
Both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have refused to formally link their electoral campaign 
to political parties. While Putin has officially endorsed one party he has never campaigned for 
presidency with its logos. Bjørn Nistads argues that it might be fruitful to compare Putin and 
Charles De Gaulle. “As with Putin, de Gaulle appealed to the patriotism of his country 
compatriots, and he as well tried to make the president a national icon raised above party 
politics.” (Nistad 2004:306)    
 
Russia is perhaps best compared to the French fifth republic. In both cases a territorial crisis 
called for a system change. In Russia it was the fall of Soviet Union, in France it was the loss 
of Algeria. However there are important differences as Sakwa writes: “The separation of 
Algeria or Ireland did not strike at the very heart of the identities of France or Britain, But 
Russia appeared to lose part of its soul” (Sakwa 2002:263). 
 
Until now we have not taken into considerations whether the Russian semi-presidential 
system, meets the minimal definition of a parliamentary democracy. The minimal definition 
of parliamentary democracy provided by Strøm, Müller and Bergman says that:   
 
Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the Prime minister and 
his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the member of parliament and can 
be voted out of office by the latter, through an ordinary or constructive vote of no 
confidence. (Strøm et al. 2003:13) 
 
Quite clearly one can argue that this is not the case in Russia. The possibilities of rejecting a 
PM and his or her cabinet in Russia constitute an enormous challenge for the political parties 
in the State Duma. The one time that this nearly happened, was in April 1998 when the Duma 
deputies twice rejected the proposed PM Sergei Kiriyenko. This time the Duma and the 
president repelled force with force.  
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The Electoral System 
The election system in Russia will be elaborated in the election chapter, but there is one 
aspect that needs to be taken into consideration. That is the fact that parties are not allowed to 
organize around so called “sectional” interest. As is evident in the figure displaying cleavages 
in Russia, we see that there is no religious cleavage in Russia that has manifested itself as a 
political party. The reason for this is to be found in the institutional design of the election 
system. The institutional mechanism does not provide the option of establishing a party on 
religious grounds. As Richard Sakwa argues:  
 
Parties are not allowed to appeal to sectional interest and those advancing religious, 
racial, ethnic and professional causes are forbidden. Russian parties are this prohibited 
from drawing on the power of the cleavages that have shaped Western Party system. 
(Sakwa 2004:81) 
 
This means that the peripheral-cultural axis in the Lipset and Rokkan model has not managed 
to legitimise itself. Since this cultural periphery is located outside party competition, it is 
tempting to suggest that party politics is moved toward the economic centre. 
 
Summary Institutional Design 
The consequences of the semipresidential system are weak political parties. The reasons for 
this are twofold. First of all it is because the parties do not form the cabinet. Secondly the 
Presidents elected so far have refused to endorse political parties in the sense that they run on 
the Party ticket in the elections. They rather seek to distinguish themselves and run as 
independents.  
 
4.4 Civil Society in Russia 
In his article on civil society Graeme Gill concludes that   
 
Russian civil society remains stunted in the sense that the mass of civil society 
organizations and groups do no interact in a meaningful way with the polity and are 
unable to exercise much restraining power upon the political leadership. 
 (Gill in Flikke 2004:61) 
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One of the reasons for this is the development of the presidential regime. What characterised 
the Yeltsin era was the development of a personalistic and charismatic leader. Yeltsin referred 
to himself as “Tsar Boris”. Gill notes that “This personalist appeal was inherently anti-
institutional, rejecting the importance of institutional regularity and of institutions linking 
populace and polity” (Gill in Flikke 2004:54). Accordingly Putin “…has merely replicated the 
institutional barrier for civil society growth by the personalistic nature of Yeltsin regime.” 
(Ibid:60). 
4.5 Expectations for the analysis  
By examining the various aspects of the Russian political system, from institutional design, 
civil society and political parties we have thus presented a qualitative understanding of the 
Russian society. In chapter 5 and 6 we will penetrate deeper into party politics in Russia, 
studying the parliament and the elections. In the analysis chapter we will make a shift from 
the organisational and institutional level to the level of voting behaviour. In other words the 
focus will be on the voters. It is therefore useful to present the reader with the expectations for 
this analysis.  
 
If there are cleavages in the Russian electorate then this will be showed through distances 
between the different parties’ respective voters. In other words some parties will advocate the 
proposed cleavages more than others. Simplifying the argument we can use the intuitive 
cleavage model presented in Figure 4 and place the parties inside the figure (see Figure 3 for 
explanations of abbreviations). 
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Figure 4 Placing the Party Categories in the Intuitive Cleavage Model  
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Here we have placed the party categories and not the parties themselves. The reason for this is 
that one of the purposes of the analysis is to locate the parties.  
 
Party of Power 
The question that arises is whether there are differences between the different parties of 
power? A simple answer could be that the party of power depends on the popularity of the 
power, i.e. the President. Nevertheless this issue is about turnout and the numerical strengths 
of a party, and not necessarily about cleavages. Therefore we do not expect differences 
between the different parties of power, other than numerical strengths of the variations. The 
variations are therefore expected to fall along the same lines. Taking this a step further we 
expect that the parties of power consist of non nostalgic voters. The reason for this is that it 
seems reasonable that a support for the present regime is also a rejection of the previous 
regime. If you neither support the present regime nor the previous one, then you vote for 
another party.  
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Communist 
The Communists are expected to be strongly against the present regime. This is most likely 
displayed in two ways. First of all the communist voters will be strongly against the Kremlin. 
Secondly the very same voters will claim that “everything was better before”, meaning a 
strong nostalgic sentiment for the past. We thereby expect that the Communists will display 
oppositional results towards the Party of Power. 
 
This relationship between the Communists and the Party of Power we can asses in a more 
detailed figure: 
Figure 5 Expected placement of the Party of Power and the Communists  
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Liberals 
We expect that there are little distance between the two liberal parties. As we have discussed 
above the major difference between SPS and Yabloko is their stance towards Kremlin. It will 
be very interesting to see if the voters recognise this difference between the two liberal 
parties. It is expected that both parties will display a voter profile with strong elements of 
Zapadniki. 
 
Nationalist 
As for the nationalistic voters we anticipate that these voters are oppositional to the Liberals. 
To put it differently, we expect the nationalistic voters to locate themselves at the end on the 
Slavophile axis. Their judgment of the Kremlin is likely to be negative. The reasons for 
expecting this could be that the nationalistic voters are not satisfied with the Kremlin’s effort 
in strengthening the Russian state both in domestic as well as international areas.  
Party of 
Communist 
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As with the Party of Power and the communists we can try to place these party categories 
within a figure that defines a political space.  
Figure 6 Expected placement of the Liberals and the Nationalists 
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These expectations are based on the assumptions of voters, placing the parties purely on the 
basis of a perceived party space in reality. We will expect voters also to be influenced by 
more short term effects. When a party move to occupy a portion of the cleavage place, from 
one election to another, it will not be unreasonable to expect that change of cleavage 
placement for one party might change the placement of other parties.  
Liberals  Nationalist 
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5.0 The State Duma 
 
In December 1993 Russians for the first time since 1917 had a multiparty election. In this 
chapter we will track down some important elements in the first experience with national 
elections from 1905 to 1917. Thereafter we shall examine how the present state Duma 
functions. In particular the focus here will rest on the development of factions.  
5.1 The history of the State Duma  
The first Russian State Duma was convened on May 10, 1906. This had happened after a 
period characterised by strikes, an aborted revolution, and a lost war against Japan. Tsar 
Nicholas II issued on October 30th, what is later to be called the October Manifesto. This 
document  
 
…guaranteed civil liberties to the Russians, announced a Duma with the true 
legislative function of passing or rejecting all proposed laws, and promised a further 
expansion of the new order in Russia. In short, the October Manifesto made the empire 
of the Romanovs a constitutional monarchy. (Riasanovsky 1993:407-408)  
 
The first Duma did not produce the desired outcome and was dissolved after 73 days. The 
second Duma did not last very much longer and ended after 3 months. The two unsuccessful 
Dumas led by Tsar Nicholas II and his government changed the election law. To put it briefly 
most levels of society that had previously gained representation lost it except for the gentry 
who increased its representation.6 As Walsh puts it: “The new law gave disproportional 
representation to the large landowners and to the wealthy urban class” (Walsh 1950:147). 
This change gave the wanted results and the third and fourth Duma were composed of “men 
of substance” (Walsh 1950).  According to Riasanovsky the last two Dumas did not produce 
any significant change in the Russian society: 
 
Only Stolypin’s [Prime Minister] controversial agrarian legislation attempted a 
sweeping change in the condition of the Russian people, and even that legislation had 
perhaps too narrow a scope. (Riasanovsky 1993:415) 
                                                
6 The changes were justified by: “…his [Tsar Nicholas II] historic power, his right to abrogate what he had 
granted, and his intention to answer for the destinies of the Russian state only before the altar of God who had 
given him his authority!” (Riansanovsky 1993:411)” 
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These developments in the early Dumas reveal a pattern quite similar to the present Dumas. 
First of all it is the undesired outcome that the centre did not want. The elections produced a 
Duma that consisted of a majority of oppositional parties. Secondly the attempts from the 
executive to control or create a loyal legislative assembly are also in accordance with the post 
communist Dumas. The crafting element in making electoral laws in order to create a 
favourable outcome is however not peculiar to the Russian case. 
 
There is an important lesson from these early experiences with elections that should be noted. 
It is a popular view that Russians display an authoritarian mind, and seek to be ruled by an 
authoritarian leader. The years of Tsarist Rule and the communist regime are taken as 
evidence. Even though there were many complexities and limitations the election law of the 
first two Dumas were rather liberal in terms of suffrage. Walsh takes the participation in the 
elections as a rejection of the authoritarian notion. As he writes: 
 
The wide-spread participation of the peasants in the elections to the first two Dumas is 
contra-proof to the claim that the Russian people never took any interest in governing 
themselves. (Walsh 1949:112) 
5.2 The post communist Duma's Role 
Duma’s role according to Sakwa: “The heart of the legislative process, drafting and endorsing 
laws and issuing directive” (Sakwa 2002:127). Among its task is adopting the budget and 
approving the prime minister candidate that is proposed by the President. Furthermore the 
Duma amends or rejects legislative initiatives of the President. The Duma can together with 
the Federation Council override a Presidential veto, providing that they have a 2/3 majority. 
According to Rose and Munro “The powers of the Duma are thus greater than those of the 
British House of Commons, but much less than those of the United States Congress” (Rose 
and Munroe 2002:110). 
 
The Duma’s role has changed rapidly since the 1999 election. The two first Dumas from 1993 
to 1999 had a significant proportion of anti Kremlin Parties, making it difficult for the 
executives to cooperate with the legislatives. The two last Dumas from 1999 to the present 
have shown an opposite trend. This had led many to conclude that Duma’s role has been 
declining. As Sakwa writes: “For many this represented a decline in the Duma’s role. One 
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commentator argued that ‘today the Duma play a significantly smaller role than under Yeltsin 
or Nicholas II’ ” (Sakwa 2002:133). After the 2003 election the role of the Duma was further 
diminished by the fact that the United Russia faction managed to get a 2/3 majority, as Hale 
notes: “The Duma as an independent institution emerged weakened from this electoral cycle” 
(Hale 2005:381). 
 
The Duma represents an organ that (should) foster democracy and teach Russians democratic 
procedures. The problem is that the voters do not have sufficient information about what is 
going on inside the assembly. Most Russians cannot afford to buy several newspapers, which 
is required if one is to get at least some information about all the parties in the Duma. 
Therefore the medium that most Russians receive information from is the television. It would 
be an understatement to claim that the TV-situation is problematic. Most TV-stations which 
cover all of Russia are state owned and/ or controlled (see chapter 6).  
 
5.3 Factions 
After the election members of the Duma begin to negotiate membership in a faction 
Factions allow deputies to serve as chairman or deputy chairman of committees. This gives 
greater access to microphone during floor debates. Each faction has a vote in the state Duma 
Council which sets the agenda. A faction must have at last 35 members. It is in the factions 
that the independents can join.  
Table 3 Number of Factions in the different Dumas 
Duma Number of Factions 
1993 11 
1995 7 
1999 9 
2003 4 
 
The number of parties gaining representation in the Duma nearly doubled from 12 in 1993 to 
22 in 1995, whereas the number of factions actually decreased from eleven to seven. 
 
The factions also provide the representatives with organizational resources such as 
telephones, research and clerical staff, budgets, offices and so on. “Therefore, both for 
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ideologically motivated and office-seeking parliamentary factions, factional status is a 
resource for future reelection” (Remington 2001:189). 
 
The fact that members of the parliament change side is however not an unknown phenomenon 
in other democratic systems, for instance the US congress or the House of Commons in UK. 
What is special with the Russian is the “institutionalization” of party switching. This might be 
a reasonable explanation for the high amount of independents being elected from SMD?   
 
Unity success and Putin's presidency made the executive-legislative relations harmonious. 
These developments produced new models of coalition politics. As Remington remarks: 
”As in previous elections parties' political tendencies in 1999 could be classifieds in four basic 
categories: "pro-reform, communist, nationalist and pro-government/ party of power”.  
Remington furthermore notes that to label party of power as centrist is misleading because 
those adherent to this party “…are a residual category composed of pragmatics who prefer 
office to any policy commitments” (Remington in Hesli and Reisinger 2003:235).   
 
Rose and Munroe argue that we must distinguish between electoral parties and Duma parties.  
 
The definition of a party in Duma differs fundamentally from the ballot definition. 
Duma parties, officially known as fractions, are groups that have at least 35 members, 
7,8 per cent of the assembly’s total. (Rose and Munroe 2002:106) 
 
There is a difference between what you say you'll do and what you actually do. In a system 
where voters have perfect information about what elected representatives do, the voter world 
reward or punish the representatives (or parties) on the basis of their voting record. However 
in the Russian case “…it is virtually impossible for constituents to know their representatives' 
voting record” (ibid 239). It does not seem like the candidates’ voting record is an important 
part of the campaigns. Neither is it used by opponent candidates. This is a striking difference 
with the US experiences, where a candidate who is seeking re-election must either defend his 
or her voting record or express it. An example of that could be John Kerry who during the 
presidential campaign was constantly attacked for his positions on the Iraqi war.  
 
Deputies that are elected to the State Duma seek to influence public policy as well as taking 
advantage of being in office. In other words they want policy and reelection. The factions 
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offer both these possibilities. As Remington writes: “They [deputies] affiliate for both policy-
based and office-based reasons; factions, in fact, may be characterized by whether they tend 
to emphasise one or the other set of interest” (Remington 2001:187). This is in line with what 
Strom observes “some parties are more office motivated, others more concerned about the 
pursuit of voters or policy” (Remington in Hesli and Reisinger 2003:238) We see here two 
goals that might have an trade-off but not necessarily. It might be useful to join a faction in 
order to ensure that your policy view is implemented, at the same time as you want reelection. 
In order to be reelected it would be an advantage to have access to the benefits of office 
facilities. Remington suggests that we have three policy oriented parties. That is: KPRF, 
Yabloko and SPS. The other parties (including LDPR) don't have a distinct left-right division. 
 
One problem with the factions is that the memberships are floating. The discipline within 
these factions does not seem to be striking. One of the reasons for this lies in the nature of 
election. The deputies elected from the single mandate districts are mostly labelled as 
independents. In fact viewing the distribution of independents seats in the four Duma 
elections, that is before affiliating with factions, the independent category counts for between 
15 to 30 percent. The trend is wavelike, meaning that the number of independents dropped in 
1995 and then rose in 1999 and then dropped in 2003.  
 
When debating about factions and their role in 1993, Zhirinovsky argued that those elected 
from the SMD and were independents could not join any group as he said: 
 
As far as there are independent deputies they wish to form into groups. But naturally, 
these will be formations based on regional characteristics, professional, even perhaps 
gender, but under no circumstances political, because the voters have already rated 
you as independent, non-party deputies, who do not join any party in our country. If 
you join, it means that you are violating the will of your voters. (Haspel in Löwehardt 
1998:185) 
 
Again we see that some elements of the liberal representative theory are evident in how the 
candidates from SMD are viewed. In this case the argument is that if the independent 
candidates join party factions then they violated the voters’ will. The alignment between voter 
and candidate does not occur until after the election, and thereby the candidate breaks an 
important link. On the other hand, one might ask what kind of independence we should allow 
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these independent candidates to have. Do the voters send the candidate as a delegate or a 
trustee?  
 
Summary 
The history of the Duma demonstrates that electoral engineering and crafting institutions is 
not new in the Russian society. At the same time it is worth noting that those who had the 
possibility to participate did so. 
 
The factions do provide a possibility for the deputies to avoid accountability to the voters, 
which is a consequence of the alignment after election. Nevertheless I agree with Remington 
on the fact that factionalism has increased the power of Council of the Duma and thereby 
replacing the heavily centralized system that prevailed in the former legislative assemblies in 
Russia and USSR. The factions can therefore also be viewed as a means of not only 
increasing party cohesion but also a degree of democratisation of deputies. Factionalism is 
indeed a means of strengthening the political parties.  
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6.0 Elections in Russia: from 1993 to 2003 
In the Bartolini and Mair model of cleavages the institutional level is important. We have thus 
so far focused on the institutional design when it comes to the division of power. In the first 
part of this chapter we will further narrow the institutional scope to the electoral system. The 
reason for including a detailed description of the electoral system is twofold. First of all it is 
because this institutional feature has direct consequences for the political parties and shapes 
their behaviour. Secondly this is closely related to the Kremlin-Periphery cleavage in the 
model presented in chapter four. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, the parliamentary elections from 1993 to 2003 will be 
studied. Here the focus will rest upon the campaigns, conduction of the election day, results 
etc. 
6.1 Rules of the Game – the election law 
The parliamentary elections to the state Duma from 1993-2003 have been what Moser and 
Thames call mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system. (Moser and Thames 
2003:255) Of the Duma’s 450 members half are elected in proportional elections. The other 
225 members are elected through majoritarian elections in single mandate districts.  
 
The early drafts 
There were a lot of to and fros about the election law. The early drafts took shape in the 
Congress of People’s Deputy. Viktor Sheinis who later co-founded Yabloko, became the chief 
architect of the MMM system (Moser and Thames 2003:260). Yeltsin and the drafters had 
two competing goals; to establish political parties and to assure a reformist majority in the 
state Duma. The MMM must be seen as a consequence of these two goals. For instance the 
SMD was included because it was believed that the reformist parties would not do well in PR. 
Another argument was that it would be easier to pressure SMD candidates with “pork barrel” 
means.  
 
The arguments for the different election laws varied from strengthening the reformist parties, 
as well as making sure the districts of Russia were represented. Almost all drafters’ 
maintained a common argument; majoritarian election in SMD was needed because of the 
weaknesses of Russian political parties. This argument bears some resemblance to the liberal 
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representation theory. The assumptions are (or were) that parties cannot represent the people, 
so the people elect whom they think can represent their village or their opinions best.  
 
In a comparative perspective the mixed-member is not new.  
One western European country which practices this mixed-member electoral system is 
Germany. Still there are two major differences between Russia and Germany: 
First of all in Germany there are separate party list in each Land. The Russian drafters 
rejected this option because they feared that this rule would produce regional parties. 
Secondly the seats that German parties earn in districts are subtracted from those received on 
the party lists vote in a region. In Russia these are added. The last point is important as:  
 
This rule created a powerful reason for a party to nominate all the strong candidates on 
its list as candidates in the districts as well. This in turn created powerful incentives to 
form local branches that could nominate and support candidates. (Hough in Colton and 
Hough 1998:52)  
 
It is important to note that the candidates in SMD do “...not appear on the ballot paper as a 
party standard-bearer, as the law on elections specified that such candidates were to be 
described by name, date of birth, occupation, and place of residence, but not by party 
affiliation” (White et al. 1997:124). This has serious consequences since the alignment 
between parties and voters occur after the elections. The district candidates do not reveal their 
party affiliation until they are in the parliament and the faction-building takes place. (See 
chapter 5) 
 
 
Changes in the electoral law from 1993 to 1995 
Yeltsin did not want a strong party representation, and he wanted first and foremost a loyal 
Duma. One of his wishes was therefore to increase the number of SMD and decrease the PR-
seats. The majority of the State Duma on the other hand wanted a somewhat different election 
law. The main arguments for each of the election tier can be summed up in the table below. 
The different tiers do not necessarily represent either the President or the Duma, but it seems 
obvious that the parties elected on the Proportional list in 1993 advocated the PR tier 
arguments.  
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Table 4 Summing up the electoral system arguments 
SMD Arguments PR arguments 
In 1993 Russia’s Choice win 30 seats in 
SMD, a change into a 150/300 split would 
favour the party of power. 
PR, imposing party discipline 
 
Russian Parties were insufficiently developed 
to justify party-list elections 
Stronger parties, stronger leaders, greater 
voice in setting the political agenda 
 
Increase in the SMD would improve quality 
of voter representation 
Rewriting election law destabilized the 
political system 
 
PR-list were biased in the sense that most of 
the candidates were from Moscow (in 1993 
135 of 225 were from Moscow) 
 
 
Eventually Yeltsin came up with an election law that suggested a 300:150 ratio of SMD to PR 
seats. This was rejected by the State Duma, who then came up with a law that suggested a 
225:225 ration of SMD to PR seats.  
 
The result from the battle between the Duma and the President was a continuation of the 
election system implemented in 1993. Parties that were against the Presidential version were 
most notably KPRF Yabloko and LDPR7. There were however some changes in the new law. 
One of these was the change in signature requirements. To be allowed to stand as a party list 
one needed 100.000 signatures in 1993. No more than 15 percent of these could come from 
one region. This was changed in 1995 and the number of required signatures increased to 
200.000 and no more than 7 percent in each region.  
 
                                                
7 For a more detailed voting record on the different versions see Moser and Thames chapter 12 in Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2003.  
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The important lessons form the struggle over election law in 1995 was that it showed the 
strength of party/ faction cohesion. In other words the debate over the electoral law forced the 
parties to act as parties, as well as coordinate their actions with other parties. As Moser writes: 
 
The outcome of this long drawn-out struggle between the Duma, Federation council, 
and President Yeltsin over the electoral law was the maintenance of Russia’s MMM 
system. Given the assumed dominance of the Russian presidency, it is interesting that 
the State Duma was the winner of this battle. (Moser in Shugart and Watternberg 
2003:274) 
  
Changes from 1995 to 1999 
One of the main changes from 1995 to 1999 was the allowance to deposit an amount of 
money instead of collecting signatures. The level of these payments was $ 7,000 for a single 
mandate candidate and $170,000 for a party list. (Respectively 2,000 and 50,000 times the 
minimum wage). 
 
The rigid threshold at 5 percent was replaced with a “floating” threshold at 5 percent. Parties 
gaining 3% in the PR would be allowed representation if the combined votes of all parties 
gaining 5% or more was less than 50%. This means that if the parties that managed to pass the 
5 pct threshold together accounted for less that 50% of the total votes cast, then the small 
parties passing 3 pct would get access. In 1995 those parties that passed the threshold 
accounted 51,1 percent. So if for instance the Communist Party received 21,2 instead of 22,3 
pct of the votes parties like Women of Russia and the Agrarian Party would have been 
allowed seats on the PR list (these parties got 4,6 and 3,8 pct of the votes respectively).  
 
The Law on Basic guarantees of Electoral Rights is a federal but not constitutional law. 
Article 108 states that a law is considered constitutional if it gets 2/3 majority in both houses.8 
Although this is not likely the election-law can therefore conflict with other federal laws. The 
Basic Guarantees however stipulate that the law should prevail if conflicting with other laws.  
 
                                                
8 For English translation of the constitution see http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml. 
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It is not clear how this stipulation would stand up if legally challenged in the face of 
contradictory federal laws bearing the same rank, or if a “constitutional law” were 
ultimately passed that dealt with similar issues in a different way (OSCE 2000:5) 
 
OSCE argues that the most significant changes were that the law laid down the framework for 
equal participation. This is reflected in that the new law includes “…registration procedures, 
and campaigning finance, financial disclosure and media provision that are generally 
consistent with international standards have been entered in the electoral law” (OSCE 
2000:6). 
 
Changes from 1999 to 2003 
During this period the criteria for being accepted as a political party were changed. In the 
previous election law the requirements were signatures. Now the organizations must have at 
least 10,000 members with no less than 100 members in each of at least 45 of the union 
subjects. This is an important change because the definition of what a party is becomes more 
precise. At the same time this gives the parties more organizational challenges. It is harder to 
recruit members than to allocate signatures. 
 
Summary Election law 
The evolution of the electoral law in Russia is interesting because it shows how the different 
political actors struggle for their own very existence. The struggle between the President and 
the Duma made the parties act like cohesive actors and forced the opposition parties to 
collaborate. 
 
 The different arguments of having majority elections in single mandate districts that were 
presented above are rather interesting in when viewing the political theories on parties. Given 
the antiparty nature in the vast majority of the Russian electorate, it seems quite reasonable 
that many felt that the parties could not represent the voters in a sufficient manner. The 
problem is that many of those elected in the SMD do not reveal their affiliation until after 
they have been elected. The alignment between voter and party therefore can said to take 
place after the election.  
 
The battle between The President and the State Duma is also important in the shaping of the 
Kremlin-Periphery cleavage. As we have seen neither the Kremlin nor the Periphery are 
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passive actors in the fight over institutional thresholds. Both seek to maximise their chances 
for survival and influence. In this review we have seen how the actors at the macro level have 
acted. It will be interesting to see in the analysis chapter how the voters respond to this. As we 
noted parties like KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko were taking a strong position against the 
election law suggested by Yeltsin in 1995. One could therefore expect that voters that display 
anti-Kremlin sentiments would vote for these parties. 
6.2 Parliamentary elections in Russia 
The 1993 Duma election 
The election on the12th of December in 1993 took place after a period of dramatic events in 
the Russian society. The creation and election to the State Duma came as a consequence of a 
power struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. The problem was 
that both institutions, the president on the one hand and the legislative on the other, claimed a 
legitimate mandate from the people. On September 21st 1993, Yeltsin announced the 
dissolution of the Parliament and called for new elections in December. The result was that 
many deputies, with Rutskoi and Kasbulatov in the lead, seized the White House, which 
housed the parliament. The conflict ended on October 4th “…when the army (around 1300 
troops) blasted the White house into submission with the aid of tanks” (Jeffries 2002:458). 
What one might label the “second” transition was far more violent than the first. The death 
tolls were estimated by the prosecutor general to be 123. (Jeffries 2002). 
 
Thirteen registered parties or blocs managed to contest the election of December 12th. Of 
these thirteen, eight managed to pass the five pct threshold. Ten years later only four of these 
eight are still represented in the State Duma.9 The turnout was 54,3 pct. 
 
The results were devastating for the Kremlin. The openly Kremlin backed party Russia’s 
Choice (VR), gained 15,5 pct of the proportional votes and 11,4 pct of the seats in the State 
Duma. It was expected that the party would do well in the SMD but they only managed to win 
25 of 225 districts.  
 
The “Independents” could claim the victory in the 1993 election. They received 30% if the 
seats in state Duma. This should however not surprise anyone. As we have seen the setting for 
                                                
9 These four parties are: KPRF, LDPR, Yabloko and APR. OF these only two managed to pass the five pct 
threshold. Yabloko secure four seats in the Single Mandate District election, whereas the Agrarian party 
managed one seat. 
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this election was quite remarkable. Two years had passed since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The country was on the edge of a civil war, and now Russians were supposed to vote 
for parties they had never heard of until two months before the election.  
 
The 1993 election is characterised as a transitional one, by White et al. (White et al. 
1997:107). However it is important to note that the election was held two years after the coup. 
This fact has several consequences. First of all, the immediate popular success of the coupers 
had waned. In many Eastern European countries those who initiated the coup also won the 
first election. Thereafter they implemented economic reforms, often through a “shock 
therapy”, and in the next election they lost.  
 
The 1993 Duma included many antigovernment members. Still the Duma passed some 
elements of Yeltsin’s economic program as well as compromising on a new electoral law. 
 
The 1993 election is claimed to have significant fraud. For instance there are doubts that the 
turnout for the constitutional referendum passed 50% (as required).The fact that the Central 
Election Committee never published complete results questions the validity of this election. 
 
(…) there were doubts about the authenticity of the voting figures and allegations of 
misreporting in order to produce the official (that is, government-desired) result. (…) 
Observers at the polls estimated that between 38 and 43 percent had voted, well short 
of this figure [50 pct]. (White et al. 1997:100) 
 
The 1995 Dumaelection  
There are three differences between the 1993 and the 1995 elections. First of all this election 
was guided by an election law which was debated in the State Duma. In 1993 the election was 
held through a decree which stipulated how the seats were allocated and how the parties could 
register themselves. Secondly there were more parties on the ballot. In the 1995 43 parties had 
registered by the deadline 22nd October. As became evident, the amounts of wasted votes 
were far more numerous than in 1993. In 1993 the parties that passed the five pct threshold 
accounted for 87,1 pct of the votes. In 1995 this measure was 51,1 pct, meaning that half of 
those who voted in the PR tier “wasted” their votes. The third difference was the introduction 
of an election cycle in Russia. As Belin and Orttung writes: ”One of the most important 
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functions of the December 1995 Elections was to set the stage for the Presidential election on 
16th June 1996” (Belin and Orttung 1997:4) 
 
The informal primary election character is important to stress. The success of KPRF in the 
election made Yeltsin adopt many points from the party’s platform in the presidential 
campaign. Yeltsin clearly drew on the lessons from the 1995 election (Belin and Orttung 
1997:166). 
 
The 1995 election did not produce the Kremlin loyal Duma that Yeltsin wanted. Instead it 
became more hostile signified by the remarkable progress of the Communists. The party of 
power did once again fail. The KPRF became the winner with 22,3 pct of the votes in the 
election. There seem to be two main explanations for this. First of all the organizational 
strength of the KPRF had been reinforced (Belin and Orttung 1997). Secondly the KPRF 
gained votes among those who had not benefited from the economic shock therapy 
implemented by the Kremlin (CSCE 1996). 
 
 
The 1999 Duma election 
This election is characterised by OSCE as:  
 
…a benchmark in the [Russian] Federation’s advancement toward representative 
democracy (…) [and furthermore] the State Duma elections marked significant 
progress in consolidation representative democracy in the Russian Federation. 
 (OSCE 2000:1-2) 
 
Judging from the election results there were three new significant parties that managed to gain 
representation in the State Duma. Those parties were Unity, Fatherland All-Russia (OVR) and 
Union of Right Forces (SPS). Only three parties from the 1995 election managed to renew 
their representation. Those were the Communist party, the Liberal Democrats (albeit running 
under the banner “Zhirinovsky Bloc”) and Yabloko10. 
 
                                                
10 The party ”Our Home is Russia” also managed to win some single mandate districts.  
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As in the previous elections the relationship with Kremlin is one of the fundamental 
questions. The main struggle was between OVR and Unity. This struggle can best be viewed 
in the fact that the state Duma elections are primary elections to the forthcoming presidential 
election. As the Economist wrote before the election: “…the presidential candidates whose 
popularity will be tested in Sunday’s vote are Mr Putin [then prime minister] and Yevgeny 
Primakov” (The Economist 1999 [Online]). 
 
The fact that Kremlin did so well was rather surprising. OSCE describes the year leading to 
the election as “turbulent, with major recession further eroding Russia’s economic stability, 
scandals, allegations of corruption, international money laundering, and rapid changes in the 
cabinet with a succession of prime ministers” (OSCE 2000:9) In other words this should be an 
election where the Russians could express their dissatisfaction with Kremlin. But that did not 
happen. Although KPRF gained more votes in the PR tier (up 2 percent from 1995 election) 
they lost the number of seats. This was because more parties managed to cross the five 
percent threshold. In the 1999 election those who managed to pass the 5 pct threshold together 
accounted for 81 percent of the votes, which is a clear increase from the 1995 level. 
Comparing these numbers with the fact that parties contested the elections dropped from 43 in 
1995 to 26 in 1999, we can conclude that both parties and voters learned from the 1995 
election.  
 
The pattern from 1993 to1999 suggests a very rational development. First of all we have the 
efforts in establishing a strong party power. It might not be a very democratic way to use 
institutional mechanisms to accomplish this, but it is rational. On the other hand institutional 
engineering is common in mature/ established democracies as well. So it might be argued that 
this is an inherent part of democracy. Another rational development is the fact that 
oppositions gain strength through collaborating with other parties, in order to achieve 
decisions that are favourable to themselves. The increase in number of parties from 1993 to 
1995 can partly be explained by the fact that the timing was much more suitable. So people 
had time to collect signature and raise money. The decrease in the number of parties from 
1995 to 1999 was determined by the experiences from 1995 and that many parties build 
coalitions such as SPS and OVR. 
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The 2003 Duma election 
In 2003 The Kremlin finally managed to achieve a loyal Duma. The merger between Unity 
and Fatherland-All Russia resulted in around 38% of the votes in the PR tier and 46 in the 
SMD. In addition quite a few of the independent deputies from the SMD tier chose to join the 
United Russia coalition. In this way Kremlin managed to secure a 2/3 vote in the state Duma.  
 
Many commentators have considered Yabloko’s and SPS’ failure to pass the 5% threshold as 
a sign of a weakening democracy in Russia. Yabloko has now four representatives and SPS 
has two. The liberal parties’ failure was seen as a “prove” that liberalism had failed, and 
authoritarianism had prevailed. Henry Hale argues that liberalism as a social cleavage does 
exists in the Russian society. Hale contends that Yabloko’s failure started in the 1999 
campaign, and that lack of organizational resources is one of the reasons.    
 
The nationalistic parties did very well in this election The LDPR witnessed a political revival 
and doubled their share of seats from around four to eight pct. Rodina was a newcomer in the 
Russian party system and did fairly well gaining around  9 pct of the list votes.  
 
Prospects for the 2007 election: what will be the effects of the new electoral reform? 
Quite clearly with the absence of SMD and a threshold at seven pct the number of parties 
gaining representation will be low. If these rules were applied to the 2003 election results 
(without including the SMD results), the Duma would have had four parties (KPRF, Rodina, 
LDPR and United Russia). The party of power however would not claim a super majority as it 
does now; neither would it claim a simple majority.  
 
The media situation 
One of the major obstacles towards the consolidation of free and fair elections in Russia is the 
media situation. There are three main TV channels which most Russian can receive. Two of 
these are state controlled, that is ORT and RTR. The independent channel NTV was owned 
by Vladimir Gusinsky. The TV situation is important because it is the main medium from 
where most Russian get their information. During the Yeltsin period NTV and Gusinsky’s 
Media-MOST had a high degree of independency. An example of this independence was how 
the TV channel negatively viewed the first Chechen war (1994-96). According to Lipman and 
McFaul this had a profound effect on Russian public opinion. “By January 1995, only 16 
percent of the Russian populace supported the use of force in Chechnya while 71 percent 
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opposed the war” (Lipman and McFaul in Herspring 2005:59). After Putin came to power the 
state owned oil-company Gazprom became the largest stakeholder in NTV. Still many of the 
printing press companies are independent and rather critical to the Kremlin. The problem is 
that the circulations of these newspapers are mostly limited to the big cities, and most 
Russians do not use newspapers as their main source of information. 
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7.0 Methodological Chapter  
The main methodological approach in this thesis will be logistic regression. In this chapter 
this method will be presented in detail, explaining why and how this method is used. The 
analysis will also be supplemented with other methods such as cross tablatures and 
frequencies studies when appropriate.   
7.1 Why logistic regression? 
As stated earlier the dependent variables in this thesis are political parties represented in the 
Russian State Duma. These will be coded as dummy variables in the analysis. The value 1 
represents the party that is examined, 0 represents “Other parties”, “Independents” and the 
label “Against All”. The “Did not vote” category is usually excluded unless otherwise is 
noted.  
 
The reasons for using logistic regression instead of ordinary regression are located in the 
dependent variable. As mentioned above the dependent variables are dummy variables, which 
varies between 0 and 1. This has consequence for the assumptions that follow ordinary 
regression analysis. Firstly the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated. This assumption 
means that the variance around the regression line is the same for all values of the predictor 
variable (X). As Ringdal writes:  
 
The variance of the residuals depends on predicted Y and X(…) The consequence is 
that one cannot rely on the estimated coefficients of the standard error and by that not 
the statistical test’s that these are built upon. (Ringdal 2001:428 own translation.)   
 
The second assumption that is violated is the assumption that the effect of X is constant. The 
problem that we are facing here is of a more serious character. This because of the 
possibilities that a value on X can predict probabilities outside the 0-1 interval (Ringdal 
2001). 
 
The violations of these assumptions are solved when using logistic regression. Simply stated 
we change the probabilities to odds. The next step is to make the dependent variable a logit 
which is the natural logarithm of the odds for Y-1. The logistic regression model can be 
defined as: 
Li = B0+ B1Xil+ B2Xi2+…+ BK-1XiK-1 
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In this model the logit is a linear function of the X-variables. This means that the 
probabilities are a non-linear function of the x-variables. The predicated probabilities 
in the figure can never exceed the 0-1 interval. (Ringdal 2001:429) 
 
The problem with the assumption of homoscedasticity is solved by the fact that logistic 
regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) instead of the ordinary least square 
(OLS). MLE does not have the assumption of equal variance. 
 
The Data-sets 
The data that the analysis is based on come from four different sources. Two of these datasets 
are surveys conducted in 1994 and 1996 (Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994 and 
Monitoring Russia 1996).11 The numbers of respondents in these surveys are around 3500 and 
2500 respectively. The two last sources are exit polls conducted in the 1999 and 2003 Duma 
elections.12 These polls include a large number of respondents ranging from 7.700 in 1999 to 
12.700 in 2003.  
 
In the science of statistics the problem of the “band wagon” effect is well known. This is 
particularly important in election studies. Surveys conducted after an election tends to give 
the winner of the recent election better results. In other words, when asked “What party did 
you vote in the recently held election?”, the respondent might answer that he or she voted for 
the winning party, rather then the losing party. The band wagon effect is absent in the exit 
polls since no one knows who is going to win. This is one of the advantages of using the exit 
polls. The disadvantage is that the exit polls usually contains fewer questions, and thereby 
limits the possibilities of creating interesting indexes. 
 
It is important to note that since this thesis is based on different surveys conducted from 
different pollsters and at different times the independent variables used will not be the same 
from analysis to analysis. I have tried to recode variables so that they are as similar as 
possible.  
 
                                                
11 The surveys were conducted by “The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA)” 
12 The data of Exit Polls were conducted by CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative 
social research) and Mitofsky International (USA) 
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The analysis step by step 
The first task is to locate variables that fit our cleavage model. This is however in most cases 
problematic. Quite often one is dealing with data that do not include all variables that 
“should” be included within the model. A social scientist is thus often faced with a trade off: 
many variables few cases on the one hand and few variables many cases on the other hand. 
 
In this thesis there are four models that are being reported. These models are multiple 
regressions meaning that more than one independent variable are included. The advantage of 
using a multiple regression model is that you find effects that are controlled by the other 
independent variables. The first model consists of demographic variables. Depending on what 
variables that are included in the datasets, the variables included are: Age, Gender, Education 
and Geography. The second model includes four indexes (except for the 1996 survey). These 
four indexes are Nostalgia, Individualism, Authoritarianism and Kremlin. The third model 
combines all the variables. The fourth model is determined by the significant from the 
bivariate regressions. In other words, we regress each independent variable against each 
political party included as dependent variables. The purpose of doing this is to see which 
variables are significant. The independent variables failing to meet the 0,05 significance level 
will not be included in the multiple regressions. In the multiple regressions we must also 
expect that some of the independent variables are not significant. Again we must extract 
insignificant variables from the model until all the independent variables are significant.  
 
Now we have four different models that show the regression coefficients, standard error, 
significance level and the odds ratio. We must now find the probability scale for each 
independent variable. This is done through two series of operations. First of all we find the 
predicated logits based on the estimated equation. The constant is added or subtracted from 
the control variables’ coefficients and then multiplied with their respective means. The sum of 
this is used to find the predicated logits for the variable we are examining. By adding or 
subtracting the coefficient with the sum of the equation and multiplied by the values of the 
variable that is studied we find the predicted logit.  
 
Now we can find the predicated probabilities by using the formula of the inverse 
transformation, which is: 
 1 
P=  1+e^-L 
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The last method that will be used is a party pair analysis. Here the purpose is to measure the 
distances between voters. Whereas in the previous analysis we recoded the dependent variable 
as 1=Party A and 0=Others, we now recode the dependent variable as 1=Party A 0=Party B. 
The result from a logistic regression here provides us with the difference between the voters 
of Party A and Party B respectively. The logic here is that if we increase the value in the 
independent variable then the distance between the voters will increase. Since the category 
“Others” is not included then the number of respondents within the dependent variable will 
vary from party pair to party pair.13  
 
Selection of Variables 
For each survey being analysed, there is a list of variables showing which variables that were 
included, their names, and values. In order to achieve a parsimonious design the analysis will 
focus on the significant parties, that is parties that gained representation in the PR-tier. The 
independent variables used in the analysis will vary depending on what surveys are being 
used. But we will try to use variables that are as similar as possible. All analysis will include 
demographic variables, like gender and age.  
                                                
13 Since this method is a bit complicated it might be useful to read how others have applied this method. See for 
instance Evans and Whitefield The Structuring of Political cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia 1998 
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Table 5 Analysis used in thesis  
Analysis Variables included Purpose Measurements 
Model 1 
Demographics 
Model 2 
Indexes 
Model 3 
All variables 
Logistic Regression 
Party by party 
1=Party A  
0=Others 
Model 4 
Only significant 
variables  
Finding party support 
bases 
Odds Ratio, Wald, 
predicted probability, 
standardised 
coefficients 
Logistic Regression 
Party pairs 
1=Party A, 0=Party B
 
Indexes 
Finding differences 
between voters for 
each party pair  
Odds, Wald, 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
 
 
The interpretation of logistic regression 
There are three main scales of interpreting the results in logistic regression. These are the 
logit-, odds- and the probability scale. In the first of these, the logit scale, it is only possible to 
say something about the significance and the direction of the interaction between the 
dependent and independent variable. 
 
The odds scale gives us more possibilities. Here we can study the increase and decrease of 
probabilities when changing the value of the independent variable. Let us for instance assume 
that we have an independent dummy variable such as gender where 1 is male and 0 is female. 
The dependent variable, i.e. what we want to be explained, is the education level among the 
respondents.  If we the results give us an odds ratio at 1 then this means that gender does not 
play a role in determining the education level. An odds ratio greater than 1 tells us that the 
education level increases when the independent variable increases. In other words if you are 
male then your education level will raise.  
 
The last source of interpretation is the probability scale. Particularly when using continuous 
independent variables this technique becomes useful. Here we can also make diagrams that 
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make it easier to view the effects. The details of probability scales will be elaborated later, 
now we focus on a stepwise description of the analysis. 
 
In addition to these three scales it is possible to find the standardised coefficients. This is not 
done by SPSS, so we have to calculate the coefficients by hand.14 This gives us a valuable 
source of understanding the interactions between the dependent and independent variables, 
since it reveals the relative strength of the different independent variables. In other words, by 
including the standardised coefficients we are able to distinguish between important and less 
important variables. The interpretations of the coefficients are quite similar to how we 
interpret these in OLS: “A 1 standard deviation increase in X produces a b* standard 
deviation change in logit (Y)” (Menard 2001:53). 
 
The question of measuring cleavages 
Since one of our main data source is the two exit polls conducted in the 1999 and 2003 Duma 
election we are facing a problem which can be summarised as: many cases, few variables. 
One way of solving this problem is by creating indexes. This thesis operates with a model 
with four indexes. These four are: Nostalgia, Individualism, Authoritarianism and Kremlin.15 
The intention is that these indexes should represent the four axis in the figure presented in 
chapter four (see Figure 3). For the 2003 exit poll we also have a variable that measures the 
voters’ attitudes on how involved the state should be in the economy. This variable is used to 
measure the economic cleavage.  
 
                                                
14 Scott Menard gives a detailed introduction in how to calculate the standardised coefficients. See in particular 
Menard 2001:53 
15 For a more detailed description of how the indexes were created and what variables that constitute the indexes 
see Appendix B. 
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8.0 Analysis: what do the Russians say? 
In this following chapter we will study in detail what the Russian voters “say”. Until now we 
have focused on political parties, different political institutions and elections. In other words 
we have studied the Russian society from above. It is now time to move to the voter level and 
take a more “from below” perspective. The question we ask is what do the Russians say? 
 
 This chapter is organised into two main parts. First of all we will examine the results from 
each party. All together the analysis consists of four main models that are as similar as 
possible in each dataset. In addition there are some models that are specific for the datasets, if 
there are any other variables that need to be included. Secondly the different parties will be 
studied by using different party pairs as dependent variables instead of the vote/non-vote 
dichotomy.  
8.1 Studying party voting through different models 
The structure here is to first present the different models, then explaining the expectation of 
the correlation between the independent and dependent variables.  
 
Model 1 The demographics of the Russian Voter 
Our first model is a demographic as well as geographic one. This model consists of four 
variables: age, gender, education and geography. Two of these variables are not mobile, that 
is age and gender. By saying that they are not mobile we mean that the parties cannot do 
anything to change these variables per se. This is not to say that parties are not able affect 
these variables, but they cannot stop the voters from ageing or being male or female. They 
can, however, for instance promise the voters that life will be better for pensioners and 
women. The two last variables, education and geography, are mobile in the sense that voters 
can change them. Voters can move from rural to urban areas, as well as achieve more 
education. At the same time parties can for instance promise voters improved chances of 
education, and easier communication between different areas of the country.  
 
This model is not an operationalisation of the cleavage model presented in chapter four. (see 
Figure 3) Nevertheless it is an important model that should be included in order to get a better 
understanding of the Russian electorate. The question that arises is therefore the following: 
why are demographics important? First of all they are important because they reveal a rock 
bottom structure of society. If there is a pattern among demographic variables then there is a 
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possibility that there are some deep cleavages that might be correlated with other cleavages. 
In post authoritarian countries demography, in particular age, is extremely important because 
it includes the validation of the past. As times goes you will have a divided electorate – those 
who experienced the former regime and those who did not.   
 
The analysis of model 1 is of a descriptive character in the sense that we do not have any 
specific expectations for this analysis. That being said, we can make some general 
expectations. There might be an urban-rural cleavage such as the one Lipset and Rokkan 
suggested (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For instance we could expect that the parties that we 
could label as liberal parties do well in urban areas. 
 
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables can be viewed in the figure 
below. Education is important because this criterion reveals some information about how the 
intellectual “elites” vote. Geographic relationship can also be a deep historical cleavage, as 
well as an indication of the centre-periphery dimension. 
 
Figure 7 Expectations for Model 1 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the figure the model also stipulates some expectations on the relationship 
between the independent variables. The reason for this is that it is important to view how the 
independent variables affect each other. Another aspect is the fact that if a party has the 
“wrong” combination of for instance highly educated and old aged voters, then this result 
reveals an interesting pattern, since it goes against the trends from the relationship between 
Gender 
Age 
Geography 
Education 
Party Voting
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the independent variables. Furthermore such a combination also narrows the scope of 
electoral support. For instance if the electoral support is among young and uneducated then it 
is quite likely that this party is unique, which would be reflected in campaigning slogans and 
party manifesto.  
 
The correlation analysis between the independent variables supports our expectations on the 
relationship between the independent variables. Age and education correlates negatively 
throughout the surveys and exit polls. The same goes for education and places where 
respondents come from. In other words, high aged and rural voters correlate negatively with 
education.  
 
The results 
If there is one aspect of Russian politics that remains virtually stable, it is the fact that those 
who vote for the Communist Party are old aged. This aspect is demonstrated in many ways. 
The age variable is significant and positive in all the surveys analysed.  
 
Whereas the Communist Party attracted the old aged voters, the LDPR bring to light a 
somewhat opposite pattern. The results from the 1994 study show a positive but insignificant 
result. The age distribution in 1994 is more even than uneven. In 2003 we see that around 1/3 
of the LDPR voters were below 30 years old. As we can see from the standardised 
coefficients, the age variable increases in importance from 1994 to 2003. Zhirinovsky and his 
party have been able to turn its support from old and middle aged voters to the younger part of 
the electorate. Studying the party power as an identical analytical unit, this story goes for 
them as well. The first survey in 1994 indicates that the party of power did well among the 
old aged.  
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This model shows a clear and distinct difference between the parties of power in the Yeltsin 
period and in the Putin period. The VR and the NDR in the Yeltsin period both had significant 
and negative signs on the geographic variable. This means they attracted support in larger 
cities rather than in the countryside. The geographic variable might reveal an important 
explanation for success for the party of power in 2003. In 1999, Unity for the first time revolts 
this trend and the support for party of power now comes from rural areas. In 2003 the results 
are still negative but not so strong. One explanation for this might come from the fact that 
OVR attracted urban voters. It seems plausible that when two parties with different electoral 
support merge, then the potential for gaining more votes together are higher. In other words, 
one explanation for UR success in 2003 was that Unity had the rural votes whereas OVR had 
the urban votes. 
 
The liberal parties do well in the central parts of Russia and in the metropolis in particular. In 
the exit polls it is possible to study the voting behaviour by regions. Although the variable 
records four rather crude categories, it represents a common way of dividing Russia. In 1999 
the Yabloko votes are distributed evenly on three different regions, together accounting  for 
three quarters of their total vote. The fourth region, Eastern Siberia/ Far east, constitutes the 
smallest share of votes with around 13 pct. The SPS follow the same trend, but is more biased 
towards the North/ Central European part. In 2003 this changes dramatically as both parties 
are losing support in all the three regions except for the North/ central European part. Still it is 
important to bear in mind that the liberal parties lost a considerable amount of votes in the 
North/ Central European part. Most notably it seems that these parties lost a great deal of 
votes to the newcomer Rodina. This is in line with the findings from Clem and Craumers 
analysis (Clem and Craumer 2003). 
 
Is there a gender cleavage in Russia? Among the different parties it is the LDPR that produces 
the strongest showings. In the four different datasets taken into consideration the LDPR 
shows positive and significant results in all of them. This means that throughout its electoral 
history the LDPR has managed to consolidate itself a “male voter party”. For the other parties 
we see that the results are mixed. The KPRF have also mostly support from male voters. As 
 71
for the party power the UR shows a fairly strong and negative coefficient. Both the liberal 
parties tend to gain support among the female voters. 
 
The education level among the voters of the different parties shows an interesting relationship 
between the Communist, nationalist and party of power on one hand and the liberals and 
Rodina on the other. The LDPR and Yabloko voters differ from each other on education 
throughout the study. The Communist and party of power however have gone from highly to 
lowly educated voters since 1994. 
 
Before we move on to the next model it would be useful to display some of the findings 
graphically. Here we approach two different ways of doing this. Firstly we can study the 
findings through predicted probabilities. The second way of doing this is by taking the 
standardised coefficients as a point of departure.  
 
The detailed discussion of how to find the predicted probabilities was dealt with in the 
methodological chapter. The advantage of using this method is simply that we can see the 
distribution of voters on the different values on the independent variables.  
Figure 8 Party choice distributed by age using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 2003) 
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If we look at the distribution of party choice by age the communist voters differ from the 
other voters by the sharp increase as the age value grows. This finding is also strengthened by 
looking at the youngest age group (18-24 years). Here the communists have the lowest 
predicted value. The difference between the liberal parties is also interesting since their lines 
cross each other at the age of 50.  
Figure 9 Party choice distributed by places using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 1999) 
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Figure 10 Party choice distributed by places using predicted probabilities (Source: Exit Poll 2003) 
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The figures also indicate the numerical strength of the respective political parties. As is shown 
in the figurers from 2003 exit poll, the party of power, the United Russia has far more support 
than the other parties. A comparison between the 1999 and 2003 figures disclose a continuous 
relationship between the liberal parties on the one hand and the party of power, communist 
and LDPR on the other. As is mentioned above there might be a possibility that the merger 
between Unity and OVR has led to a more even distribution of voters by geography for the 
UR party. The figure might support this prospect. The slope of the UR line is not increasing 
so much as the Unity slope.  
 
We have so far focused on the distribution of voters by looking at predicted probabilities. If 
we use the standardised coefficients we can produce some more interesting graphs by 
combining two different variables. This is a more coherent and way of doing this since we can 
combine two variables by using simple scatter plots. The graphs thereby create a two 
dimensional political space which consists of four different “kinds” of voters. The figure 
includes all the dependent variables used from the surveys and exit polls analysed. We must 
therefore view this figure with caution since the different results come from different 
variables. The reason why we are using this is to asses a picture of how the parties have 
developed in terms of voter support. The figure also includes the insignificant results. In 
practise, values below 0,030 on the axis are usually insignificant. In other words the closer the 
unit move towards the zero value of the axis the more likely the result is insignificant. 
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Figure 11 Voters on the age and geographic variable (Standardised coefficients) 
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The graph shows, as stated earlier, that there is a difference between the parties of power in 
the Yeltsin and the Putin period respectively. We also note the distance between Unity and 
OVR, which may be a plausible explanation for the position of UR. The SPS voters are young 
and urban, whereas the Yabloko voters tend to be older but still urban. The KPRF clearly 
represent an “outlier” in this scatter plot. A substantial explanation why the KPRF in 1996 is 
located so far to left on the place variable, might be that they unleashed the huge support 
among voters who reside in the red-black belt. This belt is a band of units that stretches: 
 
…along the southern arc of oblast stretching from Tver’ and Smolensk in the west and 
extending through Bryansk, Kaluga, Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Lipetsk and 
Tambov oblast, down into the North Caucaus foreland, then across the Volga region, 
thence along the southern tier of units in Siberia (Clem and Craumer 1995:604). 
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The belt is named “red” after its political colour and “black” after the colour of the soil. As we 
have discussed earlier in the election chapter, KPRF’s electoral success in the 1995 Duma 
election might be as a result of the fact that the party had an organisational advantage that was 
used efficiently. 
 
Figure 12 Voters on the education and place variable (Standardised Coefficients) 
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The figure reveals that the education variable is less important than the geographic variable. 
This is reflected in the fact that the units are not scattered far from each other on this axis. The 
differences are strongest between the liberal parties and the LDPR. 
 
How well does the model function? This question is best answered when we include model 1 
and model 2, resulting in Model 3. Here we can test if the new model entered represents a 
significant change.  
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Model 2 the attitudes of the Russian voters 
In this model we try to operationalise the cleavage model that was presented in chapter four. 
The model consists of four different indexes that seek to measure different attitudes among 
the voters. 
 
The datasets available limit us to measure the different cleavages directly. The individualism 
and authoritarian index might be considered as operationalisations of the Zapadniki 
Slavophile axis. This is a rather crude operationalisation, but it seems plausible that a 
Zapadniki minded voter is more individualistic at the same time as a Slavophile is more 
authoritarian. It has not been possible for the author to create indexes that measure the 
economic view of the voters. The exceptions are for the 2003 exit poll. The findings from this 
index are presented later in model five. The table below intends to summarise the 
combination between individualism and authoritarianism. 
 
Table 8 Suggesting the relationship between Individualism and Authoritarianism 
 Not authoritarian Authoritarian 
Individualistic Democratic minded voters 
(Zapadniki) 
Individualistic authoritarian 
Not Individualistic Indifferenced voters Anti Democratic voters 
(Slavophile) 
 
 
We expect a negative correlation between individualism and authoritarianism. The reason for 
this is that they represent different values. An individualist is measured whether he or she 
endorses democratic values such as freedom of speech and human rights. Authoritarian voters 
on the other hand sacrifice these views in support for a more centralised state and a 
strengthening of the state in military power. The relationship between the Kremlin and the 
Nostalgia index is also believed to be negative. Since nostalgia is a way of endorsing the past 
it seems logical that the same voters would reject the present regime.  
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Figure 13 Expectations for Model 2 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= positive 
  = negative 
Thus the model suggests that if you have negative values on one of the indexes then this will 
affect the opposite index positively which again will effect party voting. This can be 
exemplified in the figure below. 
 
Figure 14 An example of two different voters 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= positive 
  = negative 
The Nostalgia and Kremlin index is more traceable to the cleavage model presented in chapter 
four. Simply stated we can say that the nostalgic index is a judgement of the past and the 
Kremlin index is a judgement of the present. 
Individualism 
Nostalgia Kremlin 
Authoritarianism
Party Voting
Individualism 
Nostalgia Kremlin 
Authoritarianism
A liberal 
party 
A Nostalgic 
party 
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The results 
Taking the individualism and authoritarian index as a starting point, we must begin by 
searching combinations so that we can place the parties on Zapadniki Slavophile axis. The 
first impression from the results when viewing the significance levels is that these indexes are 
less important than the other indexes. The individualism and authoritarian index have more 
insignificant results than the nostalgia and Kremlin index.16 A tentative conclusion can 
therefore be that the Zapadniki Slavophile cleavage is less important than the other cleavages 
such as the economical, nostalgia and the centre periphery cleavage. Still we must also view 
the importance of the variables in concert with other variables. The standardised coefficients 
allow us to draw some conclusions on the importance of the variable compared to the other. 
The most important cleavage in 1994 seems to be the one between the past and the present. 
This is hardly surprising since the election 1993 was a transitional one. The former Soviet 
regime was still fresh in the voters mind. As time goes by the positive attitudes towards the 
past will probably decline and more negatively attitudes will rise. In 1999 the individualism 
index increases its importance, in particular with the liberal parties on the one hand and the 
Communist and Unity on the other. In 2003 both individualism and authoritarianism 
decreases except for the liberal parties. 
 
The individualistic voters tend to vote for the liberal parties. This is a result that was expected. 
One of the parties that gain support from more collectivistic minded voters is the KPRF. 
Given the collectivistic nature of the communist regime, it is reasonable to expect this. As for 
the different parties of power the results are mixed. In particular the difference between Unity 
in 1999 and UR in 2003 is striking. Here the direction of the relationship has changed. The 
voters of Zhirinovsky do not show significant results on the individualism index until the 
2003 exit poll. Here the results are negative and rather weak.  
                                                
16 Not counting the 1996 survey, the Individualism index has seven insignificant results, Authoritarianism three, 
Nostalgia two and Kremlin two. 
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If we combine the results with the authoritarian index the picture becomes even more 
complex. Only KPRF and SPS in 1999 display the expected and significant outcome. The 
KPRF are collectivistic and authoritarian whereas SPS voters are the opposite. As for the 
Zhirinovsky party the findings are as expected positive and significant.  
 
As we did with the analysis of model 1 we can try to illustrate the relationship between the 
different independent variables using line graphs and scatter plots. Starting with the 
individualism index from the 2003 exit poll we see quite clearly which parties that display 
individualist voters (see Figure 15). Another striking feature of the graph is how close the 
Yabloko and SPS voters are located on the line.  
 
 
 
Figure 15 Party choice distributed by degree of individualism using predicted probabilities (Source exit 
poll 2003) 
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As for the authoritarian index the graph displays a divided electorate (see Figure 16). Again it 
is interesting to see how close the liberal lines are to each other. 
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Figure 16 Party choice distributed by degree of authoritarianism using predicted probabilities (Source 
exit poll 2003) 
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It would be fair to say that the LDPR shows authoritarian tendencies because of the party’s 
leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Does the correlation go beyond the admiration of the party’s 
charismatic leader? It seems that there is a xenophobic wave coming in over Russia. The 
Moscow Human Rights Bureau estimated that there were around 50.000 skinheads in 
Russia.17 Many interpreted the revival of LDPR and the strong showing of Rodina in 2003 as 
a sign that nationalism is on the march. On the other hand a survey of more than 1500 youths 
across Russia gave ground for a more moderated view. This survey was conducted in 2004 
and concluded that: “aggressive xenophobia (…), has become a marginal phenomenon and 
extremist ideologies have lost their sway among the overwhelming majority of young people” 
(Bransten 2004, RFE/ RL). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Figures were reported in a Report on neo-Nazi trends in Russia. See http://antirasizm.ru/english_rep_007.doc. 
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Figure 17 Voters on the individualism and authoritarian index (Standardised coefficients) 
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What can be seen from this scatter-plot is that the 2003 exit poll marks a sharper cleavage 
between the liberals and the other parties. The exception is Rodina which has significant 
negative sign on the Authoritarian index and negative, but not significant, on the 
Individualism index. This might be viewed in light of what was suggested by Clem and 
Craumer that the liberals lost some votes to Rodina.  
 
The Nostalgic and the Kremlin index are perhaps the most important variables throughout the 
surveys that are studied in this thesis. This is seen through the standardised coefficients.  
Almost all parties throughout the various analyses of the different datasets have either the 
Kremlin or the Nostalgia index as the most important variable.  
 
The KPRF stands out as the most nostalgic party in our analysis. This is one of the most 
important variables that explain the voting behaviour of this party. It is interesting to see that 
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the voters recognise both Unity and UR as nostalgic. This can imply that their support for the 
Kremlin parties are based upon a belief that these parties together with President Putin are 
able to give them the economic security they once had in the previous regime. As with the 
geographic variable there is a difference between the parties of power from the Yeltsin and 
Putin period. VR did not display nostalgic attitudes, at the same time as NDR were more 
optimistic towards the future.18   
 
As expected both Yabloko and SPS voters are right through negative towards the past. It 
would be strange if a nostalgic voter should vote for parties that advocate an abrupt change 
from the past. Furthermore the importance of being non nostalgic tend to increase from 1999 
to 2003.  
 
We note that the LDPR voters in 94 displayed a nostalgic, albeit insignificant view towards 
the past. This was not the case in 1999 and 2003. Here the results are negative and significant. 
The nationalistic voters share the same trend as the liberals in that the negative attitude to the 
past increases over time. 
 
The Kremlin index justifies the categorisation of VR, NDR, Unity and UR as “Party of 
power”. We see that all the parties except VR have the Kremlin variable as the most 
important variable. As for VR it is the Nostalgia variable that is most important. This can 
partly be explained by the fact that the need for the Party to distance itself from the past was 
more important than supporting the Kremlin. On the other hand, a strong aversion for the past 
might also be a strong support for the present. 
 
The SPS voters might give us an indication of how the Russian party system has developed 
between the two last Duma elections. This thesis has discussed the stance of SPS towards 
Kremlin. Many of its top candidates had previous experience inside the governments, as well 
as top positions in state firms. In 1999 this was reflected by the voters given the fact that the 
results were positive and significant. In the last election this index was still positive but not 
significant. This might be a result of a sharper polarization on the Kremlin axis, and that the 
SPS has not succeeded in choosing either to be a fully liberal and oppositional party or a 
                                                
18 In the 1996 we do not have an operationalisation of nostalgia, individualism and authoritarianism. In stead the 
model consist of a Kremlin index and a variable that measures the voters view on how the future will turn out 
economically.  
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liberal “loyal” party. Yabloko voters distinguish themselves from SPS in that they are 
negative towards Kremlin. The LDPR voters are together with the KPRF negative towards 
Kremlin. 
Figure 18 Voters distributed by stance towards Kremlin using predicted probabilities (Source Exit poll 
1999) 
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Figure 19 Voters distributed by stance towards Kremlin using predicted probabilities (source Exit Poll 
2003) 
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These two graphs quite clearly demonstrate how the two parties of power in the Putin period 
have been successfully aligning the pro-Kremlin voters.  
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Displaying the results from the Nostalgia and Kremlin index in a scatter-plot we see that here 
the cases are more spread than the individualism-authoritarianism scatter-plot.19 In other 
words, the Nostalgia and Kremlin indexes have a more polarising effect on the voters.  
 
Figure 20 Voters on the Nostalgia and Kremlin index (Standardised coefficients) 
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Model 3 Towards a more coherent model? 
In this model it is possible to achieve a more coherent picture of the Russian voters. By 
including both models into one, we will be able to see in a more detailed manner how the 
different variables affect each other. In other words, the multiple model gives results for each 
independent variable that are controlled for by the other variables.  
 
                                                
19 The reader should note that the two different scatter plots have different scales on the X and Y axis. This 
means that in the Individualism –Authoritarian scatter plots the case are closer the centre than is showed. The 
reason for this is of practical character. By decreasing the scales on the axis it becomes easier to see the labels of 
each party.  
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Most importantly the standardised coefficients make it possible to study which variable 
explains most of the variance in the data. In other words do we have cases in which the 
demographic variables explain more than the indexes and vice versa? 
In all analyses the extending of the model, i.e. combining Model 1 and Model 2, gives a clear 
increase in level of significance. We can thereby conclude that extending the model to include 
both Model 1 and Model 2 gives us a better understanding of voting behaviour. 
 
This model allows us to see how the relationship between the indexes and the demographic 
variable is. One obvious comparison is the one between Age and Nostalgia. Again the picture 
seems clear that the KPRF are moving upwards on the age scale whereas the LDPR are going 
downwards. 
Figure 21 Voters on the Age variable and the Nostalgia index (Standardised coefficients) 
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Another interesting combination is the Kremlin index and the geographic variable. The 
scatter-plot reveals that the support for parties that endorse Kremlin has gone from urban to 
rural areas since 1994. As we mentioned above in the analysis of model 1 there is a clear and 
distinct difference between the parties of power in the Yeltsin period and the Putin period. 
This becomes more evident in this scatter-plot.  
 
We also see that the three longest surviving parties, Yabloko, LDPR and KPRF are clearly 
divided on the geographic variable. The parties stay in their categories throughout the datasets 
that are analysed. This is an important observation since it gives an indication of a stable and 
possibly deep cleavage between the oppositional parties.  
 
Figure 22 Voters on the geographic variable and Kremlin index (Standardised coefficients) 
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Model 4 A more Robust Model 
This model is constituted of variables that were significant in the bivariate regression. The 
reason for using this model is to exclude variables that are not significant and thereby having 
a model that explains more of the variation in the different datasets. This model is therefore 
more robust, since the results are more reliable. 
 
The results from model 4 do not reveal any significant new changes. The directions of the 
relationships between the various dependent and independent variables are the same. The 
changes are found in the strengths of the relationships.  
 
Model 5 Including the Economic Cleavage 
This model is based on variables that are unique in the sense that they do not exist in the other 
datasets. There are two different variables from the 96 and 03 datasets that are of interest. In 
the 1996 dataset there is no operationalisation of nostalgic, individualism or authoritarianism 
indexes. There is however a future index that is included, in addition to the Kremlin index. 
We have not included the economic cleavage so far but this potential is realised in the 2003 
exit poll. To measure the economic cleavage we here use a question of how much the state 
should involve in the economy.20Again if we examine the relationship through various scatter 
plots and linear graphs, another interesting pattern emerges.  
 
Figure 23 Voters distributed by economic stance using predicted probabilities (Source Exit Poll 2003) 
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20 The results can be viewed in Appendix E. 
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First of all it seems that the voters do not recognise the Kremlin backed party as a pro market 
economic party. Based on the fact that the United Russia did not have any particularly clear 
cut party programme this might not be surprising. The party makes general statements on 
economic issues rather than specific. An example of this is could be one of its economic 
statements: “The development of an economy based on powerful production potential, 
modern technologies and the efficient use of natural resources” (RenCap 2003 [online]). The 
parties that share this negative view of market economy are KPRF and Rodina. This is 
expected since they both are campaigning on leftwing economic issues. The parties that 
favour the market economic reforms are the Yabloko, SPS and LDPR. Interestingly enough 
we see that both LDPR and SPS cross the UR line on the “Strong pro market” category. This 
means that although the UR is a strong party in numerical sense, it is not so strong that it 
covers a vast majority of the Russian voters. When including the economic variable, we have 
found another polarising effect on the Russian party system. The voters are clearly divided on 
the economic issue. Be that as it may, most Russians are not in favour of the market 
economy.21  
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 On the economy index used in exit poll 2003 only 5,8 pct of the respondents can be labelled as pro market 
economy in that they did not want that the government should involve in the economy.  
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8.2 Studying distances between voters through party pairs 
So far we have focused on each party’s voters. We have been able to show how the respective 
parties’ voters respond to the indexes. In addition we have cast into light the demographic 
variables and their effect on party choice. The dependent variables have been based on 
whether the respondent voted for the party or not. It is now time to look at distances between 
different voters.22 
 
Rather than discussing the findings for each variable, the intention here is to study the 
analysis through different sets of party combinations. There are four different models that 
stand out as the most interesting ones. First of all it is the difference between the three longest 
surviving parties, KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko. Since they have been participating in all 
elections it sounds reasonable that these parties also have developed a stable distance between 
each others. The second party pair model that needs attention is the one between Yabloko and 
SPS. Since both are labelled as liberal we must search for what their respective differences. 
The third model deals with the problematic classification of Rodina. In the classification of 
the Russian party system (See Table 2 in chapter four), the question of whether Rodina should 
be classified as a nostalgic oppositional party or a nationalistic party was raised. In this 
analysis at least the voters might give us a lead. The last and fourth model is taking the 
“parties of power” into consideration. 
 
Model 1 KPRF versus LDPR versus Yabloko 
If we look at the parties that have contested all four elections, KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko, we 
see a certain degree of stability. For most of the variables the signs are the same. Those that 
have changed have not been significant. The differences between the communists and the 
liberals are continuous, in that the communist voters are always more nostalgic, less positive 
towards Kremlin and less individualistic than the Yabloko voters. The distance between the 
communists and the nationalists are first and foremost based on the nostalgic variable. The 
results from the other variables are mixed.  
 
                                                
22 In the following I shall use the words ”strong”  and “weak” when I comment results that show big distances 
between the parties. This might not be the proper words to use, since the unstandardised coefficients can not 
predict the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. Nevertheless a high 
unstandardised coefficient means that there is a “high” distance between the respective voters.  
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Table 11 Model 1 the distance between KPRF, LDPR and Yabloko from 1994 to 2003 (Unstandardised 
Coefficients) 
* significant at p < 0,05 
** significant at p < 0,01 
 
The examination of the different Yabloko-LDPR pairs, give ground for concluding that there 
might be a Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage among the Russian electorate. The LDPR voters 
are more authoritarian and less individualistic than the Yabloko voters. In fact if we include 
the results for the SPS-LDPR pairs in 1999 and 2003 the same pattern emerge.23 
 
Model 2 The fight between the liberals(?) 
We must not forget that this is the voter’s view of the national politics. The expectations for 
Yabloko and SPS are that their respective voters will display similar attitudes on most of the 
indexes. This is reflected if the regression produces weak (values near nil) coefficients and 
insignificant values.  
 
                                                
23 A regression with the SPS-LDPR pair (SPS=1 and LDPR=0) shows positive and significant coefficients on the 
individualism index and negative and significant coefficients on the authoritarian index. See Appendix H 
 
Year 
1994 1999 2003 
 
Party Pair 
KPRF 
LDPR 
KPRF 
YABLOKO
YABLOKO 
LDPR 
KPRF 
LDPR 
KPRF 
YABLOKO
YABLOKO
LDPR 
KPRF 
LDPR 
KPRF 
YABLOKO
YABLOKO
LDPR 
 
Nostalgia 
 
 
0,928** 
 
1,427** 
 
-0,550** 
 
1,010* 
 
1,158* 
 
-0,129 
 
0,990** 
 
1,029** 
 
-0,117 
 
Individualism 
 
 
-0,237 
 
-0,334 
 
-0,017 
 
-1,077** 
 
-1,477** 
 
0,332* 
 
-0,232** 
 
-0,885** 
 
0,634** 
 
Authori-
tarianism 
 
 
-0,820** 
 
0,133 
 
-0,697** 
 
-0,446** 
 
-0,194 
 
-0,227* 
 
0,026 
 
0,706** 
 
-0,577** 
 
Kremlin 
 
 
-0,027 
 
-0,837* 
 
0,638** 
 
-0,291* 
 
-0,235* 
 
-0,090 
 
-0,124 
 
-0,301** 
 
0,126 
 
Initial -2log 
Likelihood 
 
 
392,728 
 
260,077 
 
448,202 
 
1698,118
 
2108,508 
 
1328,868 
 
3966,79 
 
2330,256 
 
2563,58 
 
Model chi 
square  
 
81,755 
 
 
169,049 
 
 
68,781 
 
390,949 
 
813,711 
 
25,819 
 
429,464 
 
654,197 
 
167,157 
 
N 
 
 
351 
 
311 
 
376 
 
2358 
 
 2620 
 
1026 
 
3231 
 
2430 
 
2317 
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Table 12 Model 2 the distance between Yabloko and SPS from 1999 to 2003  
 
 
Year 
1999 2003 
 
Party Pair 
YABLOKO 
SPS 
YABLOKO 
SPS 
 
Nostalgia 
 
 
0,058 
 
0,085 
 
Individualism 
 
 
-0,419** 
 
-0,061 
 
Authoritarian 
 
 
-0,163 
 
-0,169* 
 
Kremlin 
 
 
-0,775** 
 
-0,704** 
 
Initial -2log 
Likelihood 
 
 
1778,63 
 
1878,24 
 
Model chi square  
 
 
171,564 
 
128,534 
 
N 
 
 
1415 
 
1517 
* significant at p < 0,05 
** significant at p < 0,01 
 
 
What is interesting is that the voters are able to recognize the differences between the parties 
so clearly. The Yabloko - SPS distance is very low with exception of one aspect that is the 
stance towards the Kremlin. Judging from the coefficients and the significance level the 
Kremlin index is what separates the liberal opposition from each other. Although this might 
lead us to believe that the Russian voters are well informed about what goes on in Moscow, 
we must remember from the analysis of demographics that the SPS and Yabloko voters are 
well educated and live in the metropolis.  
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Figure 24 Distance between Yabloko and SPS showing predicted probabilities (Source Exit Poll 2003)  
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The figure shows the relationship between the liberals on the indexes. The further you move 
to the right along the X-axis the more positive you are on the index. Another aspect that is 
captured in the graph is that if the lines are above 0,5 it is more likely that one votes Yabloko. 
As we see both the Authoritarianism and Individualism indexes, which are not significant, lie 
around the 0,5 line. The Nostalgic index which is positive and significant show a slow 
increase, meaning that the more nostalgic you get the more likely it is that you will vote for 
Yabloko. The most important information from this graph is how the Kremlin line 
dramatically drops as the stance becomes more positive.  
 
If we compare the results from the two different exit polls we see that the distances are 
decreasing from 1999 to 2003. This could indicate that the voters are becoming more “united” 
in the fight against anti liberal forces. Still the major difference between the liberal parties are 
how to view the Kremlin, this seems to be the major obstacle in the prospect for a coalition 
between them.  
 
Model 3 Rodina a nostalgic or a nationalistic party? 
As we have mentioned above it is believed that Rodina is a “brain child” from Kremlin. The 
party’s purpose is to “steal” voters from the KPRF so that the largest opposition party would 
be weakened. When we compare the Communist party and Rodina the strongest difference 
between the parties is how to judge the past. Rodina voters are also more liberal-minded than 
the KPRF in that they are more individualistic and less authoritarian. This goes for the 
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comparison with the LDPR voters as well, albeit here the individualist index is not significant. 
Whereas the communist are more nostalgic this is not the case for the nationalist. Here the 
Rodina are more nostalgic. 
 
Table 13 Model 3 The distance between Rodina, KPRF and LDPR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* significant at p < 0,05 
** significant at p < 0,01 
 
It therefore seems that the Rodina voters lie between the Communists and the Nationalist. The 
exception is on the Kremlin index, here Rodina attract voters that are less sceptic towards the 
Kremlin. Still as we remember from the previous analysis the Rodina voters are negative 
towards Kremlin. The voters therefore have given us a clear cut answer of how to categorise 
this party. The party display nostalgic attitudes and thereby compete for the communist 
voters. The Rodina voters are also not supportive towards the Kremlin, and not authoritarian. 
If we base our classification of the Russian party system on the voters’ perspective then it 
seems more reasonable to categorise Rodina as a nostalgic opposition.  
 
 
Year 
 
 
2003 
 
Party Pair 
KPRF 
RODINA 
LDPR 
RODINA 
 
Nostalgia 
 
 
0,600** 
 
-0,379** 
 
Individualism 
 
 
-0,284** 
 
-0,108 
 
Authoritarian 
 
 
0,303** 
 
0,322** 
 
Kremlin 
 
 
-0,378** 
 
-0,234** 
 
Initial -2log 
Likelihood 
 
 
3875,73 
 
3687,32 
 
Model chi 
square  
 
281,574 
 
65,729 
 
N 
 
 
2865 
 
2752 
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Model 4 Party of power 
The party pair analysis demonstrates, once again, that it seems quite clear that the Russian 
voters have no problem with identifying the party of power. In all the datasets studied here the 
results are positive, significant and strong. In addition we see that the distance is increasing. 
This might underline the polarising effect of the Kremlin-Periphery axis.  
 
As we have commented earlier it is possible to distinguish between the Party of power during 
the Yeltsin and the Putin period. In the 1994 survey, the party of power is less nostalgic than 
KPRF and Yabloko. In both the 1999 and the 2003 exit poll the results are the same for the 
pairs including KPRF, but for the other pairs the results are positive. This means for one thing 
that the party with the most nostalgic voters are without doubt the KPRF, but it also shows 
that the voters who endorse Putin do not necessarily reject the Communist regime. 
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9.0 Conclusion 
 
How well did the intuitive model perform - towards a revised model? 
If we look at the suggested cleavage model for the Russian case in chapter four, there are at 
least two of the proposed cleavages that perform well. These are the Kremlin and Nostalgia 
cleavage. As for the Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage, we have been limited by the variables 
included in the various datasets. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the authoritarian and 
individualism index might give us a hint of where to locate the parties. The economic 
cleavage that was measured in the last exit poll did not produce strong results. This could be 
taken as evidence that the owner-worker cleavage that has been crucial in the formation of the 
various party systems in Western-Europe does not play a similar role in the Russian Party 
System. In other words the left-right dimension is not suited to the Russian case. There are 
several reasons for this. One plausible explanation might be the weak Labour Unions, and 
thereby weak relationship between employers and employees.  
 
One of the most interesting findings in our analysis is the nostalgic attitudes of the two parties 
of power in 1999 and 2003. These were as we have seen positive and significant. This is not 
in line with our expectations. Probably some parts of the party, that is candidates, MP’s, 
leaders etc. will consider the UR as a modernising party, in reforming Russia towards a 
market economy. But the voters do not seem to agree with this picture.  
 
The voters of the liberal parties seem to fit in to our model. Both parties have display positive 
and rather high results on the individualism index. As for the Nationalists and LDPR in 
particular we are a bit struck by the combination of high scores among the younger part of 
electorate and their authoritarian values.  
 
The Communists are mostly characterised by an old aged and nostalgic electorate. It will be 
interesting to see how the KPRF will manage to cope with this challenge in the future. In my 
view it is too early to consider the Communists as a waning actor on the political scene. The 
reason for this is twofold. First of all it is still the largest oppositional party, secondly it has 
huge organizational resources to draw on. 
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Based on the various analyses we can now revise our intuitive cleavage-model presented in 
chapter four. First of all we have certainly located a strong and polarising cleavage in the 
Kremlin-Periphery. This cleavage is the strongest and most enduring cleavage among the 
Russian voters. Secondly the analysis has shown a cleavage on the Nostalgia variable. The 
third observation is a clear cultural cleavage between the Liberals on the one hand and the 
Nationalist on the other. This can be expressed in our revised cleavage model: 
 
Figure 25 A revised cleavage model 
      Kremlin 
               
               UR 
  
       Zapadniki      Slavophile 
 
   
            
    SPS    
 Future                 Nostalgia 
           
       RODINA 
    YABLOKO       
     LDPR     
      
             
      
          KPRF 
      Periphery 
 
 
 
The logic in this model is not the same as in the Lipset-Rokkan model showed in chapter four 
(see Figure 1). The horizontal axis can be viewed as one linear continuum. On the left side of 
the vertical axis we find the parties that are nostalgic. Here the KPRF are the most nostalgic 
party. On the right side of we find parties that are not nostalgic towards the former communist 
regime.  
 
The vertical axis is quite similar to the Centre – Periphery cleavage that the Lipset-Rokkan 
model suggests. The difference is that this cleavage does not necessarily resemble the Urban-
Rural cleavage. As we have seen the party of power in the Putin period have a voting support 
that is located in the rural areas rather than the urban areas of Russia. This cleavage is 
therefore more a question of political power and the control the executive. The horizontal axis 
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is dividing the parties that are pro- and anti-Kremlin. The model thus distinguishes between 
the two different liberal parties. As we see SPS is positive and Yabloko is negative towards 
the Kremlin. 
 
The model is also incorporating the Zapadniki-Slavophile cleavage. This is marked with the 
stippled vertical axis. Most importantly divides the liberals from the nationalistic party. This 
pattern is in line whit we the expectation that was presented in the last part of chapter four. It 
is perhaps not so difficult to understand that this historical cleavage still plays a vital role in 
the Russian political system. As we mentioned in the chapter two the Russian state- and 
perhaps more important nation-building is an unfinished task. As a result the disagreement, on 
which path the Russian State should take or follow, becomes an important question for many 
Russian voters.  
 
There are two more observations from the incorporation of the stippled axis that should be 
noted. First of all the axis indicates that all parties right to the stippled axis are not Zapadniki 
oriented. Secondly, and following this argument, this also means that the parties that advocate 
such a policy are a minority in the Russian political system.  
 
The parties are placed within this figures based on the observations from the quantitative 
analyses and the qualitative analyses in chapter four and six. The party that was difficult to 
figure where to place was Rodina. The reason for this is twofold. First of there has been done 
little research on this party. This is probably because the party is newly established. Secondly 
the results in chapter eight did not provide us with a particular clear picture. On the one hand 
the party seems to be somewhat similar to the KPRF, but on the other it also seems to share 
some of the Liberal voters’ attitudes. The Rodina-voters are a bit nostalgic and old aged, but 
at the same time urban and highly educated.  
 
The future of the party system in Russia 
The 2007 parliamentary election will have an electoral system that uses PR and a 7 pct 
threshold. One thing that is evident from the discussion on electoral systems and the history of 
the State Duma, is the fact that the reform from above does not necessarily produce the 
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wanted outcome. The Party of power will most likely not be able to secure their two-third 
majority in the State Duma.24 
 
The 7 pct threshold may also force the two liberal parties Yabloko and SPS to cooperate and 
contest the elections on the same ballot. On the other hand the distances between these parties 
might be too far. In a study of the two parties’ election manifestos Hale argues that this 
distance is evident. According to Hale Yabloko stresses to move from “an oligarchical system 
to a welfare state for citizens” and an elimination of poverty, whereas SPS had a more 
philosophical discourse that was distant from the average Russian voter (Hale 2005:375). 
Furthermore as our analysis has shown there is a difference between the liberal voters on how 
to judge the Kremlin. A merger between these parties will probably alienate some of the SPS 
voters to the party of power.  
 
As for the other parties it is even harder to predict how this will develop. If we are to judge 
from the age variable, then the KPRF will lose more votes and LDPR will increase its share of 
the electorate. Rodina seems even harder to predict since the party has not, at least in our 
analysis, established a clear alignment to the voters. In the aftermath of the presidential 
election in 2004, the top candidates were divided on which path the party should take.  
 
Democracy in Russia 
It is my view that one of the major obstacles for consolidating democracy in Russia lies 
within the anti-party nature of the presidents elected so far. Boris Yeltsin himself admits that 
there were lost opportunities (Linz and Stepan 1996). Since the presidents so far have refused 
to be officially and formally linked with parties, then parties do not play such an important 
role in the political sphere since. 
 
The rather stable alignment between the parties and voters is thus therefore a rather promising 
prospect for democracy in Russia. As we saw in chapter 5 on the Russian State Duma, the 
parties are capable of acting in a coherent way and thereby making the Parliament a stronger 
institution. This gives ground for optimism because the Russian political system thereby has 
an inbuilt dynamic which cannot be controlled by one or few persons alone.  
 
                                                
24 An average of electoral support in surveys conducted by Levada shows around 39 pct for 2005. (See 
http://www.levada.ru/reitingi2005.html)  
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The missing cleavage (?) 
Through the analysis of a wide range of surveys we have been able to demonstrate that there 
are significant cleavages within the Russian electorate. This is positive in the sense that it is 
possible to manifest them, and cultivate them in a parliamentary democracy. The stabilising 
effect of such a manner is important to stress. A deep cleavage is not a value in itself; it is the 
manifestation of it that becomes important.  
 
We are thus faced with an important theoretical as well as empirical dilemma: how do we deal 
with non-manifested but still significant latent cleavages? As we have seen through the 
theoretical as well as analysis chapter, the peripheral cultural axis is missing in the Russian 
party system. Russia is more ethnically homogeneous than the Soviet Union. Still 
approximately 20 pct of the Russian population are not what we can call ethnic Russians. One 
might argue that extremist organizations should be banned because democracy does not 
tolerate parties and organizations that do not respect human rights. If we extend the argument 
we could also say, that allowing such interest to participate, is a way of legitimising such 
societal forces, and even reinforcing them. On the other hand, if the Russian minorities are not 
allowed to organise on sectional interest, why should they accept parties that lash out at them. 
Is it democratic to allow the parties to organise on “Russification” of the minorities? 
 
How well did the Lipset Rokkan framework perform in the Russian case? 
Studying the Russian Political system through the concept of cleavage has proven to be very 
vibrant. The analysis in chapter eight has revealed a pattern of stability. In particular the 
centre-periphery axis has an important explanation for the development of the political parties 
in Russia. As have been stated several times in this thesis the centre-periphery axis must be 
understood in terms of political power and not necessarily in terms of geography. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that although the party system in Russia might seem unstable, 
the voters reveal a remarkably stable relationship. It seems clear that the alignment which is 
an ongoing process has, if not stabilised, then at least developed a pattern. We can thus 
conclude that cleavage both as a concept and as an analytical tool provides a better 
understanding of Post Communist Russia. 
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Appendix A List of Abbreviations 
 
CPSU – Communist Party of Soviet Union 
 
KPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
 
LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation 
 
NDR – Our Home is Russia 
 
OVR – Fatherland – All Russia 
 
RODINA – Motherland  
 
SPS – Union of Right Forces 
 
UR – United Russia 
 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialists Republics 
 
VR – Russia’s Choice 
 
Yabloko- Yavlinsky – Lukin – Boldyrev Bloc 
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Appendix B List of indexes 
Most indexes consist of more than one variable. The exceptions are the Nostalgic index in 
1999 and 2003, and the Economic index in 2003. The process of creating the indexes was the 
following:  
 
- Firstly the selected variables were recoded as dummy variables.  
- The second step was to compute the new dummy variables into one variable. For 
instance: Individualism = Indi_dummy_1 + Indi_dummy_2 + Indi_dummy_3. 
We thus have a scale that range from zero to three.  Where the value zero indicates 
that the respondent did not answer value 1 on any of the dummy variables, and value 
three indicates that respondent answered the value 1 on all the dummy variables.  
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Political and economic problems Russia 1994 
 
Index 
 
Variable index were 
created from 
 
 
Old Values 
 
New Values 
Variable 30 
“Where would you 
place the 1989 socialist 
economy 
on this scale?” 
 
1. The best/highest 
mark  
2.  
3.  
4. 
5.  
6. Good enough  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11. Neither good, nor 
bad  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16. Bad enough 
17.  
18.  
19.  
20.  
21. The worst/lowest 
mark 
1 = 1-10 
0 = 11-21 
Variable 33 
“If you compare your 
family’s modern 
economical 
situation with your 
economical situation 
five years ago, could 
you say that it was...” 
 
1. Much better 
2. A little better 
3. Same 
4. A little bit worse 
5. Much worse 
1 = 1, 2 
0 = 4, 5 
Nostalgia 
Variable 82 
“It would be better to 
restore the former 
communist system?” 
 
1.Absolutely agree 
2. Rather agree 
3. Rather no 
4. No 
 
1 = 1, 2 
0 = 3, 4 
Individualism Variable 50 
“Who is to blame for 
your economic 
problems? 
And how much? - We, 
Russians, ourselves” 
 
 
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. A little 
4. No 
8. Difficult to answer 
9. NA 
1 = 1, 2 
0 = 3, 4 
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 Variable 66 
It is most important to 
save silence and order 
in our country.  
 It is most important to 
have personal liberty, 
the right to do 
everything one wants 
without state 
interference. 
 
1. I absolutely agree 
with what is written first 
2. I am basically in 
favour of what is written 
first 
3. I am basically in 
favour of what is written 
second 
4.  I absolutely agree 
with what is written 
second 
5. Both top and bottom 
variants 
9. NA 
1 = 3, 4 
0 = 1, 2 
Variable 83 
“Army must rule the 
state 
1. Absolutely agree 
2. Rather agree  
3. Rather no 
4. No 
8. Difficult to answer 
9. NA 
1 = 1, 2 
2 = 3, 4 
Authoritarianism 
Variable 84 
“We do not need 
neither parliament, nor 
elections, but 
a strong person who 
can find decisions and 
who embodies them 
quickly.” 
 
1.Absolutely agree 
2. Rather agree 
3. Rather no 
4. No 
8. Difficult to answer 
9. NA 
1 = 1, 2 
2 = 3, 4 
Variable 40 
Who is to blame for 
your economic 
problems? 
And how much? - The 
President 
 
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. Little 
4. No 
8. Difficult to answer 
9. NA 
1 = 3, 4 
2 = 1, 2 
Kremlin 
Variable  41  
Who is to blame for 
your economic 
problems? 
And how much?  The 
Government 
 
 
 
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. Little 
4. No 
8. Difficult to answer 
9. NA 
1 = 3, 4 
2 = 1, 2 
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Variable 87 
There are various 
social institutions in 
Russia such as 
legislative and 
executive bodies, 
government, court, 
militia. Please value in 
a 7-mark-scale how 
strong is your own 
confidencein these 
social institutions. (1 
means that you do not 
trust maximally, 7 
means that you do trust 
maximally.) – President 
Yeltsin 
 
1. I do not trust 
maximally  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
 
1 = 5, 6 , 7 
0 = 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
Variable 92 
There are various 
social institutions in 
Russia such as 
legislative and 
executive bodies, 
government, court, 
militia. Please value in 
a 7-mark-scale how 
strong is your own 
confidencein these 
social institutions. (1 
means that you do not 
trust maximally, 7 
means that you do trust 
maximally.) – The 
Government 
 
1. I do not trust 
maximally  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. I do trust maximally  
 
1 = 5, 6 , 7 
0 = 1, 2, 3, 4 
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Monitoring Russia 1996 
 
Index 
 
Variable index were 
created from 
 
 
Old Values 
 
New Values 
Variable 59  
“In your opinion, will 
our life more or less get 
moving, 
or not improve at all 
during the next twelve 
months?” 
1. Our life will more or 
less get moving 
2. Our life will not 
imporve at all 
 
1 = 1 
0 = 2 
Variable 168 
“As far as the economic 
situation in the country 
as a whole is 
concerned, in your 
opinion will the next 
twelve months be a 
good or 
bad time for the 
economy of the 
country?” 
 
1. A good time 
2. A good time, but not 
in all things 
3. Not good, not bad 
4. A bad time, but not 
in all things 
5. A bad time 
1 = 1, 2 
0 = 3, 4, 5 
Variable 169 
“Will the next five years 
be a good or a bad 
time for the economy 
of the country?” 
 
 
1. A good time 
2. Not good, not bad 
3. A bad time 
1 = 1 
0 = 2, 3 
Future 
Variable 391 
In your opinion, which 
will be your position on 
this scale 
in five years time? 
 
1. High social position 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. Low social position 
1 = 1-5 
0 = 6-10 
Variable 52 
“What is your personal 
opinion of the Russian 
President, 
Boris Yeltsin?” 
 
 
 
1. I support him 
completely in all he 
does 
2. I do not agree with 
what he does 
3. I think that he should 
resign 
1 = 1 
0 = 2, 3 
Kremlin 
Variable 54 
“What is your personal 
opinion of the Russian 
government?” 
 
1. I support it 
completely in all he 
does 
2. I do not agree with 
what it does 
3. I think that it should 
resign 
1 = 1 
0 = 2, 3 
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Variable 112 
Which rating between 1 
and 10 would you give 
Yeltsin’s 
work as President of 
Russia? 
 
1. Lowest rating 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. Highest rating 
1 = 6-10 
0 = 1-5 
 
Variable 113 
Which rating between 1 
and 10 would you give 
Chernomirdin’s 
work as Prime 
Minister? 
 
1. Lowest rating 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. Highest rating 
1 = 6-10 
0 = 1-5 
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Exit Poll 1999 
 
Index 
 
Variable index were 
created from 
 
 
Old Values 
 
New Values 
Nostalgia Variable C: When were 
you and your family 
better off? 
1.Under socialism 
before perestroika  
2.Now 
3. Not Much Difference 
 
-1 = Now 
0 = Not much 
difference 
1 = Under Socialism 
before Perestroika 
Variable F 
“What type of 
government is best for 
Russia?”  
 
 
 
1.Socialism, as it was 
before Perestroyka  
2.Socialism, made 
more modern  
3.Democracy in its 
present form 
4.Democracy, with 
many changes 
5. Some other way 
1= 3, 4  
0= ELSE 
Individualism 
Variable G 
“Who will be most 
responsible for 
improving your future 
economic condition?” 
1.Boris Yeltsin  
2.The new President 
elected next year 
3.The Duma  
4.Business leaders  
5.The work of you and 
your family  
 
1 = 5 
0 = ELSE 
Variable E 
“Do you approve or 
disapprove of the 
Russian government’s 
military action in 
Chechnya?” 
 
1. Approve 
2. Disapprove 
1 = 1 
ELSE = 0 
Authoritarianism 
Variable F 
“What type of 
government is best for 
Russia?”  
 
 
 
1.Socialism, as it was 
before Perestroyka  
2.Socialism, made 
more modern  
3.Democracy in its 
present form 
4.Democracy, with 
many changes 
5. Some other way 
1 = 1, 2, 5  
0 = ELSE 
Variable C 
“ When were you and 
your family better off?” 
1.Under socialism 
before perestroika  
2.Now 
3. Not Much Difference 
1 = 2 
0 = ELSE 
Kremlin 
Variable D: 
“ If the election for 
President were being 
held today, would you 
vote for?”  
1.Yuri Luzhkov  
2.Yevgeny Primakov  
3.Vladimir Putin  
4.Vladimir Zhirinovsky  
5.Gennadi Zyuganov  
6.Grigory Yavlinsky  
7.Alexandr Lebed  
8.Some other 
candidate/WHICH 
9.Against All/ would not 
vote 
1 = 3 
0 = ELSE 
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 Variable E 
“Who will be most 
responsible for 
improving your future 
economic condition” 
1.Boris Yeltsin  
2.The new President 
elected next year 
3.The Duma  
4.Business leaders  
5.The work of you and 
your family  
6.The economic 
condition will not 
improve 
 
 
1 = 1, 2 
0 = ELSE 
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Exit Poll 2003 
Index Variable index were 
created from 
Old Values New Values 
Nostalgia Variable D: When were 
you and your family 
better off? 
1.Under socialism 
before perestroika  
2.Now 
3. Not Much Difference 
 
-1 = Now 
0 = Not much 
difference 
1 = Under Socialism 
before Perestroika 
Individualism Variable B 
“Which Issue was most 
important to you vote 
today?” 
 
 
 
 
1.War in Chechnya 
2.Fighting crime  
3.Fighting corruption 
4.Economy and jobs 
5.Strengthening the 
position of Russia 
internationally 
6.More civic freedoms 
and democracy 
7.Control of Business 
1= 6 
0= ELSE 
 Variable E 
“Who will be most 
responsible for 
improving your future 
economic condition” 
1.Vladimir Putin  
2.The newly elected 
State Duma  
3.Business leaders and 
companies 
4. Regional Leaders 
5.The work of you and 
your family  
6. The economic 
condition will not 
improve 
5 = 1 
0 = ELSE 
 
  
Variable H  
“What should the 
government do  
about democratic  
reforms in  
Russia?” 
 
 
 
 
1.The government 
should provide more 
civic  
freedom and 
democracy. 
2.Freedom and 
democracy are OK as 
they are now. 
3.The government 
should take more 
control so there is more 
order and stability, 
even if we lose some 
civic freedom and 
democracy 
 
 
 
1 = 1 
0 = ELSE 
Authoritarianism Variable B 
“Which Issue was most 
important to you vote 
today?” 
 
 
 
 
1.War in Chechnya 
2.Fighting crime  
3.Fighting corruption 
4.Economy and jobs 
5.Strengthening the 
position of Russia 
internationally 
6.More civic freedoms 
and democracy 
7.Control of Business 
 
1 = 1, 5, 7  
0 = ELSE 
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Variable G 
“What should be the 
role of the government 
in Russia’s business?” 
1. The government 
should take control of 
all businesses  
2. The government 
should only control oil, 
gas and electricity, but 
nothing else. 
3. The government 
should not intervene in 
any Russian business 
1 = 1 
0 = ELSE 
 
 
Variable H  
“What should the 
government do  
about democratic  
reforms in  
Russia?” 
 
 
 
 
1. The government 
should provide more 
civic  
freedom and 
democracy. 
2. Freedom and 
democracy are OK as 
they are now. 
3.The government 
should take more 
control so there is more 
order and stability, 
even if we lose some 
civic freedom and 
democracy 
 
 
1 = 3 
0 = ELSE 
Variable C 
Who would you vote for 
if the Presidential 
election be held today? 
 
1.Sergei Glaziev  
2.Vladimir Zhirinovsky  
3.Gennady Zyuganov  
4.Vladimir Putin  
5.Aman Tuleev 
6.Sergei Shoigu 
7.Grigory Yavlinsky 
8.Other /SPECIFY 
9. Against all/ would 
not vote 
 
1 = 4 
0 = ELSE 
Variable D 
”When were you and 
your family better off?” 
1.Under socialism 
before perestroika  
2.Now 
3. Not Much Difference 
 
1 = 2 
0 = ELSE 
Kremlin 
Variable E 
“Who will be most 
responsible for 
improving your future 
economic condition” 
1.Vladimir Putin  
2.The newly elected 
State Duma  
3.Business leaders and 
companies 
4. Regional Leaders 
5.The work of you and 
your family  
6. The economic 
condition will not 
improve 
1 = 1 
0 = ELSE 
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Appendix C The Mean and Standard deviation of the independent 
variables 
 
Here the means and the standard deviation of the different independent variables from the 
different datasets are reported. The reason for reporting this is twofold. First of all I want to 
show the reader the differences between the datasets both in terms of minimum and maximum 
values and the differences in the independent variables. As stated in the methodological 
chapter I have tried to compose a research design that is as similar as possible. 
 
Secondly the means and standard deviation are reported because they are important in 
calculating the predicted probabilities and standardised coefficients.  
 
  
Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 3535 1 10 5,30 2,993 
Gender 3535 0 1 ,46 ,498 
Education 3535 1 4 2,52 1,052 
Geography 3505 1 4 2,79 ,917 
Nostalgia 2855 0 3 1,34 1,107 
Individualism 2908 0 2 ,75 ,648 
Authoritarianism 2760 0 2 ,63 ,647 
Kremlin 3535 0 4 ,65 1,001 
 
 
 
Monitoring Russia 1996 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 2380 1 10 5,03 2,964 
Gender 2405 0 1 ,43 ,495 
Education 2351 1 36 12,11 3,528 
Geography 2405 1 4 2,57 1,052 
Future 2405 0 4 ,82 ,930 
Kremlin 2336 0 4 ,56 ,985 
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Exit Poll 1999 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 7711 1 4 2,55 1,056 
Gender 7539 0 1 ,47 ,499 
Geography 7770 1 4 2,72 ,877 
Nostalgia 7454 -1 1 ,45 ,755 
Individualism 7770 0 2 ,77 ,733 
Authoritarianism 7770 0 2 ,73 ,552 
Kremlin 7770 0 3 1,10 ,836 
 
 
 
 
 
Exit Poll 2003 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 12657 1 10 5,79 2,965 
Gender 12369 0 1 ,46 ,499 
Education 12553 1 5 3,16 1,359 
Geography 12719 1 4 2,74 ,941 
Nostalgia 12373 -1 1 ,22 ,843 
Individualism 12719 0 3 ,78 ,770 
Authoritarianism 12719 0 3 1,00 ,689 
Kremlin 12719 0 3 ,92 ,758 
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Appendix D Results from Logistics Regressions  
 
The tables report following results: 
b = Unstandardised coefficients 
S.E. = Standard Error 
Wald = Wald chi square used in testing the null hypothesis 
Sig. = two tailed p-value used in testing the null hypothesis  
Exp(B) = The odds ratios for the predictor 
B* = Standardised Coefficients 
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Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994  
            The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPRF 1994 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographics) 
  
 AGE ,213 ,028 59,876 ,000 1,238 0,153
  Gender ,407 ,145 7,866 ,005 1,502 0,049
 Education ,259 ,071 13,376 ,000 1,295 0,068
 Geographys ,014 ,079 ,029 ,865 1,014 0,003
 Constant -4,934 ,404 149,270 ,000 ,007 
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA 1,143 ,115 98,017 ,000 3,136 0,269
  INDIVIDUALISM -,283 ,153 3,412 ,065 ,754 -0,039
  AUTHORITARIAN -,528 ,147 12,865 ,000 ,590 -0,073
  KREMLIN -,760 ,180 17,795 ,000 ,468 -0,162
  Constant -4,031 ,320 158,593 ,000 ,018 
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,154 ,037 17,361 ,000 1,167 0,103
  Gender ,584 ,193 9,097 ,003 1,792 0,065
  Education ,395 ,095 17,316 ,000 1,485 0,093
  Geographys ,014 ,104 ,017 ,896 1,014 0,003
  NOSTALGIA 1,155 ,124 87,137 ,000 3,174 0,286
  INDIVIDUALISM -,281 ,161 3,055 ,080 ,755 -0,041
  AUTHORITARIAN -,481 ,157 9,336 ,002 ,618 -0,070
 KREMLIN -,777 ,184 17,810 ,000 ,460 -0,174
 Constant -6,420 ,617 108,188 ,000 ,002 
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  AGE ,115 ,032 12,804 ,000 1,122 0,087
  GENDER ,556 ,181 9,493 ,002 1,744 0,069
  NOSTALGIA 1,112 ,112 99,328 ,000 3,041 0,308
 AUTORITARIAN -,595 ,144 17,168 ,000 ,551 -0,096
  KREMLIN -,744 ,171 18,935 ,000 ,475 -0,186
 Constant -5,132 ,333 237,170 ,000 ,006 
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Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994  
            The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
VR 1994 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,057 ,019 9,033 ,003 1,059 0,059
  Gender -,002 ,107 ,000 ,985 ,998 0,000
 Education ,225 ,054 17,456 ,000 1,252 0,082
 Geography -,236 ,058 16,517 ,000 ,790 -0,075
 Constant -2,301 ,272 71,772 ,000 ,100
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA -,574 ,077 55,145 ,000 ,563 -0,221
  INDIVIDUALISM ,051 ,106 ,238 ,626 1,053 0,012
  AUTHORITARIAN -,351 ,121 8,412 ,004 ,704 -0,079
  KREMLININDEX ,514 ,057 82,208 ,000 1,673 0,179
  Constant -1,701 ,165 106,655 ,000 ,182
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,131 ,027 24,221 ,000 1,139 0,136
  Gender -,071 ,141 ,256 ,613 ,931 -0,012
  Education ,083 ,072 1,317 ,251 1,086 0,030
  Geography -,097 ,077 1,602 ,206 ,907 -0,031
  NOSTALGIA -,632 ,080 63,005 ,000 ,531 -0,243
  INDIVIDUALISM ,080 ,108 ,546 ,460 1,083 0,018
  AUTHORITARIAN -,382 ,124 9,467 ,002 ,683 -0,086
 KREMLININDEX ,509 ,057 78,526 ,000 1,663 0,177
 Constant -2,256 ,396 32,527 ,000 ,105
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  NOSTALGIA -,630 ,067 89,597 ,000 ,533 -0,240
  KREMLIN ,524 ,050 109,621 ,000 1,688 0,181
  Constant -1,823 ,103 312,374 ,000 ,161
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Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994  
            The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YABLOKO1994 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,045 ,025 3,299 ,069 1,046 0,034
  Gender ,106 ,139 ,579 ,447 1,111 0,013
 Education ,226 ,070 10,500 ,001 1,254 0,061
 Geography -,253 ,075 11,367 ,001 ,776 -0,059
 Constant -2,882 ,351 67,313 ,000 ,056
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA -,395 ,084 22,384 ,000 ,674 -0,118
  INDIVIDUALISM -,059 ,127 ,218 ,640 ,942 -0,010
  AUTHORITARIAN -,366 ,139 6,901 ,009 ,693 -0,064
  KREMLININDEX -,096 ,080 1,440 ,230 ,909 -0,026
  Constant -1,706 ,189 81,411 ,000 ,182
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,060 ,031 3,842 ,050 1,062 0,048
  Gender -,143 ,164 ,762 ,383 ,866 -0,019
  Education ,185 ,085 4,767 ,029 1,203 0,052
  Geography -,262 ,090 8,481 ,004 ,769 -0,064
  NOSTALGIA -,405 ,086 22,265 ,000 ,667 -0,120
  INDIVIDUALISM -,058 ,129 ,199 ,656 ,944 -0,010
  AUTHORITARIAN -,273 ,141 3,736 ,053 ,761 -0,047
 KREMLININDEX -,097 ,080 1,467 ,226 ,908 -0,026
 Constant -1,798 ,454 15,685 ,000 ,166
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  GEOGRAPHY -,265 ,081 10,538 ,001 ,768 -0,059
  NOSTALGIA -,358 ,073 23,748 ,000 ,699 -0,096
  Constant -1,499 ,223 45,264 ,000 ,223
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Source: Political and Economic Problems Russia 1994  
            The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
LDPR 1994 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,004 ,021 ,038 ,846 1,004 0,003
  Gender ,705 ,120 34,546 ,000 2,024 0,097
 Education -,079 ,061 1,674 ,196 ,924 -0,023
 Geography ,310 ,069 20,175 ,000 1,363 0,078
 Constant -3,381 ,321 111,015 ,000 ,034
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA ,117 ,069 2,875 ,090 1,124 0,033
  INDIVIDUALISM -,010 ,120 ,006 ,936 ,990 -0,002
  AUTHORITARIAN ,535 ,110 23,424 ,000 1,707 0,087
  KREMLININDEX -,476 ,104 20,809 ,000 ,622 -0,120
  Constant -2,530 ,194 169,629 ,000 ,080
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE -,001 ,028 ,001 ,974 ,999 -0,001
  Gender ,688 ,156 19,571 ,000 1,990 0,090
  Education ,001 ,079 ,000 ,988 1,001 0,000
  Geography ,305 ,089 11,731 ,001 1,356 0,073
  NOSTALGIA ,101 ,072 1,959 ,162 1,107 0,029
  INDIVIDUALISM -,014 ,122 ,014 ,906 ,986 -0,002
  AUTHORITARIAN ,455 ,115 15,620 ,000 1,576 0,077
 KREMLININDEX -,503 ,105 22,858 ,000 ,605 -0,132
 Constant -3,695 ,450 67,476 ,000 ,025
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  GENDER ,748 ,137 29,700 ,000 2,112 0,015
  GEOGRAPHY ,266 ,077 11,918 ,001 1,305 0,137
  AUTORITARIAN ,508 ,098 26,762 ,000 1,661 0,193
 KREMLIN -,455 ,090 25,832 ,000 ,634 -0,160
  Constant -3,567 ,259 190,394 ,000 ,028
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Source:  Monitoring Russia 1996 
              The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPRF 1996 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,243 ,023 115,617 ,000 1,275 0,237
  Gender ,011 ,126 ,007 ,932 1,011 0,002
 Education -,002 ,017 ,014 ,906 ,998 -0,002
 Geography ,407 ,065 39,356 ,000 1,502 0,397
 Constant -4,300 ,376 130,997 ,000 ,014
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Future -,422 ,086 23,993 ,000 ,656 -0,078
 Kremlin Index -,751 ,117 41,045 ,000 ,472 -0,148
  Constant  
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,247 ,024 106,199 ,000 1,280 0,182
  Gender ,043 ,129 ,110 ,741 1,044 0,005
  Education -,008 ,018 ,221 ,638 ,992 -0,007
  Geography ,318 ,068 21,917 ,000 1,375 0,234
  Future -,195 ,089 4,769 ,029 ,823 -0,045
  Kremlin  -,761 ,118 41,502 ,000 ,467 -0,186
   -3,609 ,395 83,414 ,000 ,027
   
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  AGE ,250 ,023 120,039 ,000 1,284 0,183
  GEOGRAPHY ,333 ,064 27,155 ,000 1,396 0,244
  FUTURE -,199 ,088 5,163 ,023 ,820 -0,046
 KREMLIN -,781 ,118 43,742 ,000 ,458 -0,573
  Constant -3,728 ,256 211,854 ,000 ,024
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Source:  Monitoring Russia 1996 
              The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NDR 1996 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,044 ,023 3,522 ,061 1,045 0,040
  Gender ,103 ,139 ,549 ,459 1,108 0,016
 Education ,005 ,019 ,067 ,795 1,005 0,005
 Geography -,295 ,068 18,522 ,000 ,745 -0,267
 Constant -1,777 ,370 23,112 ,000 ,169
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Future ,301 ,070 18,523 ,000 1,351 0,115
 Kremlin Index ,545 ,060 81,609 ,000 1,724 0,220
  Constant -2,934 ,111 701,265 ,000 ,053
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,062 ,025 6,261 ,012 1,064 0,071
  Gender -,014 ,147 ,009 ,923 ,986 -0,003
  Education ,001 ,021 ,004 ,949 1,001 0,001
  Geography -,134 ,072 3,456 ,063 ,875 -0,155
  Future ,347 ,073 22,559 ,000 1,415 0,126
  Kremlin  ,513 ,063 67,117 ,000 1,670 0,197
   -2,926 ,410 51,019 ,000 ,054
   
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  FUTURE ,301 ,070 18,523 ,000 1,351
  KREMLIN ,545 ,060 81,609 ,000 1,724
  Constant -2,934 ,111 701,265 ,000 ,053
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Source:  Monitoring Russia 1996 
              The Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
 
 
 
 
 
YABLOKO 1996 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,025 ,024 1,052 ,305 1,025 0,025
  Gender -,011 ,141 ,007 ,935 ,989 -0,002
 Education ,079 ,018 18,833 ,000 1,082 0,095
 Geography -,106 ,068 2,412 ,120 ,899 -0,107
 Constant -3,048 ,361 71,284 ,000 ,047
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Future ,100 ,076 1,724 ,189 1,105 0,029
 Kremlin Index -,036 ,075 ,231 ,631 ,965 -0,011
  Constant -2,252 ,095 562,592 ,000 ,105
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 AGE ,029 ,025 1,378 ,240 1,029 0,029
  Gender -,035 ,142 ,062 ,803 ,965 -0,006
  Education ,076 ,018 17,119 ,000 1,079 0,091
  Geography -,108 ,070 2,384 ,123 ,897 -0,109
  Future ,089 ,080 1,237 ,266 1,093 0,028
  Kremlin Index -,063 ,079 ,649 ,420 ,939 -0,021
   -3,031 ,379 64,126 ,000 ,048
   
 Modell 4 
(Significants) 
  
  EDUCATION ,088 ,018 24,461 ,000 1,092 0,104
  Constant -3,317 ,241 189,001 ,000 ,036
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KPRF 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,617 ,028 490,216 ,000 1,852 0,267
  Gender ,333 ,055 36,340 ,000 1,395 0,068
 Geography ,237 ,032 56,316 ,000 1,267 0,085
 Constant -3,532 ,130 741,988 ,000 ,029
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia 1,129 ,074 235,586 ,000 3,093 0,249
  Individualism -1,238 ,052 559,967 ,000 ,290 -0,265
  Authoritarianism -,305 ,053 32,682 ,000 ,737 -0,049
  Kremlin -,671 ,043 247,992 ,000 ,511 -0,164
  Constant -,190 ,098 3,787 ,052 ,827
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age ,353 ,032 119,008 ,000 1,423 0,110
  Gender ,544 ,064 71,450 ,000 1,722 0,080
  Geography ,179 ,037 23,764 ,000 1,196 0,046
  Nostalgia 1,034 ,075 190,688 ,000 2,813 0,230
  Individualism -1,122 ,054 424,517 ,000 ,326 -0,242
  Authoritarianism -,347 ,057 37,019 ,000 ,707 -0,056
  Kremlin -,676 ,044 232,398 ,000 ,509 -0,166
  Constant -1,869 ,175 114,215 ,000 ,154
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
   
  Same as Modell 3  
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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UNITY 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE -,294 ,026 124,606 ,000 ,745 -0,129
  Gender -,101 ,055 3,365 ,067 ,904 -0,021
 Geography ,383 ,032 141,063 ,000 1,467 0,140
 Constant -1,436 ,117 150,913 ,000 ,238
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia ,527 ,047 124,639 ,000 1,694 0,147
  Individualism ,750 ,047 254,386 ,000 2,117 0,203
  Authoritarianism ,498 ,057 76,403 ,000 1,646 0,101
  Kremlin 1,249 ,045 772,373 ,000 3,488 0,385
  Constant -3,974 ,117 1149,709 ,000 ,019
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,222 ,031 52,651 ,000 ,801 -0,084
  Gender -,180 ,062 8,403 ,004 ,835 -0,032
  Geography ,418 ,037 128,832 ,000 1,519 0,131
  Nostalgia ,509 ,049 106,436 ,000 1,664 0,138
  Individualism ,734 ,049 219,812 ,000 2,083 0,193
  Authoritarianism ,502 ,060 71,083 ,000 1,652 0,099
  Kremlin 1,241 ,046 714,104 ,000 3,458 0,372
  Constant -4,489 ,183 601,308 ,000 ,011
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age -,218 ,030 52,358 ,000 ,804 -0,083
  Geography ,410 ,036 128,109 ,000 1,507 0,130
  Nostalgia ,508 ,049 109,149 ,000 1,662 0,138
  Individualism ,723 ,049 220,408 ,000 2,061 0,191
  Authoritarianism ,483 ,058 69,468 ,000 1,621 0,096
 Kremlin 1,244 ,046 738,705 ,000 3,471 0,374
  Constant -4,533 ,179 641,439 ,000 ,011
    
    
  
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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SPS 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE -,466 ,038 152,161 ,000 ,628 -0,154
  Gender -,184 ,077 5,706 ,017 ,832 -0,029
 Geography -,438 ,044 97,432 ,000 ,645 -0,120
 Constant ,174 ,151 1,334 ,248 1,190
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,455 ,061 54,886 ,000 ,635 -0,111
  Individualism ,779 ,064 148,146 ,000 2,179 0,184
  Authoritarianism ,037 ,079 ,222 ,637 1,038 0,007
  Kremlin ,391 ,057 47,783 ,000 1,478 0,105
  Constant -3,336 ,146 520,522 ,000 ,036
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,266 ,042 40,975 ,000 ,767 -0,089
  Gender -,314 ,084 14,121 ,000 ,731 -0,049
  Geography -,344 ,048 52,042 ,000 ,709 -0,095
  Nostalgia -,346 ,063 29,666 ,000 ,708 -0,082
  Individualism ,689 ,066 108,801 ,000 1,992 0,159
  Authoritarianism ,048 ,080 ,357 ,550 1,049 0,008
  Kremlin ,452 ,058 60,713 ,000 1,571 0,119
  Constant -1,683 ,216 60,600 ,000 ,186
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age -,262 ,041 40,501 ,000 ,770 -0,087
  Geography -,352 ,047 55,048 ,000 ,703 -0,097
  Nostalgia -,338 ,063 29,012 ,000 ,713 -0,080
  Individualism ,689 ,065 110,799 ,000 1,992 0,159
  Kremlin ,456 ,058 62,596 ,000 1,578 0,120
  Constant -1,799 ,202 79,180 ,000 ,166
    
    
 
 
 
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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YABLOKO 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE -,189 ,039 23,394 ,000 ,828 -0,054
  Gender -,139 ,083 2,815 ,093 ,870 -0,019
 Geography -,311 ,047 43,866 ,000 ,733 -0,073
 Constant -1,002 ,164 37,448 ,000 ,367
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,389 ,067 33,738 ,000 ,678 -0,087
  Individualism ,414 ,062 45,218 ,000 1,512 0,089
  Authoritarianism -,088 ,078 1,296 ,255 ,915 -0,014
  Kremlin -,419 ,059 51,081 ,000 ,657 -0,103
  Constant -2,098 ,127 271,911 ,000 ,123
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,072 ,043 2,722 ,099 ,931 -0,021
  Gender -,158 ,087 3,300 ,069 ,854 -0,022
  Geography -,211 ,049 18,590 ,000 ,810 -0,052
  Nostalgia -,336 ,069 23,479 ,000 ,715 -0,072
  Individualism ,385 ,064 35,888 ,000 1,469 0,080
  Authoritarianism -,052 ,080 ,421 ,517 ,949 -0,008
  Kremlin -,401 ,060 44,845 ,000 ,670 -0,095
  Constant -1,333 ,218 37,519 ,000 ,264
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Geography -,216 ,048 20,205 ,000 ,805 -0,054
  Nostalgia -,342 ,068 25,589 ,000 ,711 -0,073
  Individualism ,405 ,062 43,076 ,000 1,499 0,084
  Kremlin -,400 ,059 46,081 ,000 ,670 -0,095
  Constant -1,625 ,163 98,979 ,000 ,197
   
    
    
    
 
 
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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LDPR 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE -,473 ,053 79,253 ,000 ,623 -,118
  Gender ,979 ,114 73,266 ,000 2,661 0,115
 Geography ,253 ,062 16,763 ,000 1,288 0,052
 Constant -3,101 ,230 181,824 ,000 ,045
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,248 ,085 8,531 ,003 ,780 -0,043
  Individualism ,051 ,079 ,413 ,520 1,052 0,009
  Authoritarianism ,229 ,096 5,628 ,018 1,257 0,029
  Kremlin -,271 ,072 14,308 ,000 ,762 -0,052
  Constant -2,748 ,162 288,801 ,000 ,064
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,467 ,057 66,769 ,000 ,627 -0,120
  Gender ,987 ,119 69,249 ,000 2,682 0,120
  Geography ,283 ,064 19,431 ,000 1,328 0,061
  Nostalgia -,183 ,087 4,433 ,035 ,832 -0,034
  Individualism -,122 ,082 2,182 ,140 ,885 -0,022
  Authoritarianism ,024 ,099 ,061 ,806 1,025 0,003
  Kremlin -,295 ,074 15,990 ,000 ,745 -0,060
  Constant -2,738 ,291 88,585 ,000 ,065
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age -,489 ,054 83,501 ,000 ,613 -0,125
  Gender ,981 ,114 73,478 ,000 2,667 0,118
  Geography ,264 ,062 18,172 ,000 1,302 0,056
  Kremlin -,244 ,065 14,252 ,000 ,784 -0,049
  Constant -2,844 ,238 142,354 ,000 ,058
    
    
    
  
 
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138
 
OVR 1999 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 AGE ,089 ,036 6,276 ,012 1,093 0,034
  Gender -,049 ,075 ,430 ,512 ,952 -0,009
 Geography -,453 ,043 111,165 ,000 ,636 -0,142
 Constant -1,143 ,152 56,516 ,000 ,319
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,437 ,062 49,343 ,000 ,646 -0,099
  Individualism -,019 ,056 ,114 ,735 ,981 -0,004
  Authoritarianism -,029 ,068 ,185 ,667 ,971 -0,005
  Kremlin -,627 ,053 139,446 ,000 ,534 -0,157
  Constant -1,268 ,109 136,256 ,000 ,281
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age ,139 ,040 12,370 ,000 1,150 0,047
  Gender -,080 ,079 1,023 ,312 ,923 -0,013
  Geography -,407 ,045 82,983 ,000 ,666 -0,114
  Nostalgia -,403 ,065 37,895 ,000 ,668 -0,097
  Individualism ,000 ,059 ,000 ,999 1,000 0,000
  Authoritarianism ,009 ,071 ,016 ,898 1,009 0,002
  Kremlin -,607 ,055 122,227 ,000 ,545 -0,162
 Constant -,629 ,198 10,135 ,001 ,533
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age ,145 ,038 14,597 ,000 1,156 0,049
  Geography -,409 ,044 86,662 ,000 ,664 -0,065
  Nostalgia -,408 ,059 47,390 ,000 ,665 -0,099
  Kremlin -,600 ,053 128,115 ,000 ,549 -0,161
  Constant -,669 ,155 18,671 ,000 ,512
    
    
    
  
 
Source: Exit Poll 1999 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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KPRF 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age ,249 ,011 543,880 ,000 1,283 0,243
  Gender ,223 ,054 16,996 ,000 1,250 0,037
 Education -,113 ,020 30,712 ,000 ,893 -0,050
 Geography ,163 ,030 29,060 ,000 1,178 0,050
 Constant -3,651 ,158 536,972 ,000 ,026
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA ,886 ,055 259,005 ,000 2,426 0,193
  INDIVIDUALISM -,324 ,040 64,390 ,000 ,723 -0,064
  AUTHORITARIAN ,228 ,042 28,971 ,000 1,256 0,041
  KREMLININDEX -,931 ,050 340,428 ,000 ,394 -0,182
  Constant -1,632 ,076 459,582 ,000 ,196
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age ,189 ,012 260,892 ,000 1,208 0,151
  Gender ,185 ,057 10,475 ,001 1,204 0,025
 Education -,075 ,022 11,657 ,001 ,928 -0,027
  Geography ,084 ,033 6,688 ,010 1,088 0,021
  NOSTALGIA ,740 ,058 164,450 ,000 2,097 0,168
  INDIVIDUALISM -,182 ,043 17,855 ,000 ,834 -0,038
  AUTHORITARIAN ,214 ,045 22,778 ,000 1,239 0,040
  KREMLININDEX -,887 ,053 282,651 ,000 ,412 -0,181
  Constant -3,021 ,182 274,194 ,000 ,049
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
   
  Same as Model 3  
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
 
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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UR 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age -,064 ,007 94,235 ,000 ,938 -0,088
  Gender -,408 ,039 109,967 ,000 ,665 -0,095
 Education -,060 ,015 16,426 ,000 ,941 -0,038
 Geography ,136 ,021 40,869 ,000 1,146 0,060
 Constant -,238 ,101 5,519 ,019 ,788
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia ,164 ,032 26,873 ,000 1,178 0,058
  Individualism -,200 ,028 50,862 ,000 ,819 -0,065
  Authoritarianism ,125 ,030 16,986 ,000 1,133 0,036
  Kremlin 1,229 ,038 1030,964 ,000 3,417 0,392
  Constant -1,846 ,060 944,122 ,000 ,158
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,026 ,008 11,952 ,001 ,974 -0,032
  Gender -,408 ,043 92,173 ,000 ,665 -0,084
 Education -,085 ,017 26,421 ,000 ,918 -0,048
  Geography ,217 ,024 84,633 ,000 1,242 0,084
  Nostalgia ,156 ,033 21,955 ,000 1,169 0,054
  Individualism -,147 ,030 24,834 ,000 ,863 -0,047
  Authoritarianism ,098 ,031 9,883 ,002 1,103 0,028
  Kremlin 1,243 ,040 990,014 ,000 3,468 0,389
  Constant -1,877 ,128 215,712 ,000 ,153
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Same as model 3  
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
 
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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SPS 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age -,149 ,014 119,351 ,000 ,862 -0,107
  Gender -,105 ,078 1,794 ,180 ,900 -0,013
 Education ,229 ,032 52,990 ,000 1,258 0,076
 Geography -,379 ,043 78,816 ,000 ,684 -0,087
 Constant -1,744 ,197 78,188 ,000 ,175
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,548 ,066 68,994 ,000 ,578 -0,132
  Individualism ,629 ,048 170,891 ,000 1,876 0,139
  Authoritarianism -,206 ,056 13,324 ,000 ,814 -0,041
  Kremlin ,116 ,070 2,773 ,096 1,123 0,025
  Constant -3,308 ,111 887,968 ,000 ,037
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,088 ,015 35,956 ,000 ,916 -0,074
  Gender -,154 ,081 3,648 ,056 ,857 -0,022
 Education ,133 ,033 16,437 ,000 1,143 0,051
  Geography -,307 ,044 47,829 ,000 ,736 -0,082
  Nostalgia -,448 ,068 43,079 ,000 ,639 -0,107
  Individualism ,500 ,050 98,185 ,000 1,649 0,109
  Authoritarianism -,156 ,057 7,403 ,007 ,855 -0,030
  Kremlin ,078 ,071 1,230 ,267 1,082 0,017
  Constant -2,315 ,232 99,571 ,000 ,099
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age -,085 ,015 34,641 ,000 ,918 -0,071
  Education ,136 ,033 17,543 ,000 1,146 0,052
  Geography -,311 ,044 50,338 ,000 ,733 -0,083
  Nostalgia -,497 ,050 99,825 ,000 ,608 -0,119
  Individualism ,494 ,049 100,245 ,000 1,639 0,108
  Authoritarianism -,155 ,057 7,423 ,006 ,857 -0,030
  Constant -2,317 ,211 120,546 ,000 ,099
    
  
 
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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YABLOKO 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age ,023 ,014 2,870 ,090 1,023 0,017
  Gender ,035 ,079 ,191 ,662 1,035 0,004
 Education ,271 ,031 75,483 ,000 1,312 0,090
 Geography -,476 ,044 117,206 ,000 ,621 -0,109
 Constant -2,680 ,207 167,923 ,000 ,069
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,496 ,064 59,168 ,000 ,609 -0,112
  Individualism ,558 ,049 128,807 ,000 1,747 0,115
  Authoritarianism -,450 ,059 58,014 ,000 ,637 -0,083
  Kremlin -,640 ,069 85,194 ,000 ,527 -0,129
  Constant -2,266 ,098 529,563 ,000 ,104
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age ,051 ,015 11,715 ,001 1,052 0,042
  Gender -,078 ,081 ,908 ,341 ,925 -0,011
 Education ,208 ,032 41,207 ,000 1,232 0,078
  Geography -,429 ,045 89,791 ,000 ,651 -0,111
  Nostalgia -,497 ,068 53,826 ,000 ,608 -0,115
  Individualism ,447 ,052 73,983 ,000 1,564 0,094
  Authoritarianism -,353 ,061 33,619 ,000 ,702 -0,067
  Kremlin -,680 ,072 90,127 ,000 ,507 -0,142
  Constant -2,107 ,236 79,710 ,000 ,122
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age ,052 ,015 12,394 ,000 1,053 0,042
  Education ,211 ,032 43,007 ,000 1,235 0,078
  Geography -,435 ,045 94,402 ,000 ,647 -0,111
  Nostalgia -,493 ,067 53,786 ,000 ,611 -0,113
  Individualism ,450 ,052 75,870 ,000 1,569 0,094
  Authoritarianism -,367 ,061 36,694 ,000 ,693 -0,069
  Kremlin -,692 ,071 94,857 ,000 ,501 -0,143
 Constant -2,133 ,229 86,761 ,000 ,118
    
  
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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LDPR 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age -,164 ,010 266,828 ,000 ,849 -0,157
  Gender ,549 ,059 87,282 ,000 1,732 0,088
 Education -,184 ,023 62,326 ,000 ,832 -0,081
 Geography ,107 ,033 10,750 ,001 1,113 0,032
 Constant -1,196 ,152 62,332 ,000 ,302
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 Nostalgia -,381 ,046 67,194 ,000 ,683 -0,107
  Individualism -,081 ,039 4,361 ,037 ,922 -0,021
  Authoritarianism ,188 ,042 19,734 ,000 1,207 0,043
  Kremlin -,761 ,051 226,121 ,000 ,467 -0,191
  Constant -1,446 ,073 396,337 ,000 ,235
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age -,196 ,011 318,222 ,000 ,822 -0,193
  Gender ,531 ,060 77,204 ,000 1,701 0,088
 Education -,157 ,024 41,596 ,000 ,855 -0,072
  Geography ,074 ,034 4,783 ,029 1,077 0,023
  Nostalgia -,193 ,049 15,347 ,000 ,825 -0,054
  Individualism -,147 ,042 12,401 ,000 ,863 -0,037
  Authoritarianism ,130 ,044 8,898 ,003 1,139 0,030
  Kremlin -,765 ,052 213,621 ,000 ,465 -0,192
  Constant -,343 ,172 3,970 ,046 ,709
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age -,192 ,011 307,748 ,000 ,825 -0,188
  Gender ,521 ,060 74,542 ,000 1,683 0,059
  Education -,171 ,024 50,764 ,000 ,842 -0,077
  Geography ,083 ,034 6,056 ,014 1,087 0,026
  Nostalgia -,169 ,049 12,081 ,001 ,844 -0,047
  Authoritarianism ,092 ,042 4,785 ,029 1,097 0,021
  Kremlin -,742 ,052 204,114 ,000 ,476 -0,186
 Constant -,447 ,170 6,912 ,009 ,640
   
  
  
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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RODINA 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 1 
(Demographic
s) 
 
 
 Age ,100 ,011 88,142 ,000 1,106 0,092
  Gender ,149 ,060 6,157 ,013 1,160 0,023
 Education ,179 ,023 61,821 ,000 1,196 0,076
 Geography -,111 ,033 11,389 ,001 ,895 -0,033
 Constant -3,123 ,163 368,562 ,000 ,044
MODEL 2 
(Index) 
  
 NOSTALGIA ,090 ,048 3,473 ,062 1,094 0,021
  INDIVIDUALISM -,023 ,041 ,302 ,583 ,978 -0,005
  AUTHORITARIAN -,168 ,045 13,668 ,000 ,845 -0,033
  KREMLININDEX -,424 ,052 66,751 ,000 ,654 -0,091
  Constant -1,653 ,077 457,402 ,000 ,192
MODEL 3 
(Mix) 
  
 Age ,071 ,012 37,925 ,000 1,074 0,062
  Gender ,128 ,061 4,371 ,037 1,137 0,019
 Education ,197 ,024 69,775 ,000 1,218 0,079
  Geography -,143 ,034 17,953 ,000 ,866 -0,040
  Nostalgia ,062 ,051 1,486 ,223 1,064 0,015
  Individualism -,067 ,043 2,373 ,123 ,936 -0,015
  Authoritarianism -,127 ,047 7,431 ,006 ,880 -0,026
  Kremlin -,439 ,054 67,152 ,000 ,644 -0,098
  Constant -2,392 ,183 170,487 ,000 ,091
MODEL 4 
(Significants) 
  
 Age ,079 ,011 54,225 ,000 1,082 0,070
  Education ,180 ,023 63,460 ,000 1,197 0,073
  Geography -,146 ,032 20,250 ,000 ,864 -0,041
  Authoritarianism -,138 ,044 9,849 ,002 ,871 -0,028
  Kremlin -,470 ,043 121,965 ,000 ,625 -0,107
  Constant -2,307 ,169 186,831 ,000 ,100
    
   
   
  
Source: Exit Poll 2003 
 CESSI-Russia (Institute for comparative social research) and Mitofsky International  
 (USA) 
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Appendix E Results from logistic regressions with model 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia ,841 ,056 226,125 ,000 2,318
  Individualism -,255 ,040 40,920 ,000 ,775
 Kremlin -,932 ,051 333,026 ,000 ,394
 Economic -,427 ,057 56,065 ,000 ,653
 Constant -1,712 ,080 461,778 ,000 ,180
KPRF 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgi  ,841 , 56 226,1 5 ,  2,318 0,191
 Individualism -,255 , 40 40,9 0 ,  ,755 -0,053
 Kremlin -,932 , 1 333, 26 ,  ,394 -0,191
 Economic -,427 , 57 56,065 ,  ,653 -0,068
 Constant -1,712 ,080 461,778 ,000 ,180
UR 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia ,134 ,032 17,326 ,000 1,144 0,048
  Individualism -,147 ,028 28,326 ,000 ,863 -0,048
 Kremlin 1,227 ,039 998,371 ,000 3,412 0,391
 Economic -,290 ,037 62,272 ,000 ,748 -0,072
 Constant -1,942 ,061 1000,017 ,000 ,143
SPS 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia -,469 ,067 48,845 ,000 ,626 -0,118
  Individualism ,520 ,048 119,597 ,000 1,681 0,120
 Kremlin ,158 ,070 5,097 ,024 1,172 0,036
 Economic ,564 ,058 95,859 ,000 1,758 0,100
 Constant -3,174 ,108 865,385 ,000 ,042
 146
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
YABLOKO 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia -,432 ,066 42,911 ,000 ,649 -0,102
  Individualism ,407 ,048 71,262 ,000 1,503 0,087
 Kremlin -,621 ,070 78,432 ,000 ,537 -0,131
 Economic ,552 ,058 89,782 ,000 1,736 0,091
 Constant -2,297 ,096 575,029 ,000 ,101
LDPR 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia -,379 ,048 63,423 ,000 ,685 -0,106
  Individualism -,040 ,038 1,089 ,297 ,961 -0,010
 Kremlin -,762 ,051 220,749 ,000 ,467 -0,191
 Economic -,105 ,051 4,330 ,037 ,900 -0,021
 Constant -1,351 ,072 348,114 ,000 ,259
RODINA 2003 
                       Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 
B* 
MODEL 5   
 Nostalgia ,089 ,049 3,248 ,072 1,093 0,021
  Individualism -,070 ,041 2,990 ,084 ,932 -0,015
 Kremlin -,424 ,052 65,431 ,000 ,655 -0,091
 Economic ,086 ,051 2,809 ,094 1,090 0,014
 Constant -1,718 ,077 500,588 ,000 ,179
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Appendix F Predicted Probabilities based on Model 4 (the 
significant results) 
 
 
Results from Exit Poll 1999 
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Appendix G Correlations between the independent variables 
 
These tables report the correlations between the independent variables, using Kendall’s Tau 
B. As is seen there is a positive relationship between the individualism and authoritarian 
index. This is somewhat disturbing, but there might be two explanations for this. First of all it 
might be because the indexes are created from the same variables, using different values. The 
second reason, which is of a more substantial character, might be because you might have 
voters who both endorse authoritarian and individualist values. We could for instance imagine 
that a communist voter would display both individualistic and authoritarian attitudes. Some 
communist voters might feel that the Kremlin has left them and therefore the work of me and 
my family becomes more important in improving ones economy. At the same time they want 
democratic right to protest against this new regime.
 
15
5 
  
Po
lit
ic
al
 a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
in
 R
us
si
a 
19
94
 
  
Ag
e 
 
G
en
de
r 
ED
U
C
AT
IO
N
  
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
  
N
O
ST
AL
G
IA
 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
AL
IS
M
 
AU
TH
O
R
IT
AR
IA
N
 
KR
EM
LI
N
 
Ke
nd
al
l's
 
ta
u_
b 
Ag
e 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
1,
00
0
-,0
18
-,2
48
(*
*)
,0
85
(*
*)
 
,1
77
(*
*)
-,0
91
(*
*)
,0
93
(*
*)
-,0
21
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
.
,2
09
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,1
17
 
  
G
en
de
r 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
18
1,
00
0
,0
45
(*
*)
-,0
01
 
-,0
54
(*
*)
,0
44
(*
)
-,0
21
,0
39
(*
) 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,2
09
.
,0
04
,9
74
 
,0
02
,0
14
,2
47
,0
14
 
  
ED
U
C
AT
IO
N
  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,2
48
(*
*)
,0
45
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,1
44
(*
*)
 
-,1
15
(*
*)
,0
84
(*
*)
-,1
85
(*
*)
,0
20
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
04
.
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,1
70
 
  
 G
eo
gr
ap
hy
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,0
85
(*
*)
-,0
01
-,1
44
(*
*)
1,
00
0 
,1
30
(*
*)
-,0
86
(*
*)
,1
33
(*
*)
-,0
38
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,9
74
,0
00
. 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
09
 
  
N
O
ST
AL
G
IA
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,1
77
(*
*)
-,0
54
(*
*)
-,1
15
(*
*)
,1
30
(*
*)
 
1,
00
0
-,1
83
(*
*)
,1
52
(*
*)
-,2
09
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
02
,0
00
,0
00
 
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
 
  
IN
D
IV
ID
U
AL
IS
M
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
91
(*
*)
,0
44
(*
)
,0
84
(*
*)
-,0
86
(*
*)
 
-,1
83
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,0
82
(*
*)
,0
31
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
14
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
.
,0
00
,0
62
 
  
AU
TO
R
IT
AR
IA
N
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,0
93
(*
*)
-,0
21
-,1
85
(*
*)
,1
33
(*
*)
 
,1
52
(*
*)
-,0
82
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,0
73
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,2
47
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
 
  
KR
EM
LI
N
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
21
,0
39
(*
)
,0
20
-,0
38
(*
*)
 
-,2
09
(*
*)
,0
31
-,0
73
(*
*)
1,
00
0 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-
ta
ile
d)
 
,1
17
,0
14
,1
70
,0
09
 
,0
00
,0
62
,0
00
. 
**
  C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
*  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
 
 
15
6 
 
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
R
us
si
a 
19
96
 
  
Ag
e 
G
en
de
r 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
Fu
tu
re
 
Kr
em
lin
 
Ke
nd
al
l's
 ta
u_
b 
Ag
e 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
1,
00
0
-,0
44
(*
) 
-,1
06
(*
*)
,0
22
-,1
89
(*
*)
-,0
14
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
.
,0
12
 
,0
00
,1
67
,0
00
,4
11
  
G
en
de
r 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
44
(*
)
1,
00
0 
-,0
09
,0
16
,0
68
(*
*)
,0
09
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
12
. 
,5
93
,3
88
,0
00
,6
54
  
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,1
06
(*
*)
-,0
09
 
1,
00
0
-,1
98
(*
*)
,1
12
(*
*)
,0
37
(*
)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,5
93
 
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
28
  
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,0
22
,0
16
 
-,1
98
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,0
83
(*
*)
-,1
73
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,1
67
,3
88
 
,0
00
.
,0
00
,0
00
  
Fu
tu
re
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,1
89
(*
*)
,0
68
(*
*)
 
,1
12
(*
*)
-,0
83
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,2
52
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
  
Kr
em
lin
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
14
,0
09
 
,0
37
(*
)
-,1
73
(*
*)
,2
52
(*
*)
1,
00
0
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,4
11
,6
54
 
,0
28
,0
00
,0
00
.
*  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
**
  C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
 
 
15
7 
 
 
Ex
it 
Po
ll 
19
99
 
  
Ag
e 
G
en
de
r 
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
Au
th
or
ita
ri
an
is
m
 
Kr
em
lin
 
Ke
nd
al
l's
 ta
u_
b 
Ag
e 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
1,
00
0
-,0
58
(*
*)
-,0
11
,2
18
(*
*)
-,2
68
(*
*)
-,0
85
(*
*)
-,0
39
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
.
,0
00
,2
59
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
  
G
en
de
r 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
58
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,0
11
-,0
64
(*
*)
,0
51
(*
*)
,1
66
(*
*)
-,0
02
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
.
,3
02
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,8
69
  
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
11
,0
11
1,
00
0
,1
04
(*
*)
-,0
87
(*
*)
-,0
26
(*
)
,0
34
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,2
59
,3
02
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
12
,0
01
  
N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,2
18
(*
*)
-,0
64
(*
*)
,1
04
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,3
74
(*
*)
-,1
29
(*
*)
-,3
07
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
  
In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,2
68
(*
*)
,0
51
(*
*)
-,0
87
(*
*)
-,3
74
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,0
52
(*
*)
-,0
21
(*
)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
,0
39
  
Au
th
or
ita
ria
ni
sm
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
85
(*
*)
,1
66
(*
*)
-,0
26
(*
)
-,1
29
(*
*)
,0
52
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,1
09
(*
*)
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
12
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
  
Kr
em
lin
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
39
(*
*)
-,0
02
,0
34
(*
*)
-,3
07
(*
*)
-,0
21
(*
)
,1
09
(*
*)
1,
00
0
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,8
69
,0
01
,0
00
,0
39
,0
00
.
**
  C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
*  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
 
 
15
8 
  
 
 
Ex
it 
Po
ll 
20
03
 
  
Ag
e 
G
en
de
r 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
Au
th
or
ita
ri
an
is
m
 
Kr
em
lin
 
Ke
nd
al
l's
 ta
u_
b 
Ag
e 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
1,
00
0
-,0
71
(*
*)
-,1
17
(*
*)
 
-,0
54
(*
*)
,2
43
(*
*)
-,1
63
(*
*)
-,0
19
(*
*)
-,1
55
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
.
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
09
,0
00
 
  
G
en
de
r 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
71
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,0
35
(*
*)
 
,0
33
(*
*)
-,0
29
(*
*)
,0
49
(*
*)
,0
15
-,0
26
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
.
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
01
,0
00
,0
67
,0
02
 
  
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,1
17
(*
*)
-,0
35
(*
*)
1,
00
0 
-,2
11
(*
*)
-,1
30
(*
*)
,1
70
(*
*)
-,0
38
(*
*)
,0
89
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
. 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
 
  
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
54
(*
*)
,0
33
(*
*)
-,2
11
(*
*)
 
1,
00
0
,0
75
(*
*)
-,0
79
(*
*)
,0
24
(*
*)
-,0
59
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
 
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
02
,0
00
 
  
N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
,2
43
(*
*)
-,0
29
(*
*)
-,1
30
(*
*)
 
,0
75
(*
*)
1,
00
0
-,1
44
(*
*)
,0
29
(*
*)
-,5
51
(*
*)
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
01
,0
00
 
,0
00
.
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
 
  
In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,1
63
(*
*)
,0
49
(*
*)
,1
70
(*
*)
 
-,0
79
(*
*)
-,1
44
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,1
89
(*
*)
,0
03
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
00
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
.
,0
00
,6
73
 
  
Au
th
or
ita
ria
ni
sm
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,0
19
(*
*)
,0
15
-,0
38
(*
*)
 
,0
24
(*
*)
,0
29
(*
*)
,1
89
(*
*)
1,
00
0
,0
04
 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
09
,0
67
,0
00
 
,0
02
,0
00
,0
00
.
,6
22
 
  
Kr
em
lin
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
-,1
55
(*
*)
-,0
26
(*
*)
,0
89
(*
*)
 
-,0
59
(*
*)
-,5
51
(*
*)
,0
03
,0
04
1,
00
0 
  
  
Si
g.
 (2
-ta
ile
d)
 
,0
00
,0
02
,0
00
 
,0
00
,0
00
,6
73
,6
22
. 
**
  C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
*  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
  
 
15
9 
A
pp
en
di
x 
H
 R
es
ul
ts
 fr
om
 lo
gi
st
ic
 re
gr
es
si
on
 w
ith
 p
ar
ty
 p
ai
rs
 (U
ns
ta
nd
ar
di
se
d 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s)
  
   * 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
5 
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
1 
So
ur
ce
: P
ol
iti
ca
l a
nd
 E
co
no
m
ic
 P
ro
bl
em
s R
us
si
a 
19
94
 T
he
 C
en
tra
l A
rc
hi
ve
 fo
r E
m
pi
ric
al
 S
oc
ia
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
(Z
A
) 
  
K
P
R
F 
V
R
 
K
P
R
F 
LD
P
R
 
K
P
R
F 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
LD
P
R
 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
V
R
 
LD
P
R
 
V
R
 
 
 
 
 
 N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
 
 1,
59
7*
* 
 
 0,
92
8*
* 
 1,
42
7*
* 
 -0
,5
50
**
 
 0,
18
4 
 0,
67
2*
* 
 
 
 
 
 In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
 
 -0
,4
70
 
 -0
,2
37
 
 -0
,3
34
 
 -0
,0
17
 
 -0
,0
99
 
 -0
,0
97
 
 
 
 
 
 A
ut
ho
rit
ar
ia
n 
 
 0,
04
2 
 -0
,8
20
**
 
 0,
13
3 
 -0
,6
97
**
 
 0,
07
3 
 0,
70
6*
* 
 
 
 
 
 K
re
m
lin
 
 
 -1
,1
57
**
 
 -0
,0
27
 
 -0
,8
37
* 
 0,
63
8*
* 
 -0
,5
01
**
 
 -1
,0
90
**
 
 
 
 
 
 In
iti
al
 -2
lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 
 24
7,
47
 
 39
2,
72
 
 26
0,
07
 
 44
8,
20
 
 54
6,
24
 
 47
3,
51
 
 
 
 
 
 M
od
el
 c
hi
 
sq
ua
re
 
 
 28
87
,0
7 
 
 81
,7
5 
 16
9,
04
 
 68
,7
8 
 38
,9
0 
 18
3,
35
 
 
 
 
 
 N
 
 
 41
5 
 35
1 
 31
1 
 37
6 
 44
0 
 48
0 
 
 
 
 
 
16
0 
   * 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
5 
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
1 
So
ur
ce
: M
on
ito
rin
g 
R
us
si
a 
19
96
  T
he
 C
en
tra
l A
rc
hi
ve
 fo
r E
m
pi
ric
al
 S
oc
ia
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
(Z
A
) 
         
K
P
R
F 
N
D
R
 
 
K
P
R
F 
LD
P
R
 
K
P
R
F 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
LD
P
R
 
Y
A
B
LO
KO
 
N
D
R
 
LD
P
R
 
N
D
R
 
 
 
 
 
 Fu
tu
re
 
 -0
,5
76
**
 
 -0
,2
62
 
 -0
,4
28
**
 
 0,
22
7 
 -0
,2
08
* 
 -0
,4
56
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 K
re
m
lin
 
 
 -1
,1
45
**
 
 -0
,0
68
 
 -0
,6
16
**
 
 0,
56
0*
 
 -0
,5
14
 
 -1
,0
84
**
 
 
 
 
 
 In
iti
al
 -2
lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 
 58
5,
01
 
 49
6,
41
 
 72
6,
07
 
 41
6,
10
 
 60
3,
84
 
 34
8,
75
 
 
 
 
 
 M
od
el
 c
hi
 
sq
ua
re
  
 
 19
9,
94
 
 
 4,
12
 
 53
,5
5 
 16
,5
9 
 54
,6
2 
 86
,2
3 
 
 
 
 
 N
 
 
 57
9 
 45
0 
 57
6 
 34
6 
 47
5 
 34
9 
 
 
 
 
 
16
1 
   * 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
5 
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
1 
So
ur
ce
: E
xi
t P
ol
l 1
99
9 
C
ES
SI
-R
us
si
a 
(I
ns
tit
ut
e 
fo
r c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
so
ci
al
 re
se
ar
ch
) a
nd
 M
ito
fs
ky
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l  
(U
SA
) 
 
K
P
R
F 
U
N
IT
Y
 
K
P
R
F 
LD
P
R
 
K
P
R
F 
Y
A
B
LO
 
K
P
R
F 
S
P
S
 
K
P
R
F 
O
V
R
 
U
N
IT
Y
 
S
P
S
 
U
N
IT
Y
 
O
V
R
 
U
N
IT
Y
 
LD
P
R
 
U
N
IT
Y
 
Y
A
B
LO
 
Y
A
B
LO
 
LD
P
R
 
Y
A
B
LO
 
S
P
S
 
Y
A
B
LO
 
O
V
R
 
S
P
S
 
O
V
R
 
S
P
S
 
LD
P
R
 
LD
P
R
 
O
V
R
 
 N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
 0,
67
2*
* 
 1,
01
0*
 
 1,
15
8*
 
 1,
20
9*
* 
 1,
14
8*
* 
 0,
79
7*
* 
 0,
73
8*
* 
 0,
49
4*
* 
 0,
69
6*
* 
 -0
,1
29
 
 0,
05
8 
 0,
04
0 
 0,
03
1 
 -0
,2
24
* 
 0,
14
6 
 In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
 -1
,6
40
**
 
 -1
,0
77
**
 
 -1
,4
77
**
 
 -1
,7
69
**
 
 -0
,9
63
**
 
 -0
,1
68
* 
 0,
68
7*
* 
 0,
48
2*
* 
 0,
23
4*
 
 0,
33
2*
 
 -0
,4
19
**
 
 0,
46
2*
* 
 0,
85
8*
* 
 0,
67
4*
* 
 0,
11
0 
 A
ut
ho
rit
ar
ia
n 
 -0
,6
45
**
 
 -0
,4
46
**
 
 -0
,1
94
 
 -0
,3
35
* 
 -0
,2
05
 
 0,
29
8*
 
 0,
46
9*
* 
 0,
17
1 
 0,
48
2*
* 
 -0
,2
27
* 
 -0
,1
63
 
 -0
,0
08
 
 0,
11
8 
 -0
,1
42
 
 0,
24
5*
 
 K
re
m
lin
 
 -1
,6
21
**
 
 -0
,2
91
* 
 -0
,2
35
* 
 -0
,9
41
**
 
 0,
01
5 
 0,
53
1*
* 
 1,
66
4*
* 
 1,
21
5*
* 
 1,
35
1*
* 
 -0
,0
90
 
 -0
,7
75
**
 
 0,
26
2*
 
 1,
06
9*
* 
 0,
65
7*
* 
 0,
34
4*
* 
 In
iti
al
 -2
lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 32
06
,6
1 
 16
98
,1
2 
 21
08
,5
1 
 17
74
,3
8 
 27
71
,8
6 
 29
09
,6
7 
 25
64
,2
8 
 17
94
,1
7 
 23
91
,0
2 
 13
28
,8
7 
 17
78
,6
3 
 19
56
,0
4 
 18
35
,9
0 
 13
05
,9
7 
 14
77
,3
0 
 M
od
el
 c
hi
 
sq
ua
re
 
 20
18
,3
5 
 39
0,
95
 
 81
3,
71
1 
 14
86
,7
8 
 59
1,
96
 
 23
0,
17
 
 67
2,
79
 
 22
9,
62
 
 42
7,
22
 
 25
,8
2 
 17
1,
56
 
 42
,9
8 
 35
7,
54
 
 15
8,
58
 
 19
,5
5 
 N
 
 37
75
 
 23
58
 
  2
62
0 
 27
47
 
 27
88
 
 25
70
 
 26
11
 
 21
81
 
 24
43
 
 10
26
 
 14
15
 
 14
56
 
 15
83
 
 11
53
 
 11
94
 
 
16
2 
   * 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
5 
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
,0
1 
So
ur
ce
 E
xi
t P
ol
l 2
00
3 
C
ES
SI
-R
us
si
a 
(I
ns
tit
ut
e 
fo
r c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
so
ci
al
 re
se
ar
ch
) a
nd
 M
ito
fs
ky
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l  
(U
SA
) 
 
 K
P
R
F 
U
R
 
 K
P
R
F 
LD
P
R
 
 K
P
R
F 
Y
A
B
LO
 
 K
P
R
F 
S
P
S
 
 K
P
R
F 
R
O
D
IN
 
 U
R
 
S
P
S
 
 U
R
 
R
O
D
IN
 
 U
R
 
LD
P
R
 
 U
R
 
Y
A
B
LO
 
 LD
P
R
 
R
O
D
IN
 
 Y
A
B
LO
 
LD
P
R
 
 Y
A
B
LO
 
S
P
S
 
 Y
A
B
LO
 
R
O
D
IN
 
 S
P
S
 
R
O
D
IN
 
 S
P
S
 
LD
P
R
 
 N
os
ta
lg
ia
 
 0,
66
5*
* 
 0,
99
0*
* 
 1,
02
9*
* 
 1,
07
8*
* 
 0,
60
0*
* 
 0,
73
6*
* 
 0,
06
6 
 0,
49
1*
* 
 0,
66
9*
* 
 -0
,3
79
**
 
 -0
,1
17
 
 0,
08
5 
 -0
,4
70
**
 
 -0
,5
22
**
 
 -0
,1
85
* 
 In
di
vi
du
al
is
m
 
 -0
,1
96
**
 
 -0
,2
32
**
 
 -0
,8
85
**
 
 -0
,8
16
**
 
 -0
,2
84
**
 
 -0
,6
78
**
 
 -0
,0
97
* 
 0,
08
1 
 -0
,6
56
**
 
 -0
,1
08
 
 0,
63
4*
* 
 -0
,0
61
 
 0,
56
8*
* 
 0,
57
6*
* 
 0,
64
2*
* 
 A
ut
ho
rit
ar
ia
n 
 0,
12
4*
 
 0,
02
6 
 0,
70
6*
* 
 0,
41
8*
* 
 0,
30
3*
* 
 0,
26
8*
* 
 0,
22
9*
* 
 -0
,1
18
* 
 0,
48
1*
* 
 0,
32
2*
* 
 -0
,5
77
**
 
 -0
,1
69
* 
 -0
,2
44
* 
 0,
10
1 
 -0
,3
52
**
 
 K
re
m
lin
 
 -1
,9
20
**
 
 -0
,1
24
 
 -0
,3
01
**
 
 -0
,9
82
**
 
 -0
,3
78
**
 
 0,
78
8*
* 
 1,
40
0*
* 
 1,
66
7*
* 
 1,
61
0*
* 
 -0
,2
34
**
 
 0,
12
6 
 -0
,7
04
**
 
 -0
,1
11
 
 0,
56
1*
* 
 0,
79
8*
* 
 In
iti
al
 -2
lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 52
00
,1
0 
 39
66
,7
9 
 23
30
,2
56
 
 19
49
,5
4 
 38
75
,7
3 
 38
25
,4
2 
 52
83
,7
6 
 55
60
,7
5 
 34
72
,4
4 
 36
87
,3
2 
 25
63
,5
8 
 18
7,
24
 
 24
40
,4
0 
 22
7,
55
 
 23
85
,5
1 
 M
od
el
 c
hi
 
sq
ua
re
  
 21
85
,2
8 
 42
9,
46
4 
 65
4,
19
7 
 10
72
,8
0 
 28
1,
57
4 
 37
2,
12
3 
 75
4,
90
5 
 92
0,
77
3 
 66
5,
24
9 
 65
,7
29
 
 16
7,
15
7 
 12
8,
53
4 
 16
9,
03
8 
 41
3,
15
1 
 37
8,
59
4 
 N
 
 61
65
 
 32
31
 
 24
30
 
 24
31
 
 28
65
 
 52
52
 
 56
86
 
 60
52
 
 52
51
 
 27
52
 
 23
17
 
 15
17
 
 19
51
 
 19
52
 
 23
18
 
